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TRANSMITTAL LETTER
To the President, Congress, Secretary of State and the American People:
Established in 1948, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) is authorized pur
suant to Public Law 114- 113 to appraise all U.S. government efforts to understand, inform and in
fluence foreign publics. We achieve this goal in a variety of ways, including, among other efforts,
offering policy recommendations, and through our Comprehensive Annual Report, which tracks
how the roughly $1.8 billion in appropriated funds is spent on public diplomacy efforts throughout
the world.
Part of the Commission’s mandate is to help the State Department prepare for cutting edge and
transformative changes, which have the potential to upend how we think about engaging with
foreign publics. This report aims to achieve precisely that. In order to think carefully about public
diplomacy in this ever and rapidly changing communications space, the Commission convened a
group of private sector, government, and academic experts at Stanford University’s Hoover Insti
tution to discuss the latest research and trends in strategic communication in digital spaces. The
results of that workshop, refined by a number of follow-on interviews and discussions with other
organizations interested in similar questions, are included in this report.
Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet? features essays by workshop participants that focus on
emergent and potentially transformative technology and communication patterns. The essays also
highlight the potential challenges and opportunities these changes create for public diplomacy
practitioners in particular and the U.S. government more broadly. We explore how public diplo
macy practitioners can continue to productively engage with audiences around the world in the
face of likely shifts in communication patterns, continue to effectively and efficiently help the United
States to achieve its foreign policy priorities, and synchronize American interests with the interests
of citizens and governments around the world.
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FORWARD: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN A POST-TRUTH SOCIETY
Modern electronic communication is transforming the spread and impact of
ideas in unpredictable ways. Individuals and organizations can now share information widely and instantly at no cost, bypassing conventional media and
its traditional role in curating news, focusing civic agendas, and moderating
debate.
While technological advances have enabled broader participation in public
discussion, they have also fractured it into silos where dubious assertions
and accusations can reverberate unchallenged. Fake news is disseminated for profit or political advantage. Extremists have new forums in which to
spread hatred and lies with impunity. And foreign actors influence domestic
policy undetected. Compounding the problems, individuals have little ability
to discern the identity of interlocutors or basis for distinguishing fact from
fiction.
The speed and scale of today’s “weaponization of information” is unprecedented. Propelled by novelty, falsehood often travels faster than truth, leaving context and provenance behind. The traditional answer to the spread of
bad information has been to inject good information into the mix, on the assumption that the truth would rise to the top. But in a world of trolls and bots,
where simple facts are instantly countered by automated agents, this strategy may not be adequate. It is unclear how effectively democratic societies
can continue to deliberate and function, and how hostile foreign actors can
be identified and neutralized.
I’m thrilled to have been supportive of the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy’s work, in conjunction with Stanford’s Hoover Institution, on better
understanding how the U.S. government can get its messages out and connect with foreign audiences in this challenging and remarkable era of globally-networked communications.

Francis Fukuyama
Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the Mosbacher Director of FSI’s Center
on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
By Shawn Powers, Executive Director of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy
Scientific progress continues to accelerate, and while we’ve witnessed a revolution in communication technologies in the past ten years, what proceeds in the next ten years may be far more transformative. It may
also be extremely disruptive, challenging long held conventions behind public diplomacy (PD) programs and
strategies. In order to think carefully about PD in this ever and rapidly changing communications space, the
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD) convened a group of private sector, government, and academic experts at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution to discuss the latest trends in research on strategic
communication in digital spaces. The results of that workshop, refined by a number of follow-on interviews
and discussions, are included in this report. I encourage you to read each of the fourteen essays that follow,
which are divided into three thematic sections: Digital’s Dark Side, Disinformation, and Narratives.
Digital’s Dark Side focuses on the emergence of social bots, artificial intelligence, and computational propaganda. Essays in this section aim to raise awareness regarding how technology is transforming the nature
of digital communication, offer ideas for competing in this space, and raise a number of important policy and
research questions needing immediate attention. The Disinformation section confronts Oxford English Dictionary’s 2016 word of the year – “post-truth” – with a series of compelling essays from practitioners, a social
scientist, and philosopher on the essential roles that truth and facts play in a democratic society. Here, theory,
research, and practice neatly align, suggesting it is both crucial and effective to double-down on fact-checking and evidence-based news and information programming in order to combat disinformation campaigns
from our adversaries. The Narrative section concludes the report by focusing on how technology and facts
are ultimately part of, and dependent on, strategic narratives. Better understanding how these narratives
form, and what predicts their likely success, is necessary to think through precisely how PD can, indeed, survive the Internet. Below are some key takeaways from the report.

IN DEFENSE OF TRUTH

•

We are not living in a “post-truth” society. Every generation tends to think that the current generation
is less honest than the previous generation. This is an old human concern, and should be seen today
as a strategic narrative (see Hancock, p. 49; Roselle, p. 77). Defending the value and search for truth is
crucial. As Jason Stanley notes (p. 71), “without truth, there is just power.”

•

Humans are remarkably bad at detecting deception. Studies show that people tend to trust what others say, an effect called the truth bias. This bias is actually quite rational—most of the messages that a
person encounters in a day are honest, so being biased toward the truth is almost always the correct
response (see Hancock, p. 49).

•

At the same time people are also continuously evaluating the validity of their understanding of the
world. This process is called “epistemic vigilance,” a continuous process checking that the information that a person believes they know about the world is accurate. While we have a difficult time detecting deception from interpersonal cues, people can detect lies when they have the time, resources,
and motivation. Lies are often discovered through contradicting information from a third source, or
evidence that challenges a deceptive account (see Hancock, p. 49).

•

Fact checking can be effective, even in hyper-partisan settings (see Porter, p. 55), and is crucial for sustained democratic dialogue (Bennett, p. 61; Stanley, p. 71). Moreover, it is possible, using digital tools, to
detect and effectively combat disinformation campaigns in real time (Henick and Walsh, p. 65).
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COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA

•

Computational propaganda refers to the coordinated use of social media platforms, autonomous
agents and big data directed towards the manipulation of public opinion.

•

Social media bots (or “web robots”) are the primary tools used in the dissemination of computational
propaganda. In their most basic form, bots provide basic answers to simple questions, publish content on a schedule or disseminate stories in response to triggers (e.g. breaking news). Bots can have
a disproportionate impact because it is easy to create a lot of them and they can post a high-volume
content at a high frequency (see Woolley, p. 13).

•

Political bots aim to automate political engagement in an attempt to manipulate public opinions. They
allow for massive amplification of political views and can empower a small group of people to set
conversation agenda’s online. Political bots are used over social media to manufacture trends, game
hashtags, megaphone particular content, spam opposition and attack journalists. The noise, spam
and manipulation inherent in many bot deployment techniques threaten to disrupt civic conversations
and organization worldwide (see Chessen, p. 19).

•

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) – an evolving constellation of technologies enabling computers
to simulate cognitive processes – will soon enable highly persuasive machine-generated communications. Imagine an automated system that uses the mass of online data to infer your personality, political preferences, religious affiliation, demographic data and interests. It knows which news websites
and social media platforms you frequent and it controls multiple user accounts on those platforms.
The system dynamically creates content specifically designed to plug into your particular psychological frame and achieve a particular outcome (see Chessen, p. 39).

•

Digital tools have tremendous advantages over humans. Once an organization creates and configures a sophisticated AI bot, the marginal cost of running it on thousands or millions of user accounts
is relatively low. They can operate 24/7/365 and respond to events almost immediately. AI bots can be
programmed to react to certain events and create content at machine speed, shaping the narrative
almost immediately. This is critical in an information environment where the first story to circulate
may be the only one that people recall, even if it is untrue (see Chessen, p. 39)

•

PD practitioners need to consider the question of how they can create and sustain meaningful conversations and engagements with audiences if the mediums typically relied upon are becoming less
trusted, compromised and dominated by intelligent machines.

•

Challenging computational propaganda should include efforts to ensure the robustness and integrity of the marketplace of information online. Defensively, this strategy would focus on producing
patterns of information exchange among groups that would make them difficult to sway using techniques of computational propaganda. Offensively, the strategy would seek to distribute the costs of
counter-messaging broadly, shaping the social ecosystem to enable alternative voices to effectively
challenge campaigns of misinformation (see Hwang, p. 27). In the persuasive landscape formed by
social media and computational propaganda, it may be at times more effective to build tools, rather
than construct a specific message.

•

Practitioners are not alone in their concern about the escalating use of social bots by adversarial
stateactors.Theprivatesectoris, too.Socialmediaplatforms seethistrendasapotentiallyexistential
threatto their business models, especially if the rise of bots and computational propaganda weakens
users’ trust in the integrity of the platforms themselves. Coordination with private sector is key, as
theirpoliciesgoverningautonomousbotswilladaptand,thus,shapewhatisandisn’tfeasibleonline.

3

4

ACPD | Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet?

MOVING PAST “FOLK THEORIES”

•

Folk theories, or how people think a particular process works, are driving far too many digital strategies. One example of a folk theory is in the prevalence of echo chambers online, or the idea that people
are increasingly digitally walled off from one another, engaging only with content that fits cognitive
predispositions and preferences.

•

Research suggests that the more users rely on digital platforms (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) for their
news and information, the more exposure they have to a multitude of sources and stories. This remains true even among partisans (though to a lesser extent than non-partisans). It turns out we haven’t digitally walled ourselves off after all (see Henick and Walsh, p. 65).

•

Despite increased exposure to a pluralistic media ecosystem, we are becoming more and more ideological and partisan, and becoming more walled off at the interpersonal and physical layers. For example, marriages today are twice as likely to be between two people with similar political views than
they were in 1960.

•

Understanding this gap between a robustly diverse news environment and an increasingly “siloed”
physical environment is crucial to more effectively engaging with target audiences around the world.
Interpersonal and in-person engagement, including exchange programs, remain crucial for effective
PD moving forward (see Wharton, p. 7)

•

Despite this growing ideological divide, people are increasingly willing to trust one another, even complete strangers, when their goals are aligned (see the sharing economy, for example). This creates
interesting opportunities for PD practitioners. Targeting strategies based on political attitudes or profiles may overshadow the possibility of aligned goals on important policy and social issues (see Hancock, p. 49)

RETHINKING OUR DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND METRICS

•

Virality – the crown jewel in the social media realm – is overemphasized often at the expense of more
important metrics like context and longevity. Many of the metrics used to measure the effectiveness
of social media campaigns are vulnerable to manipulation, and more importantly, don’t measure engagement in any meaningful way. These metrics were built for an industry reliant on advertising for
revenue generation, and as a result, may not be well-suited when applied to the context of PD (see
Ford, p. 33; Woolley, p. 13).

•

Overemphasizing certain metrics, such as reach or impressions, fails to account for the risks created by relaying on the same portals as other, less truthful and more nefarious actors. We need to be
cautious and aware of the various ways in which the digital media business industries are shaping PD
content, be aware of the risks, and think carefully about safeguarding the credibility U.S. Department
of State PD programs operating in this space (see Wharton, p. 7; Ford, p. 33).

STRATEGIC NARRATIVES

•

Strategic narratives—a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present
and future of politics in order to shape the behavior of other actors.” They provide the ideological
backdrop for how audiences assess the meaning and significance of current events and breaking
news. Put another way, they help people make sense of what would otherwise be a dizzying onslaught
of newstheyare exposedto on a daily basis (see Roselle, p. 77; Kounalakis, p. 91).
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•

Crafting effective narratives require a genuine consensus-even if limited or temporary-on our policy
priorities and their underlying values, as well as a detailed understanding and appreciation of local
grievances and concerns about the related policy issue (see. Wharton, p. 7; Roselle. P. 77). As such,
effective strategic narratives must be mutually constructed.

•

Rather than focusing on trending news topics and stories alone, we need to develop greater capacity
to understand competing public narratives in foreign contexts and track how they adapt over time.
Understanding distinctions between system (or governance), value, and identity narratives would allow PD practitioners to construct policy narratives that speak to, or at least acknowledge, the underlying pillars of belief in a given community (see Walker, p. 83; Roselle, p. 77).

•

Every new administration creates new opportunities for foreign engagement. A shift towards a more
transactionalapproachtoPD,focusedlessonvaluesbutmoreonsharedpolicypriorities,could allow
for improved relations and cooperation with a number of countries previously hostile to American PD
efforts and programs (see Kounalakis, p. 91).
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Bruce Wharton at TechCampWarsaw, Photo by U.S. Embassy Warsaw

REMARKS ON “PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
INAPOST-TRUTHSOCIETY”
By Bruce Wharton, Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Stanford, California
March 20, 2017
NearlysixdecadesagoHerbertHooversaidhewanted the Hoover Institution “to sustain for America the
safeguards of the American way of life,” so it is fitting that we have gathered here today to debate a
pressing challenge for both our nation and the world
community – the idea of a “Post-Truth Society.” I am
grateful to the Hoover Institution and to the U.S. Advisory Commission forPublicDiplomacyforbringing
us together forthis important discussion.

In such a world, the public policy debate is framed
largely by what “feels” true and what correlates with
people’s pre-existing set of beliefs and prejudices,
which can often be disconnected from actual facts
and the specifics of policy. It isn’t so much that facts
are dismissed entirely, but rather they are of secondary importance or simply not as compelling, especially when they challenge what feels true at an instinctual level. In this context, all opinions have equal weight,
regardless of how extreme they may be.

“POST-TRUTH” SOCIETY

While this is not a new concept — it has played a role
in politics since antiquity — in our age, social media
has exacerbated the problem, accelerating the speed
at which false stories spread, creating “digital wildfires” of misinformation. By the time a false story is
out there, it is often too late to mount an effective rebuttal based on facts.

There has been much discussion in the media, academia, and within the U.S. government about living
in a “post-truth” or “post-factual” society and how to
operate in it. Much was made of Oxford Dictionary’s
decision to make “post-truth” the Word of the Year
in 2016, an adjective they defined as “relating to or
denoting circumstances in which objective facts are
less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals
to emotion and personal belief.”

Compounding the problem is the active work of nonstate and state actors who aim not only to dissemi-
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nate misinformation but, most damaging, to erode
trust in traditional sources of information. These actors — whom Get Smart fans might collectively call
“KAOS” — do not necessarily want people to believe
they are telling the truth, but rather to think that no
one is. Their goal is to diminish public trust in government institutions, established media outlets, and subject matter experts, leaving citizens open to the influence of an onslaught of questionable information
generated through re-enforcing social media loops.
While there is much that is accurate about this description, I would like to contest the view that we are
living in a “post-truth” society — if by that we mean
truth and facts no longer matter. Facts do exist. They
are out there; we cannot operate without them. And
theyremaincompelling when theyarepart ofa larger
truth-based narrative that is backed up by supporting actions. Crafting and effectively putting forth that
narrative with foreign publics is the real challenge
of Public Diplomacy today. Making sure “our actions
match our words” is everyone’s challenge.

COMPETITION FROM PSEUDO-FACTS
As I said, I don’t think we are in a world beyond facts.
What we are facing now is intense competition at
all levels. Facts compete with pseudo-facts on substance, on speed, and for audiences’ attention. And
yes, people accept stories that “feel” true more readily than stories that challenge their beliefs. But they
accept them because they believe they are true.
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increased since a similar poll in 2014, and both people who voted to leave and to remain in the EU shared
much the same view.
On this side of the Atlantic, polling also shows that
Americans hunger for factual truth. According to a
study by the Media Insight Project, a partnership of
the American Press Institute and the AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, nearly 90 percent of
Americans say it is “extremely” or “very important”
that the media get its facts correct. Furthermore,
about 40 percent say they can remember a specific
incident that eroded their confidence in the media,
most often one involving inaccuracies or a perception
of one-sidedness, making factual accuracy the most
important component of public trust in journalism.
There are also dangers in accepting a post-truth paradigm. Communicators, experts, and officials may
feel overwhelmed and succumb to inaction or, worse,
be seduced into adopting “post-truth techniques”
that appeal only to emotion and sideline facts or challenging audiences’beliefs.
There is also the temptation to counter the barrage
of misinformation by attempting to rebut every false
story, but this is a losing proposition. There are too
many of them, they spread too quickly, and there are
too few of us to chase them.
A paper published by RAND in 2016, titled “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model,”
made three important observations: 1) people tend to
believe something when it is repeated, 2) propagan-

“The way to counter pseudo-facts and misinformation is to present a compelling narrative of our own”
Brexit is often cited as an example of the post-truth
phenomenon — with a leading pro-exit member of
Parliament famously saying that “people in this country have had enough of experts.” But about the same
time, the Institute for Government, a British government organization, released a poll conducted by the
research firm Populus, indicating that 85 percent of
those surveyed wanted politicians to consult professionals and experts when making difficult decisions
and 83 percent wanted government to make decisions based on objective evidence. In the UK, trust
in experts and confidence in government have both

dists gain the advantage when they get to make the
first impression, and 3) subsequent rebuttals may actually work to reinforce the original misinformation,
rather than dissipate it. The paper’s conclusion is that
the most effective way to respond to misinformation
is not to counter every false story out there, but to
direct a “stream” of accurate messaging at whatever the firehose of falsehoods is aimed, in an effort to
lead the targeted audience in a more productive direction.
I agree with this approach and have so for years. The
waytocounter pseudo-factsandmisinformationisto
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present a compelling narrative of our own, one that
is true, defensible, and based on the enduring values
and goals that people share, not the least of which is
strengthening our collective security and prosperity.
To gain credibility and make our narrative relevant,
we must also listen to and acknowledge our audiences’ underlying fears, grievances, and beliefs.
But it is not just a matter of telling a good story; the
narrative must be tied to action.
A case in point is the history of space exploration in
this country, in particular the quest to put a man on
the moon. In the Cold War context, this effort was an
important security goal, one that required public support, resources, and full political commitment over
many years. In 1961, President Kennedy gave his historic speech before a joint session of Congress that
set the United States on a course to the moon, which
he followed with other speeches and public acts that
inspired not just the American people, but invited audiences around the globe to be part of this great endeavor. And foreign publics responded by embracing
U.S. aspirations on behalf of the human race. When
the entire planet watched Neil Armstrong alight from
the Eagle lunar module and utter the phrase “That’s
one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind,”
he distilled into these few words a decade-long narrative that fueled the imagination and hopes of billions around the world.
Another example is the Voice of America. I am glad
Amanda Bennet is here and will talk more about this
later, but something she said last week at a public
meeting on the Hill really struck me. She described
VOA as “exporting the First Amendment” – that is to
say, the value and importance that Americans place
on a free and independent press – by providing factbased, balanced reporting to millions of people in
closedsocietieseveryday.Wetalkaboutit,andwedo
it. Nothing is aspowerfulasa living example,andasa
Public Diplomacy practitioner, I could not be prouder
of the message, both literal and figurative, that VOA
delivers.
In short, we’ve got to “walk the talk,” or risk losing
credibility. This is not to say countering disinformation is easy. It requires strategic thought, creative
tactics, and sustained investment. The State Department and other parts of the federal government have
been focused on this issue for several years, and
analyzing how these efforts have fared is helping us
chart the way ahead.
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CASE STUDY – STATE’S APPROACH TO
FIGHTING EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we in government —
and those of you in academia and the think tank world
— were desperate to find explanations for what had
happened and, more importantly, to prevent something similar from happening again, with a particular
focus on containing and countering the appeal of violent extremist ideology.
All ideas were encouraged, and we pressed our people to think creatively and to try new approaches.
One approach aimed at mass appeal was the $15
million “Shared Values” campaign featuring Muslims
living happily in the United States. As well intended as
this was, the messaging did not acknowledge underlying grievances and was not considered effective in
reaching young Muslim audiences overseas.
Another idea you may remember from a just few
years ago was the “Welcome to ISIS Land” video,
which went viral for all the wrong reasons. It was
heavily criticized for embracing the enemy’s tactics and coming across as bullying. Most critically, it
proved to be ineffective as the U.S. government was
not a credible source of information for the intended audience, who only seemed to be alienated by the
message.
Hampering our efforts was an inability to measure
the impact of our work reliably. For instance, the
former Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), which was established in 2010
to counter extremist ideology, could point to the size
of its Facebook and Twitter followings — and the
number of death threats and efforts to shut down its
accounts were evidence that the center had gotten
under the skin of ISIS — but it could not measure effectiveness.As a result, itwasneverclear whether its
efforts reached those at risk of joining ISIS, let alone
diverted them from that path.
The CSCC was also under resourced. Its budget hovered in the range of $5-6 million per year, while the
Pentagon was spending about $150 million on similar efforts and the CIA even more. This situation even
emerged as a media story, with ABC News describing
the U.S. government’s messaging strategy to counter
extremist ideology as underfunded and ineffective.
Thisexperienceprovideduswithawealthofvaluable
lessons forcharting a new wayforward in countering
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false narratives, including:
• Not imitating the enemy,
• Having a credible message based on facts
and evidence that acknowledge underlying
grievances,
• Partnering with credible, independent, trusted messengers,
• Using technology to identify the right audiences and the best approaches for reaching
them,
• Employing analytics to evaluate effectiveness
and feeding that information back into the
process, and
• Securing political and bureaucratic support,
including sufficient funding and personnel.
On the technology front, I am particularly enthusiastic about the potential to use tools such as social
graph analysis (SGA) to help us identify credible individuals who drive and shape online opinion within e
ach country. Network analysis can provide information in two critical areas: 1) topics important to people
in target audiences and 2) the most uniquely influential people within those topical clusters. This information, which is used daily by business to analyze consumers’ tastes and persuade them to buy more, can
provide a clearer view for engaging target audiences
in partnership with the influencers they trust most.
We in the U.S. government are prohibited from using
such tools when the information of U.S. citizens is involved.

ANEWAPPROACH
The beneficiary of these lessons is the State Department’s new Global Engagement Center (GEC), which
is legislatively given the task “to lead, synchronize,
and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to
recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign
state and non-state propaganda and disinformation
efforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests.” In this role, the GEC leads the
interagency in developing a whole-of-government
approach to countering malign actors in the information space, seeking to fully leverage the strengths and
capabilities of each agency involved in this effort. A
key element to ensuring coordination and maximum
efficacy is an interagency synchronization meeting
hostedweeklybyGEC.
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The GEC also enjoys strong support on the Hill, from
both sides of the aisle. In fact, it was Congress that
expanded the GEC’s mandate — which originally focused solely on non-state actors — to include recognizing, understanding, and exposing state-sponsored
propaganda and disinformation and countering its
effects.
In terms of resources, the GEC is funded at approximately $16 million dollars for FY-17 and is slated to
have an additional $19.8 million in supplemental
funding in FY-18. Further, Congress has authorized –
although not mandated – the Department of Defense
to transfer up to $60 million a year, in both FY-17 and
FY-18,tosupportGECactivities.
We are focusing today on the importance of facts,
and central to the work of the GEC is injecting factual content into the information space to counter
violent extremist radicalization and recruitment.
Content is developed through collaborative, thematic
campaigns in coordination with the U.S. interagency
and with members of the Counter-ISIS Coalition and
other global partners. GEC support includes funding,
technical assistance, capacity building, and conceiving and implementing joint projects.
Using this approach, we have reduced direct engagement on violent extremism in favor of partner-driven messaging at the local level. These partners are
credible voices that can deliver messages that resonate with at-risk populations, such as NGOs, schools,
young people, social and civil society leaders, religious leaders, and governments.
Additionally, the GEC is utilizing data science from
both the public and private sectors — including
polling operations, audience studies, and academic
research — to identify and understand target audiences, to guide and inform the development of messaging and content, and to measure effectiveness.
For instance, the GEC’s “Defectors” campaign used
content from 14 Coalition countries that highlighted
the lived experiences of ISIS defectors and the effects of their recruitment on their families. In just one
week, the campaign reached 2.4 million people who
watched over one million minutes of video. Ultimately, the Defectors campaign reached seven million
individuals and garnered 780,000 “click-throughs”
from people identified as being at risk for recruitment by violent extremists. Despite the impressive
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numbers, the cost of this data-driven campaign was
only$15,000.
Of course, the GEC is still fairly new,so I look forward
to letting you know in future discussions how it is faring. But I think we are on the right track in countering
an ideology that trades in falsehoods byworking with
credible partners to present the facts and alternatives that are true.

CONCLUSION
Going back to my original premise, I respectfully disagree with the concept that we are living in a
“post-truth society.” What we are facing instead is increased competition from pseudo-facts, but the truth
is still valued, desired, and ultimately compelling. We
just need to find the right ways to communicate it.
And while some of my remarks have been focused
on the messaging component of Public Diplomacy,
we must remember that many other PD tools play
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chaff are vital. One way we are doing this is through
TechCamps focused on disinformation. These interactive workshops, led by technical experts, build the
capacity of key foreign influencers in civil society to
push back on fake news. A special fund dedicated to
incubating collaborative follow-on projects maximizes each workshop’s impact and has resulted in such
innovations as a one-stop data verification tool for
Ukrainian journalists to fact-check online media content.
To be truly effective, however, we must start at a
younger age. A recent study by Stanford showed
that students at most grade levels cannot tell the
difference between fake and real news as they often
lack the critical thinking skills needed to separate
truth from misinformation. Game theory has the potential to help us develop smarter ways to build the
fact-checking skills of students, and video games
could contain elements that help players of all ages
become more aware – and wary of – faux facts. This
realization has prompted some teachers across the

“Our challenges aretoobigand ourresources
too limited to go it alone.”
a vital role in sharing the truth, such as educational
and cultural exchanges, youth initiatives, and English
teaching programs. These types of people-to-people
interactions help reframe conversations on contentious issues, demonstrate the value of transparency,
and build trust with key audiences.
Finally,thereisonelastcriticalelementinthisdebate.
In addition to offering compelling, truthful narratives,
I believe we must also help foreign audiences targeted by concerted disinformation campaigns to better
understand the dangers of accepting everything at
facevalueandencouragethemtocultivatea“healthy
skepticism.” By this I do not mean to promote paranoia, simply vigilance. But how do we do this effectively when people, especially young people, are bombarded with so much dubious information? How do
we help them become healthy skeptics?
Training and education programs that both cultivate
a questioning mindset and build the skills of information consumers to separate the wheat from the

country to use games, such as Simon says, to help
students build these skills.
Beyond these ideas, I believe we should be asking
what economic mechanisms might be used to encourage skepticism and objective truths. Are there
known business models that reward honesty and penalize dishonesty? Perhaps some of you here may be
tempted to undertake research in these areas.
I look forward to discussing theseissues with you further, but before we open the floor for questions and
comments, I want to thank all of you for your interest
in, and support for,the work of Public Diplomacy. We
in government need your input, your ideas, and your
talent. Our challenges are too big and our resources
toolimitedto go it alone.Together,Iknow wecan successfully navigate the current sea of misinformation
and propaganda and find a productive path forward.
After all, we have truth on our side.
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COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA AND
POLITICAL BOTS: AN OVERVIEW
By Samuel C. Woolley, Director of Research, Oxford Internet Institute’s Computational Propaganda Project
Computational propaganda is best defined as the
assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous
agents and big data directed towards the manipulation of public opinion. Social media bots are the
primary tools used in the dissemination of computational propaganda. When bots are used to automate
political engagement in attempts to manipulate public opinion our team at the University of Oxford calls
them “political” bots. Political bots allow for massive
amplification of political views, they can empower a
small group of people to set conversation agenda’s
online. They are used over social media to manufacture trends, game hashtags, megaphone particular content, spam opposition and attack journalists.
When in the hands of powerful, well-resourced, political actors these automated tools can be used to both
boost and silence communication and organization
among citizens in both democratic and authoritarian
regimes.
Security experts argue that more than 10 percent of
content across social media websites, and 62 percent of all web traffic, is generated by bots—pieces
of computer code that automate human tasks online.
Bots dominate many mundane tasks on the internet,
from aiding in the generation of personal online news
preferences, to ad generation, to promoting matches

on social media platforms to undertake tasks and
mimic real users. Over the last four years, numerous
news outlets, from The New York Times to The Guardian,
have covered rising and evolving usage of bots. They
attempt to explain how these socially oriented automated scripts work in specific contexts, from the
world of online dating to that of real-time ad sharing. The ways bots are being deployed, however, are
evolving beyond social spheres to those discretely
political. Politicians, governments and military organizations have begun using a special variety of bot
software to manipulate political communication and
engagement, choke off debate and muddy political
issues.
Until roughly five years ago, social bots were mostly harnessed by technologically adept marketers to
send spam in the form of automatically tweeted advertising content. Politicians have taken note of and
emulated celebrity Twitter users’ tactics of purchasing massive amounts of bots to significantly boost
follower numbers. Militaries, state-contracted firms
and elected officials now use political bots to invasively spread various forms of propaganda and flood
newsfeeds with political spam. Recent research reveals the pervasive breadth of global political bot
use across online social networks. For instance, re-

“Security experts argue that more than 10
percent of content across social media websites,and62percentofallwebtraffic,isgenerated by bots”
on social media. News organizations now use bots
to track and disseminate breaking articles. Sites
like Wikipedia, which generate publically accessible
knowledge, use bots as an essential part of their labor force.
The latest social bots are automated software used

searchers at the University of Southern California
believe as many as 48 million accounts (around 15
percent) on Twitter are actually bots. This number is
a 7 percent increase from the projection of automated accounts that Twitter gave in an 2014 SEC report.
Moreover, bots have been the main tools for online
astroturf1 and smear campaigns during political mo-
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ments worldwide: the U.S. midterm elections of 2010,
the ongoing crisis in Syria, and the 2014–15 disputes
over Crimea.
Politically oriented bots are an emergent phenomena
and are amongst the most important recent innovations in political strategy and communication technology. Bots are prevalent and active in social media
conversations—and their presence in these spaces
continues to grow. The noise, spam and manipulation
inherent in many bot deployment techniques threaten to disrupt civic conversations and organization
worldwide.

QUESTIONS
Several questions are at the heart of research on
the automated tools known as “political” bots and on
their chief output, computational propaganda:
•

How does the use of this technology affect public
opinion, or behavior around voting and civic engagement?

•

What do internet-oriented companies, particularly social networking platforms like Twitter and
Facebook, do to track and curate political content
generated by bots?

•

How are bots used by or against other democratic institutions, particularly the free press and
non-governmental organizations, to generate or
influence content and communication?

•

How are bots challenging traditional notions
of agency in the field of science and technology
studies and traditional conceptualizations of “the
actor” as a unit of study in political communication?

UNDERSTANDING COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA
Relatively little academic work—especially empirical
research focusing on critical social considerations—
has been done on social bots and the processes
associated with them, within the social sciences.
Political automation, especially automation that challenges the foundations of civic life, is a significant
techno-cultural phenomenon. It is also one that was
unforeseen by the early 2000s social platform movement. The social ties of those who work within the

automation work must be studied to build knowledge
on the larger industries and organizations that dominate the digital sphere. To that end, more academic
work must be done to build understandings via firsthand interaction with the people who build and deploy political bots. As Markham and Baym argue, field
research and other qualitative methods are critical
to adding breadth in understandings of emergent
techno-social phenomena—particularly online.
Many computer and social scientists treat bot-generated traffic as a nuisance to be detected and managed, thus extant systems work to simply identify or
block accounts that appear to be running as automatic scripts. This approach is too simplistic and avoids
focusing on the larger, systemic problems presented
by political bot software. Political bots suppress free
expression and civic innovation via the demobilization of activist groups and the suffocation of democratic free speech. Political bots and computational
propaganda must, therefore, be better understood
for the sake of free speech and digitally mediated
civic engagement. The information that exists on political bots is disjointed and often isolated to specific,
country or election-oriented, events.

BOT TYPES AND CASES OF USE
Any taxonomy of social bots should begin by discussing the tasks for which public facing bots are built.
Within this discussion are questions about the capabilities and sophistication of these automated and
semi-automated social actors. A simple typology of
bots should be based upon technical input and communicative output. This method of distinction runs
on a scale from simple bots preprogrammed with
a corpus of simple phrases or words that are then
transmitted to internet viewers to smart bots using
machine learning tactics to scrape data from both
websites and crowd-sourced interactions to then
communicate with publics in a unique and, potentially, unforeseen way.
An example of a simple bot in the former category
could be a spam bot that sends out the same commercial link to users on a particular platform or an
art-oriented bot like @everyword that tweets all
words in the English language from the Oxford EnglishDictionaryoverasetperiodofyears.Microsoft’s
Tay is an example of a smart bot—what developers,
and indeed Microsoft itself, deem an “AI chat bot.”
Tay,regardless of the public relations nightmare she
caused for Microsoft, was built to learn from those
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around her. Her communicative and computational
functionality was somewhat rudimentary—she could
be prompted to reiterate phrases by simply being told
“Tay, repeat after me…”—but this machine learning,
crowd-sourcing, net-scraping bot is indicative of the
direction of similar social assistance/communication
software: Cortana, Siri, Viv, Google Now, Alexa and
others.
Another way of envisioning a typology of social bots
is through questions of transparency. Simply put, is
the bot transparently a bot or does it pretend to be
human? The last five years have seen a rise in the socio-political use of bots that pass themselves off as
human—both implicitly through a lack of bot identifying information and explicitly by claiming outright to
be human—in attempts to manipulate public opinion,
stymie activism and perpetuate trolling of opposi-

tion. There are three general types of transparency
when it comes to bots: 1) transparent bots—bots that
are clearly labeled as bots (e.g., @sortingbot, which
sorts Twitter users into Hogwarts houses); 2) semitransparent bots—those that claim to be bots, but
are human-like or that have real-time dual human/
computational input (e.g., Facebook’s “M,” which can
answer questions through automated computational
search or by accessing an in-house human team; or
Tay, which is a bot that acts like a teenage girl); and
3) nontransparentbots—botsthat claim tobe human
(e.g., the bots used by the Mexican government in attempts to sway public opinion during the 2012 presidential election).
A typology of political bots can be built that usefully
catalogues the most pervasive uses of bot technology
and reveals emergent patterns may be helpful. Gov-

Timeline of major developments in bots and their political use

Image credit: Samantha Shorey
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ernments and other political actors most generally
deployed political bots during elections or moments
of distinct, and country-specific, political conversation or crisis. For example, bots used in Venezuela
focused solely on attempts to manipulate public opinion in state. The Syrian government has reportedly
used bots to generate pro-regime propaganda targeted at both in state and external targets on Twitter
during the ongoing revolution. In both these cases,
bots were created in response to the local political
climate.
Though the ways in which political bots have been
used varies from country to country and political instance to political instance, there are three primary
types of political bots: 1) follower bots—those used to
boost political figures’ follower numbers and passively like or re-tweet content; 2) roadblock bots—those
used to spam hashtags associated with activists or
political opposition in order to shut down or interrupt
dissent via non-traditional communication channels;
and 3) propaganda bots—those used to mimic humans while sending out effusively positive information about an embattled government or politician or
to propagate negative attacks against the opposition.
Follower Bots: Follower bots have also been used
during elections and security crises to pad politicians’
social media follower lists. In these cases, politicians
buy bot followers—which mimic real human users—
in attempts to look more politically relevant or technologically savvy. There are several prominent examples, particularly in Western states. According to
Inside Croydon, UK political candidate Lee Jasper used
bots to boost the number of his Twitter followers in
order “to give a false impression of the popularity of
his campaign.” There was a similar bid by former U.S.
presidential candidate Mitt Romney in which political
bots were used for padding his social media followers. According to an NBC article, “[in] over 24 hours
starting July 21, the presumptive Republican nominee acquired nearly 117,000 followers—an increase
of about 17 percent.” This increase is so substantial
it is unlikely to have occurred naturally, through the
actions of human twitter users.
Roadblock Bots: During elections, roadblock bots
have been used to demobilize an opposing party’s
followers. In this case, the deployer sends out Twitter “bombs:” barrages of tweets from a multitude of
bot-driven accounts. These tweets co-opt tags commonly used by supporters of the opposing party and
re-tweet them thousands of times in an attempt to
prevent detractors from organizing. For instance, if a
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political actor notices that their opponent’s supporters consistently use the tag #freedomofspeech in organizational messages, then that actor might make
an army of bots to prolifically re-tweet this specific
tag. The effect of this is that the opponent’s supporters have a very difficult time searching common tags
in attempts to organize and communicate with their
fellows.
Propaganda Bots: Many cases of propaganda bot use
occurwhengovernmentstargetperceivedcyber-security threats or political-cultural threats from other
states. The most widely reported case of state-sanctioned propaganda bots occurred in Russia. In this
instance, Russian bots were allegedly used to promote regime ideals or combat anti-regime speech
against targets abroad. Chinese propaganda bots
have also attacked other countries and commercial
entities. Political actors in Azerbaijan, Iran and Morocco reportedly used propaganda bots in attempts
to combat anti-regime speech and promote the idealsof thestate.
Governments, politicians and contractors employ
combinations of both propaganda and roadblock
bots to attack in-state targets on social media. Descriptions of bot usage in Mexico are particularly
representative of this automated strategy. According to numerous sources, the Mexican government
has used Twitter bot armies to stifle public dissent
and effectively silence opposition through spam tactics. Peñabots, named after the Mexican President
Enrique Peña Nieto, have also been used to send out
pro-government propaganda. In Turkey, journalists
report that both President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
government and the opposition Republican People’s
Army have used political bots against one another
in efforts to spread propaganda, fight criticism and
block dissent.
In China, and in the Chinese administrative regions of
Tibet and Taiwan, bots have been used to quash sovereignty movements while promoting state ideals.
According to journalist Brian Krebs, “Tibetan sympathizers […] noticed that several Twitter hashtags
related to the conflict—including #tibet and #freetibet—are now so constantly inundated with junk
tweets from apparently automated Twitter accounts
that the hashtags have ceased to become a useful
way to track the conflict.”
Propaganda bots have been used during elections
to send out pro-government or pro-candidate social
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media messages. The New York Times points to South
Korean state prosecutors’ allegations that “agents
from the National Intelligence Service of South Korea posted more than 1.2 million Twitter messages
last year to try to sway public opinion in favor of Park
Geun-hye, then a presidential candidate, and her
party ahead of elections in 2012.” Geun-hye eventually won the presidency, but the intelligence chief
in charge of the bot-driven effort was jailed and remains in prison. Geun-hye has since been ousted and
indictedon chargesin ofwidespreadcorruption.
Our team at Oxford has also found that political
bots—automated accounts used over social media
to spread political content—had a significant role in
spreading information and misinformation during
the U.K.’s Brexit referendum. Our report on Twitter
and Brexit found that the family of hashtags associated with the argument for leaving the EU dominated
both general conversation. Parts of this conversation
were driven by armies of political bots messaging effusively in support of the “leave” side. Furthermore, we
found that less than 1 percent of sampled accounts—
most of them highly automated—generated almost
one-third of all messages about the leave campaign.
More work, however, needs to be done to determine
whether the use of political bots had a specific effect
upon electoral outcomes: did automated messaging
change the way people voted?

CONCLUSION
The study of computational propaganda is, by its
very nature, a transdisciplinary endeavor. Such work
necessitates a combination of disciplinary and professional input from fields ranging from psychology to information science, public policy to machine
learning, political science to sociology. The spread
of political bots, and associated content from mis-
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information to intimidation, complicates the ways in
which politics are conducted and perceived both on
and offline. While tools, such as BotorNot and Twitter
Audit, are able to determine an account or users automation levels, they are not equipped for doing the
deeper work of uncovering coordinated attacks or
botnets. No effective tools currently exist for uncovering who proliferates political bot attacks or where
attacks originate. There is also a need for basic understandings of how the use of political bots plays out
in both local and comparative contexts. Our project at
Oxford is currently working on a series of case studies, to be released in mid-June 2017, that will analyze
the role of bots across several countries. This report
will provide key insight into the ways this technology
is being developed and deployed, but also regulated
and resisted, in Europe, North America, South America, Africa and Asia.
More work needs to be done to study the effects
of computational propaganda. Though social media platforms, and tools like political bots, are being
harnessed to spread misinformation in attempts to
manipulate public opinion, little is known about how
their use changes actual voting behavior or more fluid aspects of public life such as citizens’ conceptions
of a particular candidate or issue. Global policy makers, academics, technology professionals and others
must work together to build continued understandings of this rapidly progressing phenomenon.
Moreover, these same actors and their communities
must begin to generate solutions to the problems of
computational propaganda. Hypothetical fixes, including both defensive and offensive measures, must
transcend pure technological or social solutionism
and combine both software tools and media literacy—and other, yet unforeseen and unconsidered approaches and efforts—in order to succeed.

ENDNOTES
1.

Astroturfing refers to the practice of masking the sponsors of a message or organization (e.g., political, advertising, religious or
public relations) to make it appear as though it originates from and is supported by a grassroots participant(s).
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UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
By Matt Chessen, Foreign Service Science, Technology and Foreign Policy Fellow at The George
Washington University
Machine-driven communications tools (MADCOMs)
are frequently used by a variety of actors to spread
ideas online. Computational propagandists increasingly use these tools for influence and disinformation.
Their effectiveness is based on principles from cognitive psychology and the science of persuasion. This
paper is a companion piece to the accompanying
articles on computational propaganda, MADCOMs
and artificial intelligence tools and will illustrate how
these technologies exploit persuasive techniques.

•

Companies use MADCOMs for marketing,
persuading you to purchase their product or
service. They also use MADCOMs for customer service and as human-like “faces” for fulfilling back-end business processes.

•

Politicians use MADCOMS to create the appearance of massive grassroots support
(astroturfing), to amplify messages and suppress opposition communications.

•

Terrorist and hate groups use MADCOMs to
spread their messages of intolerance, to suppress opposition efforts and to identify new
recruits.

•

Nations use MADCOMs for public diplomacy,
service delivery, propaganda, counter-messaging, disinformation, espionage, democracy suppression and intimidation. In the
future, networks of competing, state-sponsored artificial intelligence MADCOMs will
use human-like speech to dominate the information-space and capture the attention of
the most online users.

MACHINE DRIVEN COMMUNICATION
TOOLS (MADCOMS)
The most commonly used MADCOMs are simple bots
(web robots) that post content on social media, websites, comment sections and the like.1 Their current
capabilities are limited to providing basic answers
to simple questions, publishing content on a schedule or disseminating content in response to triggers.
However, bots can have a disproportionate impact
because it is easy to create a lot of them and bots can
post content with high volume and high frequency.
Little expertise is required to run simple bots. An individual can easily operate hundreds of Twitter bots
with minor technical knowledge using readily available hardware and software. Bots and other MADCOMs are currently used by corporations, politicians,
hackers, individuals, state-sponsored groups, NGOs
and terrorist organizations in an effort to influence
conversations online. Bot users’ goals are myriad:
•

Individuals use MADCOMs for many purposes, including making profits, making the
world a better place or making mischief.

•

Academics use MADCOMs to network with
their communities, share ideas and conduct
research.

•

Organizations use MADCOMs to gain support
for their causes, inform a wider range of people, and connect disparate and dispersed activist groups.

In short, all groups may use MADCOMs for political
purposes, including persuasion, disinformation, astroturfing, undermining speech, intimidation, doxing
and distraction from politically inconvenient topics.

A SIMPLE TAXONOMY OF
MACHINE-DRIVEN DISINFORMATION
AND PROPAGANDA
Computational propaganda is a new term for the
use of machine-driven communication tools and associated technologies for political purposes. These
purposes can range from relatively benign amplification of political messages to insidious state-sponsored trolling and disinformation. Computational
propaganda typically uses simple bots to influence
conversations online. These bots operate on social
media user accounts that may have sophisticated,
human-like profiles.
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“Security experts argue that more than 10
percent of content across social media websites,and62percentofallwebtraffic,isgenerated by bots”
Bots typically follow three general patterns of behavior:

HOW MACHINES EXPLOIT VULNERABILITIES IN HUMAN MINDS

•

Propaganda bots attempt to persuade and influence by spreading truths, half-truths and outright fake news in a high volume or in response
to triggers (e.g., keywords or a politician’s tweet).

•

Follower bots fake the appearance of broad support for an idea or person. They can hijack algorithms that determine trending news or trending
people by generating “likes” for content or by following users en masse.

Computational propaganda has its roots in traditional propaganda, cognitive psychology and the science
of persuasion. Computational propaganda tools exploit a number of traditional theories of influence and
persuasion, including:

•

Roadblock bots undermine speech by diverting
conversations. This could be relatively benign—
like nationalist cheerleading or a “look at this cat
video” type of distraction. Or it could be more insidious—like spamming hashtags used by activists so their topical conversations and coordination are overwhelmed with gibberish.

At their most extreme, bots are used to troll/intimidate journalists, activists and others into silence by
bombarding them with thousands of threatening
or hateful messages. (Note: for more information
on computational propaganda, see the accompanying papers by Samuel Woolley, Tim Hwang and Matt
Chessen).
Computational propaganda techniques have also
been combined with more traditional hacking methods—like disclosures of information from politician
email accounts or distributed denial of service attacks on election monitoring websites and apps—
and are typically used as elements of a larger information strategy.2

•

Variety of sources: Multiple sources, preferably presenting different arguments leading
to the same conclusion, are more persuasive
than single-channel, single-message campaigns.3 And the volume of different arguments supporting a conclusion are more important than the quality of the actual individual
arguments.4 Bots allow propagandists to use
thousands of social media accounts to circulate a high volume of messages from multiple
online sources using text, images and video,
all pointing to the same conclusion. Bots can
outperform humans by posting content consistently throughout the day, or by spamming
high-volume content in response to specific
triggers. This constant repetition of themes
through multiple channels creates the appearance of consensus.

•

Number, volume and variety of endorsements:
Endorsement by large numbers of users, regardless of their individual credibility, boosts
persuasiveness.5 In information rich environments, people favor the opinions of highly
endorsed users over experts.6 Follower bots
allow propagandists to generate high-volume
likes and follows for selected content and users. Propaganda bot networks will retweet
and share content among machine-driven accounts, creating the perception of mass support. This astroturfing (faking the appearance
of grassroots support) can push low-quali-
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ty, questionable or outright false content to
the top of trending topics lists, enhancing its
credibility and persuasiveness. In the high-information online environment, this mass user
endorsement trumps expert views.
•

•

•

Social proof from others: The psychological
theory of implicit egotism explains that humans have an unconscious preference for
things they associate with themselves.7 Recipients are more likely to believe messages
from users they perceive as similar to themselves. People believe sources are credible if
they think other people believe them credible.
Popular users and content are perceived as
more important. Propagandists often create user profiles for bot accounts with images, usernames and background information
that is similar to their target audience. The
audience likely doesn’t know the account is
machine-driven and believes it is another human with similar interests and demographics. Bot-driven accounts follow real users and
other bot-driven accounts en masse, creating
the perception of a large following. This large
following enhances perceived credibility, attracting more human followers and creating a
positive feedback cycle.
The false consensus effect is a cognitive bias
where people overestimate the extent to which
their views reflect wider society.8 It is especially prevalent when individuals are in groups
that reinforce their beliefs. People think it’s
appropriate to believe, feel or act when they
think that people comparable to them are also
believing, feeling or acting in the same way.9
When computational propagandists use bot
networks to troll individual users or groups
with hate speech, it creates the perception
among some users that this is acceptable
behavior. This behavior then becomes normalized among the group and human users
will replicate the trolling behavior without bot
provocation.10
Mass criticism undermines expertise and
trustworthiness: Mass attacks on the credibilityofmessengers diminishes theirtrust and
credibility and reduces the chance that users
will act on their content.11 Propagandists use
bots for mass trolling attacks on human users
(like journalists, rights activists and experts)
and competing networks of users and bots
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that contradict their messaging operation.
Propagandist attacks may present multiple alternative arguments that undermine credibility through volume rather than quality. These
may be combined with personal attacks, hate
speech, trolling and doxing intended to intimidate the user and frighten them into silence.
False consensus effects can result in human
users “piling on” believing that their community finds this behavior acceptable.12
•

Conversion theory of minority influence: Minority groups can have disproportionate influence over the majority by expressing a confident, consistent message over time.13 Bots can
disseminate high-volume content constantly,
with significant sharing between bots, creating the appearance of a tight-knit community
with unwavering beliefs.

•

The authority principle: People are more likely to believe others who look like they know
what they are doing or are in positions of
power.14 Propagandists frequently create machine-driven accounts with false credentials—
like affiliation with government agencies,
corporations, political parties, etc. —to boost
credibility.

•

The illusory truth effect: People believe messages to be true after repeated exposure,
even if ridiculous. Familiar messages are also
critiqued with less precision than unfamiliar
ones.15 Propagandists generate “truthiness”
by using bots to spam our feeds with high-volume content supporting their ideas. Over time,
these messages become familiar and more
likely to be accepted.

•

Belief perseverance, motivated reasoning and
the first-mover advantage: Once a person
forms a belief it can be difficult to change his
or her mind, even if the information creating
the belief is patently false and factual information is later presented.16 In fact, corrections
can actually reinforce confidence in the original
misinformation.17 Corrections are especially ineffective where the correct information
threatens a person’s self-identity or worldview.18 Even if people understand and accept
corrections, the initial disinformation can have
lingering, negative, attitudinal impacts called
“belief echoes.”19 Computational propaganda
can shape false narratives broadly and quickly,
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making it difficult for factual, well-researched
or fact-checked messages to gain traction.
Even if corrected, the rapid activity of bots and
virality of social networks can cause lingering
belief echoes that can be reinforced over time.
Opinionated human pundits generate false beliefs but bot networks have greater reach and
volume and are far more insidious.20

IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS
Computational propaganda is not a vision of the future. Computational propagandists are using MADCOMs now to exploit all of these persuasive techniques. Emerging artificial intelligence technologies
will improve the effectiveness of MADCOMs and
computational propaganda significantly over the
nextseveralyears.21
These insights from cognitive psychology and persuasion may imply or suggest best practices for public diplomacy professionals, but there are multiple—
and sometimes conflicting—perspectives on nearly
any topic. Emily Thorson, an assistant professor of
media and public affairs at the George Washington
University, illustrates one facet of this complexity:
“The existence of belief echoes provides
an enormous incentive for politicians to
strategically spread false information
with the goal of shaping public opinion
on key issues. However, results from two
more experiments show that politicians
also suffer consequences for making
false claims, an encouraging finding
that has the potential to constrain the
behavior of politicians presented with
the opportunity to strategically create
belief echoes. While the existence of belief echoes may also provide a disincentive for the media to engage in serious
fact-checking, evidence also suggests
that such efforts can also have positive
consequences by increasing citizens’
trust in media”22
Similarly, much of the literature suggests that directly counter-messaging disinformation with corrections may be ineffective or counterproductive.
This implies that any counter-messaging should be
focused on short-circuiting misinformation before it

goes viral, a difficult and resource intensive proposition. This messaging would be immunological rather
than counter—designed to build resistance to the
disinformation in targeted communities before the
disinformation has time to infect them, rather than
directly contradicting the disinformation. However,
other research suggests that there are specific conditions under which corrections of disinformation
can be effective.23 This would call for more selective and precise applications of counter-messaging.
Other studies show that many of the misinformed
are likely to have already encountered and rejected
correct information that was discomforting to their
self-concept or worldview.24
Layered on top of this complexity are the network
dynamics common to all social networks, as well
as the unique network dynamics of individual social
networks, and the network dynamics of the various
user communities that are the targets of disinformation or counter-messaging. Within this context, misinformation dynamics are different than those for
information deficits. Discrediting the sources of disinformation and imposing reputational costs can be
effective, but this is an immensely imposing challenge
in an environment of computational propaganda and
distributed, anonymous and easily replicable bot networks.
In short, this is a highly complex problem with asymmetric challenges. Computational propagandists do
not require well researched articles or precise targeting of messages. They can spam disinformation
through bot networks and see what works. Failures
impose few costs. Meanwhile, the media, governments and others who trade in truth require significant investments in researching and presenting that
truth, and slight mistakes can generate mistrust and
imperil reputations.
What is clear is that the Department of State and
public diplomacy professionals must carefully examine and address the problem of computational propaganda from a multidisciplinary approach. This will
require elements of cognitive psychology, network
and influencer analysis, effective content creation,
and the use of machine-driven communication tools
and artificial intelligence systems. To accomplish
this mission, the Department should commission a
comprehensive assessment and evaluation of the
literature of the science of persuasion, disinformation and counter-messaging in the context of modern information and communication technologies.
It should assess technology tools available for com-

ACPD | Understanding the Psychology Behind Computational Propaganda
batting computational propaganda and consider desired new tools. The assessment should identify key
gaps in knowledge as well as promising areas for
academic and practical experimentation. Finally, this
assessment should drive a set of specific recommen-
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dations and best practices for public diplomacy professionals, both generally and situationally, that they
can apply in their strategic planning and daily work
tocounter the effects of computationalpropaganda.
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RETHINKING COUNTERMEASURES IN THE
AGE OF COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
By Tim Hwang, Executive Director, Pacific Social
From the rise of radio to the global adoption of social
media, changes in technology have always powerfully influenced the landscape of communication. As a
task that requires a nuanced and deft navigation of
that landscape, public diplomacy is shaped by the
available channels of mass communication, the distribution of access to those channels and the favorability of those channels to certain styles of messaging
defined by technology.
Developing a strategy to effectively conduct public
diplomacy and to counter emerging threats requires
an understanding of the continuous technological
shifts under way and the dynamics of communication
that it gives rise to.
This paper represents a preliminary attempt to articulate how one emerging technological phenomena
might impact the strategic doctrine of public diplomacy in the modern era. Specifically, it takes up the
phenomena of “computational propaganda”—the
increasingly prominent combination of automation,
sophisticated hoaxing and targeted messaging by
state and non-state actors to manipulate discussion
and spread misinformation online. By thinking holistically about these techniques and their objectives, it
seeks to provide a framework for characterizing the
nature of the threat they create, and the role of public
diplomacy in responding to the challenge.
Part I will examine the current and likely future of
play, giving an account of how state and non-state actors are leveraging computational propaganda. Part
II will make an assessment of the threat, characterizing it as distinct in a number of ways from previous
generations of strategic persuasion. Part III will turn
to proposing a set of strategic principles defining the
changing nature of communication and the conflicts
of ideas taking place on online platforms. Part IV will
then extend this doctrine to tactics, arguing that this
analysis informs the potential approaches that might
be used in countering these techniques. Finally, I will
conclude by discussing further avenues for research
and technological development.

COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW
Recent years have seen the emergence and increasing sophistication of campaigns designed to manipulate political discourse and suppress dissent. These
efforts, referred to here as “computational propaganda,” have blended together a set of common
components, merging automation with sophisticated hoaxing, targeted messaging and cyberattacks in
support of their objectives.
Bots—fake user accounts that often autonomously repeat the same or meaningless content—have
figured prominently. Activists in Turkey and Syria
have been subject to bot spamming campaigns that
attempt to drown out oppositional political speech
occurring on popular Twitter hashtags. In the United
States, false accounts have been used to bolster the
apparent grassroots support of political candidates,
sometimes with a particular emphasis among key
constituencies. In Mexico, one recent presidential
election cycle featured two opposing groups of bots
attempting to contest the other on social media. Bots
were also a prominent feature of the online political discussion around the “Brexit” vote in the United
Kingdom, helping to rally support around the decision to leave the European Union.
Fakeidentitiesareonlypartofthepicture.Beyondbot
accounts,effortshavealsobeenuncoveredthatintegrate these methods as just one component of more
sophisticated strategies for shaping public opinion.
One example detailed in the New York Times in 2015
is the Russian “Internet Research Agency,” which
has been connected with elaborate misinformation
schemes that include fabricated videos and realistic
clones of actual news sites. These types of actions
are not limited to comparatively well-resourced governmentagencies.Bloombergreportedin April 2016
the story of Andrés Sepúlveda, who was involved in
a series of private efforts to sway elections in Latin
America througha combination of bots,compromise
of voting machines and digital eavesdropping, among
other techniques.
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Our existing knowledge of these campaigns of computational propaganda set a baseline in the sense
that they indicate strong interest from state and
non-state actors in engaging in these tactics. To the
extent that we expect these campaigns to continue
to improve and become more sophisticated, it is possible to make projections along what dimensions we
might see them develop in. Two technological trends
seem particularly poised to bolster these tactics,
namely, the recent breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), and the development of better
quantitative models of human group behavior.
Machine learning (ML)—the subfield of AI research
focused on the study of algorithms that improve
themselves from data—has seen a rapid pace of development in recent years, driven by advancements
in computing power and the availability of data. This
has produced major breakthroughs in the capabilities of machines to accomplish many tasks previously believed to be difficult to automate—from the
ability to recognize objects in images and translate
languages, to the operation of automobiles and masterful play of the game “Go.” In the context of computational propaganda, these research developments
may enhance the ability to create more believable
fake identities and fabricated content in support of

of these experiments remain the realm of academic
inquiry, the results are openly published and might inform the deployment of computational propaganda
going forward. Future campaigns might more accurately model the behaviors of key influencers within
a network to better shape their behavior, or better
identify key moments for spreading information for
maximal impact.
Both trends point toward a space in which computational propaganda techniques become more
effective at manipulating discussion online. These
changes will increasingly create unique applications
and threats which differentiate this phenomena from
earlier methods of propaganda.

SIMILAR OR DIFFERENT?
From leafleting to radio broadcasts, the strategic
use of persuasion by state and non-state actors to
forward political objectives is nothing new. The techniques of computational propaganda are therefore
not without precedent—they represent only the latest development in a historical legacy of methods
meant to influence and manipulate discourse. To that
end, many established principles in public diplomacy

“...many established principles in public diplomacy
can and will continue to apply in meeting the challengeposed bythisnewbreedofpropaganda.”
campaigns of misinformation. Recent experiments
have demonstrated the ability for ML to create realistic simulations of faces, including those of celebrities
and world leaders. ML is also enabling the design of
better conversational software, which can communicate believably with a human and potentially be leveraged to increase the apparent credibility, authenticity
and persuasiveness of a bot account online.
Another advancing frontier of research is quantitative social science—an emerging field focusing on
leveraging data available about social behavior to develop insights into how groups behave at scale. This
field is generating interesting results, from developing mathematical models for how ideas become popular online, to understanding the design factors that
might influence people to turn out to vote. While many

can and will continue to apply in meeting the challenge posed by this new breed of propaganda.
However, a commonality of historical purpose across
techniques should not distract from the ways in which
new techniques might shape the costs, risks and opportunities that actors face when choosing how to
manipulate public opinion. In this respect, computational propaganda appears to differ in three major
ways from earlier methods of strategic persuasion.
First, campaigns of computational propaganda can
be conducted at significantly lower cost than persuasion campaigns of the past. As easily replicable software, large numbers of bots can be quickly
generated for a low investment and little technical
infrastructure. Even groups with little technical ex-
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pertise may be able to quickly acquire bots and compromised accounts through purchase online. Earlier
strategies relying on printed media, or control over
communications infrastructure, were comparatively
moreexpensive.
Second, the speed and geographic scope of persuasion operations are considerably augmented by
computational propaganda. Social media provides
a channel whereby a persuasion campaign can immediately begin efforts to build trust and message to
targeted groups throughout the world. While limited
by internet penetration and the adoption of certain
platforms, computational propaganda benefits from
the global scope of social media. This provides a level of access that would be cost-prohibitive to many
organizations in an earlier communications environment.
Third, techniques of computational propaganda can
be targeted and customized to a level of granularity
greater than in the past. As opposed to a radio broadcast or leafleting campaign, bots can customize their
purported identity and their messaging to best take
advantage of the biases and preferences of their targets. This might take place on a level as granular as
messaging tailored to an individual user online, using
known data about that specific user to maximize the
effectiveness of a persuasive effort, something difficult to do effectively with earlier channels of communication.
Taken together, these are changes in degree that
suggest a change in kind, particularly as computational propaganda compounds shifts already underway as a result of broader connectivity wrought by
the spread of mobile devices and the global adoption
of social media. These changes will inform the strategic doctrine which guides public diplomacy as it continually evolves to meet a changing communications
environment.

AN EVOLVING STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
The unique attributes of computational propaganda
from earlier generations of strategic persuasion have
several implications on the landscape of communication. This informs an overall strategic doctrine—that
is, a characterization of the nature of the challenge
and the objectives of public diplomacy within it.
For one, it appears that the generation of falsehood
is poised in the near-term to enjoy ever increasing
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effectiveness at ever falling costs. Bots provide small
groups the ability to influence at global scale at substantially lower expenditure, and give well-resourced
groups an affordable compliment to more elaborate influence efforts. At the same time, the costs of
generating verified information and debunking false
information remain relatively more expensive. This
margin of cost between generating and countering
falsehood may grow as the fabrication of realistic
images, audio and video becomes cheaper and more
accessible as a technology. In short, social media
may produce the circumstances under which the offense of computational propaganda systematically
has an edge against the defense of verification and
fact-checking.
Moreover, the emerging landscape is one in which
it may be increasingly difficult to halt threats definitively and systematically. For one, commitments of
public diplomacy to values of freedom of speech may
exclude the use of approaches that attempt to drown
out opposing discourse using similar “computational” methods. It is also difficult to avoid the constraints
placed on governments by the fact that much of the
focus of computational propaganda is on social media platforms operated by private corporations. This
may limit the ability for governments—particularly
when the platform is based within the boundaries of
another state—to obtain the needed data to effectively attribute and counter campaigns, and to constrain
the open creation of new accounts through which to
engage in computational propaganda.
Multiplicity of the threat is also accompanied by the
challenge of evaluating the importance of a given
threat. Not only are computational propaganda campaigns able to leverage a wide range of attack vectors
that make them difficult to detect, it is also difficult to
assess whether a given campaign will have an impact on real events. Computational propaganda may
occasionally serve as a distraction, creating extensive engagement and discussion on online channels
without necessarily producing significant outcomes.
However, what differentiates an ineffectual campaign
from one that is a legitimate threat can be challenging to ascertain at the outset. By the time success is
evident, it may be too difficult to halt the momentum
of the effort. In a context of limited resources, this aspect of the landscape may present a major dilemma
around how and when to deploy public diplomacy assets. These decisions are particularly difficult in the
shadow of the so-called “Streisand effect,” in which
efforts to directly confront a given message online itself produces greater spread and discussion.
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The proliferation of persuasive power, augmented by trends in automation, machine learning and
quantitative social science, will mean that a strategic posture purely aimed at counter-messaging to
certain strategically important audiences will face
greater challenges over time. A multitude of parties
will control the means to engage in effective mass
misinformation, with limited ability to detect, evaluate and challenge each effort. Organizations with
limited resources will quickly exhaust themselves
confronting or containing falsehood, particularly as
the believability of fabricated content continues to
grow over time. Moreover, the available measures
that have a possibility of categorically hindering
these tactics are likely to conflict with other commitments towards preservation of the freedom of
speech and media.

propaganda. Offensively, the strategy would seek to
distribute the costs of counter-messaging broadly,
shaping the social ecosystem to enable alternative
voices to effectively challenge campaigns of misinformation.

TAKING A COUNTER-NETWORKING
APPROACH
In order to be valuable, strategic doctrine should
have a direct influence on tactics. How might a new
focus on counter-networking manifest in concrete
approaches to resisting the spreading use of computational propaganda? To make the approach
more tangible, here are a set of different potential
routes for exploration:

Nevertheless, the new communications landscape
and the computational propaganda techniques
evolving within it introduce considerations that
should join these established methods. Specifically,
it may be critical to bring a “counter-networking” approach to accompany existing efforts around counter-messaging.

Network topology: In a counter-networking context,
it may be critical to adopt from the language of social network science, which provides a collection of
key metrics for summarizing the patterns of connections between individuals. Public diplomacy initiatives might be targeted at shifting these metrics
in a more discrete, tactical way,such as the average
number of direct “friends” or “followers” possessed
by an individual in the network, or the average number of links between any two individuals of the network. Raising or lowering these numbers strategically within segments of users on a social network
may give a more influential voice to allies and limit
the overall impact of misinformation efforts.

In this context, the goal of public diplomacy would
not be to defeat a specific narrative or propaganda
campaign, but instead to ensure the robustness of
the marketplace of information online. This would
be both an offensive and defensive agenda that focuses on the pattern of connections between social
groups online. Defensively, this strategy would focus on producing patterns of information exchange
among groups that would make them difficult to
effectively sway using techniques of computational

Leveraging automation: Bots may be used in a myriad of ways beyond simply direct counter-messaging. It may be possible to leverage bots to signal to
allies that misinformation is spreading, working to
rally them to engage in a dialogue and push back
online. Similarly, swarms of bots might be used to
bridge connections between social groups not regularly communicating online, helping to break echo
chambers and diversify points of view. Doing so in a
targeted way may create network topologies which

As discussed above, the novelty of computational
propaganda should not distract us from the reality
of it as just that—a form of propaganda. Tothat end,
public diplomacy should continue to apply established techniques for confronting coordinated campaignsofmisinformationandstrategicpersuasion.

“...thegoalofpublicdiplomacywouldnotbeto
defeat a specific narrative or propaganda campaign, butinsteadtoensure therobustness of
the marketplace of information online. ”
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are more or less favorable to particular positions or
feature a more ubiquitous distribution of individuals
willing to actively challenge misinformation.
Tools vs. messages: In the persuasive landscape
formed by social media and computational propaganda, itmaybe attimesmoreeffectivetobuild tools,
rather than construct a specific message. Apps that
signal to users that a coordinated persuasive effort
is taking place targeting them, for instance, may be
more effective than an effort that attempts to challenge each misinformation campaign as it is detected. Similarly,open tools that make it easier to identify
and debunk certain kinds of fabricated content may
distribute the costs of identifying and investigating
cases as they appear.
These efforts are just a beginning. Counter-networking approaches may also significantly shape the
collection of talents that are needed to conduct effective public diplomacy. Adopting the three tactical
suggestions discussed above would necessitate the
development of more nimble software development,
quantitative social science and machine learning capability within organizations combatting computational propaganda.

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this essay represents a preliminary analysis that is intended as an initial jumping off point
for discussion. Whatever the eventual strategic
approach, the rise of computational propaganda
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should not necessarily be seen as grouping of similar
case studies or a blend of tactics being deployed by
a specific adversary, but instead as a symptom of a
changing landscape of communication.
Such a frame enables thinking that looks beyond immediate challenges towards developing a general approach to characterizing these threats and a grounded approach to addressing them. The falling cost and
rising effectiveness of misinformation campaigns
online multiply threats in a manner that makes a singular focus on counter-messaging to specific audiences less efficient over time. To that end, traditional
techniques might be bolstered by data-driven, counter-networking efforts that seek to shape the patterns
of connections between users online into topologies
that are less susceptible to misinformation efforts
and that help shoulder the costs of counter-messaging.
This might manifest across a number of different
countering tactics, each of which require further
development and may involve greater collaboration
with researchers not typically within the public diplomacy community. However, as methods of computational propaganda continue to proliferate and improve, such partnerships may become increasingly
critical to meet the rapidly moving challenges posed
by these techniques.
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY’S(MISUNDERSTOOD)
DIGITALPLATFORMPROBLEM
By Sam Ford, Research affiliate and consultant with Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Program in Comparative Media Studies/Writing
In 2013, an academic book I co-authored with Henry
Jenkins and Joshua Green, Spreadable Media: Creating
Value and Meaning in a Networked Culture, was published.1
The book examines the shifting business and cultural
dynamics of a media environment where a significant portion of the public plays a more active, everyday role in the circulation of media texts. Specifically,
we examined:
“An emerging hybrid model of circulation,
where a mix of top-down and bottom-up
forces determine how material is shared
across and among cultures in far more
participatory (and messier) ways. The decisions that each of us makes about whether
to pass along media texts—about whether
to tweet the latest gaffe from a presidential candidate, forward a Nieman Marcus
cookie recipe email, or share video of a
shoplifting seagull—are reshaping the media landscape itself.”
Spreadable Media lays out how changes in the media
landscape had already been, and would be, affecting
strategic communication professionals, emerging independent media producers, the audiences for those
texts, and our greater communication landscape as
a result—particularly the international communication
landscape.
If anything, the past four years have shown just how
rapidly the media landscape shifts. Marketing and
public relations practitioners have poured budgets
into tools to gather data on and—in some cases—
qualitatively listen to discussions happening among
their customers. Entertainment properties have
moved rapidly to find new models to satisfy audiences looking to engage with content on-demand. And
newsrooms have put significant emphasis on tracking, and encouraging, sharing of their stories online.
But, as the past four years have progressed, I have
also watched developments unfold that we did not
focus deeply in the book. For instance, the depth with
which the algorithms of social network portals and

dividuals, or the ways in which social bots can drive
how content spreads (or does not spread, as the case
may be).
And I have consistently encountered new environments and challenges beyond those we explored in
Spreadable Media—such as the pressing question of
how these shifts in the media landscape affect how
effective public diplomacy is achieved across varied
national and cultural contexts.
In this piece, I reflect on how my research of, and experience in, the media realm may have direct affect
on those carrying out public diplomacy, with particular focus on how emerging business models for digital platforms threaten the integrity, not only of those
platforms, but of the messages—including U.S. government messages—therein.

USING METAPHORS PAST THEIR DUE
DATE
In retrospect, perhaps my biggest regret from
Spreadable Media is that, by demonstrating the impact
that everyday people are having on what circulated,
how it circulated, we inadvertently overly emphasized examples where things spread fast, and far,
when some of the most impactful, enduring content
that spreads does so deeply, within and around particularcommunities.Thisistosay,wemayhaveoveremphasized pure virality without fully appreciating
theimportanceoflongevityandcontext.
This reflects a problem that the media industries,
industries with which governments and diplomatic
actors are increasingly intertwined, are confronted
with today. The business models of industries like
television, radio and newspaper/magazine publishing
were created at a time where companies had limited
ability to understand the audiences they reached. As
a result, these industries sought an advertising-supported
model
on answering two simple
questions:
“whofocusing
and how many”?
2

search engines shape the circulation practices of in-
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Yet, as media professionals shift away from the mass
media era of the 20th century, they have failed to
shed outdated assumptions and models embedded
within the industry. Instead, media companies have
been hard at work trying to make current realities
fit the industry architecture they are all so deeply investedin.
Take, for instance, the power of the phrase “going
viral”—a metaphor that has been particularly attractivetomediaorganizationsandmarketersbecauseit
is defined by reachingthat mass-scale audiencethat
apreviousmedia erawasabletoconvene.Evenif the
phrase, in most cases, does not accurately describe
the cultural phenomenon it intends (people typically
are making a range of active choices when choosing whether to watch/read/listen to something and
then share it, as opposed to how we typically spread
viruses amongst ourselves without intent or event
awareness), the scale of “virality” has made it such a
powerfulmetaphorthatevenaudiencesnowusesit.
Virality brings with it the illusion that content can
somehow be self-propagating. Television ratings, online traffic rankings, demographic segment profiles,
focus group results and various other creations of
the mass media world come to haunt us. Often these
benchmarks of virality are applied with little acknowledgment that they were convenient shorthand—not
reflections of reality—intended to make sense of a
messy world that then outlived their usefulness.

CLINGING TO OUR BUSINESS MODELS
Despite the new possibilities offered by today’s digital
platforms, the journalism and strategic communication industries are still by and large governed by the
“who are they, and how many of them are there?”
business model. This approach remains driven by
metrics of reach, clicks, shares and views, which ties
success (either in terms of remuneration or strategic influence) to breadth and a logic of scale, particularly within target demographics. Governments, too,
emphasize these types of metrics in demonstrating

the reach of their strategic communications campaigns and outreach initiatives. For instance, Russia’s
RT touts itself as the most viewed news channel on
YouTube, despite the fact that the content driving its
popularity, if authentic, is largely apolitical. Similarly,
the Voice of America heavily emphasizes its weekly
reach as proof of its continued relevance, even if other markers may be far better proof of its impact and
value.
In short, as we have entered a new communication
landscape with powerful possibilities to tell new stories in new ways, and to support them in a global
market, the primary media platforms we depend on
have preserved the business logic of the broadcast
world. And the rise of big data makes this focus on
what is most easily counted more central than ever.3
Much of this continued support of old advertising
models has been exacerbated by “investor storytime.”4 Ethan Zuckerman explains, “investor storytime is persuading investors that your ads will be
worth more than everyone else’s ads. That is because
most online ads are not worth very much.”5 This
means each of the primary digital platforms—Facebook, Google, Twitter and the like—target the same
programmatic ad budgets. Convincing investors to
support a new digital platform or publication is ultimately about explaining why your “viral engine” is
going to lead to better traffic, or why your native surveillance techniques allow improved target advertising, or about how you can deliver an audience more
cheaply than competitors.
As Joe Marchese—currently president of advanced
advertising for Fox Networks Group—writes that one
of the fundamental problems is that new “impressions” are created in a digital landscape, without necessarily any real gain in human attention.6 In short,
platforms can add auto-play videos to people’s social
feeds, a new advertising spot on a page, or an extra
ad to pre-roll and count it as new “impressions,” even
if there is no actual gain in meaningful attention from
an audience. It is as if people forgot that social media

“It is as if people forgot that social media metrics are proxies for something else, and instead
started taking their own creations literally.”
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metrics are proxies for something else, and instead
started taking their own creations literally. It is one
thing to employ storytime for the people who you are
trying to get to pay you. It is another to use it on yourself.

NOT ENOUGH DISTANCE
This tail-chasing of outdated metrics is not merely a
waste of financial and human resources. By relying
on platforms grounded in faulty business logic, organizations, governments and companies risk severely
compromising their brands and credibility too.
One problem is that well-known, fact-based newsrooms and storytellers rely on the exact same media
hubs (e.g, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) as thin news and
openly partisan sites to distribute their content. But
these hubs are primarily focused on click-throughs,
or when a user clicks on an advertisement, which can
then be leveraged into additional or more profitable
ad sales. Publishers, both benign and malicious, are
thus forced to compete with one another, not based
on the quality of their content, or the longevity of their
brands, but by using catchy and sensational headlines
to try and lure views from users as they dash through
the social media feed. These are, incidentally, the exact same tactics utilized by tabloid publications like
the National Enquirer to grab attention at a check-out
counter, only scaled to every smart phone and computer in the world. And now journalists and scam
artists are competing with one another for your attention, side-by-side. The only difference is that sites
disseminating thin news or outright disinformation
do not have to pay the overhead that comes along
with producing fact-based and deeply contextualized
news.
Consider, for instance, one tactic dubbed by Variety’s
Andrew Wallenstein as a “controversial practice”
whereby digital publishers are “inflating traffic numbers”7 by counting traffic that does not come from
its own sites. Rather, publishers strike deals with independent sites to sell their ad inventory alongside
the adspaceon their own sites.So, when a publisher
talks about its audience reach, it is actually including
the traffic of sites it does not own or control.
Or take into account the ways in which journalism
sites engage in business practices that deeply intertwine them in a tangled web of digital publishing with
non-news current event sites, openly partisan sites,
scandalous articles and blatantly misleading articles.
Often, through “content amplification windows” that
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provide paid links to stories on other sites, deeply
researched news articles conclude with links to articles from publications with much lower editorial
standards, or even disinformation sites.
And, in reverse, look at the various ways digital publishers engage in paid promotion to drive traffic to
their stories, for instance, by paying to get a link to a
legitimate news story on a non-news or even an intentionally misleading site.
But why? According to Lucia Moses, “publishers
need to show big numbers,” which “rewards tricks to
inflate the size of their audiences and to make them
appear younger than they actually are.”8
This means we have created a dynamic where there
is not as much distance as there should be between
the business practices of legitimate journalistic organizations and the realm of scam artists and spammers. As Sean Blanda has written, “The methods
used to fund modern journalism simultaneously undermine trust in the news outlets…News publications
aren’t (or can’t afford to be) policing their ads. Seedy
brands are literally stealing the credibility of news
sites for a few pennies.”9
One of the fundamental reasons this has happened
is that media industries and advertising metrics do
not seem to account for negative ROI, or the erosion
of trust that may result from clickbait headlines and
rankings that highlight gross/unique views while ignoring bounce and completion rates.10 The scam artist is not concerned about “negative ROI,” because
the goal is not to build a permanent, lasting brand or
trust with citizens.
This dynamic is further driven by the fact that legitimate journalism enterprises in an online setting are
often selling their ad inventory based on “Who are
they, and how many of them are there?” In an environment where impressions are commodified, all
the infrastructure of running a legitimate news operation starts to appear as a drag on the bottom line,
with no upside. If you do not focus on a business model wherein having a dedicated readership, a trusted
relationship with an audience, or a publishing brand
that means something over time, then organizations
whose standards for publishing something is lower,
or who make no pretense for building a long-term
following and brand, might be able to generate the
semblance of enough traffic to compete on volume
by engaging in many of the same tricks, with much
lessoverhead.
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Journalism brands, driven by a concern about
monthly traffic patterns, at the exclusion of building
a long-term brand, have business models that give
no value to their strongest asset. As my former Fusion
colleague wrote in 2016, “If you have lots of traffic but
little brand value, then you can disappear more or
less overnight: look at Upworthy. On the other hand,
if you have low ratings but a strong global brand, then
you can still be worth a fortune: look at CNN.”11 Yet, it
is a common concern for traffic that leads news organizations to continuously make choices that sacrifice long-term trust for the daily, weekly, or monthly
traffic goals—leading to clickbait-style headlines that
sometimes do not sound as different as they should
from, say, The Washington Post, The Huffington Post, and
The Gummy Post (examples only chosen because of
what different “posts” each should have). Writes
Blanda about misleading headlines from legitimate
news sources, “The problem isn’t that news outlets
make these mistakes. It’s that they make them because they have business incentives to do so.”12
The current model not only does a disservice to journalism and the public, but it often leads news organizations awry from their missions and seeks to create
deceptive metrics, artificially inflating the broadest
audience possible for advertisers. If the current
model contributes to the erosion of trust across our
shared digital platforms, then this creates a fundamental problem for anyone relying on the digital
spaces to connect with audiences, including the public diplomacy community.

CONCLUSION: THE RAMIFICATIONS
FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Diplomats rely on trusted, rigorous journalism institutions to provide more credible verification of facts.
However, the damaging business practices erode the
authority independent corroboration from a news
organization can provide. And they make it even more
prone for various actors—from other governments,
private industries and overtly politically partisan
players—to question the veracity of information writlarge. As rigorous journalism and quasi-news sourc-
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es commonly adhere to the same business models
and engage in many of the same business practices,
we run the risk of driving audiences from healthy
skepticism into cynicism and moral relativism.13
Yet, diplomats should be concerned about more than
just how these tactics are undermining the credibility
of legitimate news brands. As the U.S. government
pays $1.8 billion a year in taxpayer dollars to deliver
our messages to audiences around the globe, public
diplomacy practitioners are increasingly dependent
on the same media ecosystem described throughout
this essay. While news organizations are controlled
by an advertising-driven business model that needs
to bring revenue in, public diplomacy is not. Yet, like
strategic communication teams in various sectors, it
is easy to fall into the same trap of measuring success
heavily by reach, clicks, shares and views, and shaping initiatives, content and traffic around what best
reaches those goals.
For-profit media companies will likely continue to
struggle to find ways to appropriately value engagement depth, completion rates, story shelf life and
their long-term brand strength, among other factors,
over the breadth that dominates programmatic digital ad buying. However, there is no reason that the
same problems must plague how public diplomacy is
measured and evaluated. As many of the commercial
forces behind digital publishing and sharing continue
to shape an environment that lead publishers down
a path of diminished reader trust, public diplomacy
practitioners should be careful not to head down the
same trail. Instead, the should develop publishing and
circulation strategies that are measured by meaningful metrics and be careful to avoid the traps in which
for-profit publishers and platforms currently find
themselves. By taking into account the potential for
negative ROI that comes along with many methods
of achieving reach and scale, and by finding ways to
measure success through where and how messages are meaningfully resonating with their audiences, the State Department will be better prepared to
safeguard its content and brand from tactics meant
to challenge the credibility of their messages and engagements around the world.
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Five years from
now you won’t
have any idea
whether you are
interacting with
a human online
or not.
In the future,
most online
speech, digital
engagement and
content will be
machines talking
to machines.

UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ANDCOMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
By Matt Chessen, Foreign Service Science, Technologyand Foreign Policy Fellow
at The George Washington University
Machine-driven communications tools are a reality
now and the addition of emerging artificial intelligence (AI) tools will enable machines to dominate the
online information space. This paradigm shift isn’t
limited to artificial personal assistants like Siri and
recreational chatbots like Xiaoice.1 It refers to machine-driven communication overwhelming Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tinder, Snapchat, Reddit, chat
rooms, news site comment sections and the rest of
the social web. All of it will be dominated by machines
talking. This machine communication will become
nearly indistinguishable from human communication. The machines will be trying to persuade, sell,
deceive, intimidate, manipulate and cajole users into
whatever response they are programmed to elicit.
They will be unbelievably effective.
There is an urgent need to think strategically about
what this transformed information ecosystem
means for the practice of public diplomacy (PD). In
addition to discussions of competing with computational propaganda efforts, PD practitioners need
to consider the question of how they can create and
sustain meaningful conversations and engagements
with audiences if the mediums typically relied upon
are becoming less trusted, compromised and dominated by intelligent machines. Put simply, we currently take for granted that there are trusted platforms in
virtually every country we operate to directly engage
with local audiences. The integrity of these platforms
will be threatened, and we need to start thinking
now about how to best engage foreign audiences in
a world dominated, if not overwhelmed by, artificially
intelligent computational propaganda.
Also, utilizing new AI tools for public diplomacy will
require a reinvention and reimagination of business
processes that takes into account the speed, personalization, autonomy and learning capabilities of AI
systems. We cannot just replicate the same processes using new tools. That would be a failure. Public diplomacy must be completely reinvented for the 21st
Century.

MACHINES TALKING TO HUMANS
TALKING TO MACHINES TALKING TO
MACHINES

Advances in artificial intelligence will soon enable
highly persuasive machine-generated communications. Imagine an automated system that uses the
mass of online data and easily available marketing
databases to infer your personality, political preferences, religious affiliation, demographic data and
interests. It knows which news websites and social
media platforms you frequent and it controls multiple user accounts on those platforms. The system
dynamically creates content—everything from comments to full articles—specifically designed to plug
into your particular psychological frame and achieve
a particular outcome. This content could be a collection of facts, fake news or a mix of just enough truth
and falsehood to achieve the desired effect.
The AI system has a chatbot that can converse with
you, through text, voice or even video. The chatbot will
be nearly indistinguishable from a human being and
will be able to operate in multiple languages. The AI
chatbot will engage you in online discussions, debate
you and present compelling evidence to persuade
you. It could also use information from databases or
social media to discover your weaknesses and use
this information to troll you and threaten your family.
The AI system will be able to detect human emotions
as well or better than people can. Similarly, it will
mimic convincing human emotions that resonate
with your own personality and emotional state. It will
be a learning machine, so it will figure out approaches and messages that influence you the best. It will
select for success and improve constantly. It will run
A-B tests with people who share your characteristics
to determine what messages are most effective and
then deploy those messages to similar populations.
Like other digital tools, once created, the marginal
cost of creating more is almost zero. So there could
be millions of AI chatbots prowling the internet, 24
hours a day, seven days a week, vying for your atten-
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tion so they can infect your brain with their message
and change your behavior.
Systems looking for humans to influence will inevitably wind up trying to persuade other machine-driven
accounts posing as humans. The machines will talk
to, at and over each other, drowning out human conversations online with a tidal wave of machine-driven speech and content. The online information environment will be overwhelmed with machine-driven
speech designed to sell, persuade, intimidate, distract, entertain, advocate, inform, misinform and manipulate you.
This is a highly probable vision for the information
environment we will move into over the next several years. Our actions now will shape whether spaces
are preserved for democratic speech and discourse,
or whether the social web will be destroyed by an invasion of highly intelligent machine driven communication tools. Our uptake of these tools and redesign
of PD business processes around new technologies
now is the only way to ensure U.S. public diplomacy
remains relevant in the future.

MADCOMS AND COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA
The basic technologies for this evolving information
environment are MAchine Driven COMmunication
(MADCOM)tools.Thewebrobot,or“bot,”isthemost
common type of MADCOM.2 Bot capabilities are limited to providing basic answers to simple questions,
publishing content on a schedule or disseminating
content in response to triggers. However, bots can
have a disproportionate impact because it is easy to
create a lot of them and bots can post a high volume
content at a high frequency. An individual can easily
operate hundreds of Twitter bots with little technical knowledge using readily available hardware and
software. Bots are currently used by nations, corporations, politicians, hackers, individuals, state-sponsoredgroups,NGOsandterroristorganizationsinan
effort to influence conversations online.
Computational propaganda is a new term for the
use of machine-driven communication tools for political purposes. These purposes can range from relatively benign amplification of political messages to insidious state-sponsored trolling and disinformation.
Currently, primarily simple (i.e., non-AI) bots are used
for computational propaganda. These follower, road-
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block and propaganda bots are used for amplifying
people and ideas, suppressing or diverting online
speech, and more traditional influence operations.
Emerging AI tools will radically enhance the efficacy
of MADCOMs and computational propaganda techniques. (Note: For more information on computational propaganda, see the accompanying papers by
Matt Chessen, Samuel Woolleyand Tim Hwang).

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WILL RADICALLY ENHANCE COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA EFFICACY
Artificial intelligence (AI) popularly refers to an
evolving constellation of technologies that enable
computers to simulate cognitive processes, such as
elements of human thinking. AI is also a discipline
(like biology or chemistry) that is concerned with creating machines that can make decisions well under
uncertainty, perceive data or the environment, and
act to satisfy some objective. Today’s AI is confined
to specific tasks (“narrow” AI), like providing driving
directions or recognizing faces in images, and is not a
general intelligence applicable across many domains
or a super-intelligence exceeding human abilities.
Machine learning is a subset of AI. Machine learning
extracts patterns from unlabeled data (unsupervised
learning) or efficiently categorizes data according to
pre-existing definitions embodied in a labeled data
set (supervised learning). Machine learning is used in
Google’s search algorithm, digital advertising and online personalization tools (e.g. the Amazon and Netflix
recommendation engines; the Facebook newsfeed).
Machine learning also extends into quantitative processes—such as supply chain operations, financial
analysis, product pricing and procurement bid predictions. Nearly every industry is exploiting machine
learning applications.
Deeplearningisatypeofmachinelearningthatuses
additional, hierarchical layers of processing (loosely analogous to neuron structures in the brain) and
large data sets to model high-level abstractions and
recognize patterns in extremely complex data. Deep
learning systems manage very large data sets better
than other AI tools and are ideal for understanding
data-rich and highly complex environments.3
These tools are not confined to wealthy corporations
or state-sponsored actors. AI tools are widely available (Google’s TensorFlow, Microsoft’s Control Toolkit
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and many other AI tools are free and open-source)
and operate on common computer hardware.

HOW AI WILL TRANSFORM MACHINE
DRIVEN COMMUNICATIONS
AI chatbots are increasingly capable of engaging
in robust conversations about complex topics. For
example, Microsoft’s Mandarin language AI chatbot
‘Xiaoice’ has sophistication, empathy and conversational flexibility that make “her” extremely popular.
Xiaoice has 20 million registered users, average users interact with her 60 times a month and she was
ranked as Weibo’s top influencer in 2015. She averages 23 exchanges per user interaction. That is not
trivial experimentation; it is a conversation. Some users relate intimately to Xiaoice and consider her an
always-available friend and confidant.4
Currently Xiaoice requires a team of engineers to
achieve this level of sophistication. This level of chatbot technology is well within the capabilities of a
corporation or nation-state, but still unavailable to
the masses. However, like all digital technology, it
will improve in capability and accessibility. Over the
next several years, high-end chatbots like Xiaoice will
become indistinguishable from humans in a broad
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tion. Emerging debating technologies7 will allow AI
chatbots to persuasively argue by analyzing a corpus
of knowledge, determining pro and con arguments,
and creating dynamic, persuasive content in support
of a position.
AI tools are increasingly sophisticated at affective
computing,8 one aspect of which is determining human emotional states9 from text, facial expressions
and vocal patterns. This will allow machines to interpret whether you are happy, sad, anxious, relaxed or
open to a communication when they interact with
you. AI tools can then tailor their communication to
your mood with just the right amount of emotional
emphasis to achieve the desired effect. If an affective
AI tool detects that the target is impatient and doesn’t
feel like conversing at the moment, the AI can cease
communication and try messaging them later when
they are more persuadable. If a target is curious and
wants to talk politics, the AI will detect openness in
their communications and can engage them in a lively conversation (or argument). If the AI detects emotional vulnerability, it could prey on those emotions to
persuade, manipulate, or intimidate.
In another twist on affective computing, scientists
are training AIs to accurately emulate human emotions10 in the facial expressions of avatars. This will

“Over the next several years, high-end chatbots
like Xiaoice will become indistinguishable from
humansinabroadrangeofconversations.”
range of conversations. When the technology proliferates, chatbots will converse fluidly with humans on
platforms ranging from social media apps to news
discussion boards to dating sites, about a wide variety of topics.
AItools arealsoimprovingatdynamicallygenerating
unique content and will soon be developing custom
propaganda, disinformation and persuasive arguments. Currently, humans develop content for computational propaganda that is then distributed by
bots. AI tools are already capable of generating bespoke content, like news articles5 and novels,6 using
predefined parameters. The quality of this content
will improve and AI systems will be able to communicateacrossmore subjects with greatersophistica-

be useful for generating custom, persuasive video,
but the technology can also be used to alter reality
and generate disinformation. Researchers at Stanford University have developed real-time facial reenactment tools11 that allow users to take existing
videos—like a speech by a world leader—and realistically manipulate the speaker’s facial expressions.
The resulting videos12 show realistic, if not yet perfect, manipulations of the speaker’s face and mouth.
Concatenative speech synthesis,13 or better yet, voice
conversion14 technologies like Google Deep Mind15
will allow machines to replicate anyone’s voice from
samples. If combined with affective computing, facial re-enactment tools and an AI chatbot, this would
give propagandists the capability to create videos of
anyone saying anything, or more insidiously, to subtly
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modify existing video for propaganda or disinformation purposes. Affective computing allows the emotional inflection of an altered human speaker or a dynamic AI MADCOM to be precisely tailored to achieve
the desired influential outcome.

know us personally and intimately. The communications generated by AI MADCOMs won’t be mass media, they will be custom tailored to speak to an individual’s political frame, worldview and psychological
needs and vulnerabilities.

Big data combined with machine learning tools will
enhance the ability of MADCOMs to influence people
through highly personalized propaganda. In the United States alone there are several thousand data brokers. One company, Acxiom, claims to have16 an average of 1,500 pieces of information on over 200 million
Americans. Another company, Cambridge Analytica,
claims to have 3,000-5,000 data points per individual17 and psychological profiles18 on 230 million U.S.
adults. We give away our data when we shop using
supermarket club cards, when we browse the internet, when we take “fun” Facebook personality tests,19
and through hundreds of other seemingly innocuous
activities. The spread of “Internet of Things” devices
means a proliferation in the amount of data that could

Because AIs are learning systems, they improve
rapidly with experience. An AI could autonomously
determine which of its thousands of pieces of propaganda, disinformation or intimidation are most
effective and emphasize or evolve those, while quickly ending failing campaigns. AI tools will test target
weak points and learn what provokes the desired
emotional response. By probing with multiple accounts and messages,an AIcould learn that personal threats to a particular journalist provoke little response, but threats to their loved ones provoke fear.
So, the MADCOM AI could pose as members of a local
hate group who threaten the journalist’s children until they stop reporting. And while that journalist might
notbe troubledby abuse froma fewMADCOMtrolls,

“Since machinesarenotlimitedbyhumantemporal constraints, they can operate 24/7/365
andrespondtoeventsalmostimmediately.”
be captured about our lives. Virtual reality will give
others the opportunity to test our actual reactions to
hypothetical stimuli and to measure our responses to
products and ideas subtly introduced into the background of virtual experiences. Data breaches from
private companies and government databases have
exposed extremely private information about us and
our associates. And we increasingly volunteer our
most intimate details online, posting photos of family
vacations and tweeting our opinions. AI tools could
use all of this information to tailor persuasive, distracting or intimidating speech towards individuals
based on their unique personality and background.
Human cognition is a complex system, and machine
learning tools are very good at decoding complex
systems. When provided rich databases of information about us, machines will know our personalities,
wants, needs, annoyances and fears better than we
know them ourselves. Machines will know how to influence people who share our traits, but they will also

an onslaught of threats from thousands of AI-driven
accounts, most of which look and speak like people
in their community, would significantly escalate the
effectiveness of the campaign.
Digital tools have tremendous advantages over humans. Once an organization creates and configures
a sophisticated AI chatbot, the marginal cost of running that tool on thousands or millions of user accounts is relatively low. Since machines are not limited by human temporal constraints, they can operate
24/7/365 and respond to events almost immediately.
Once an AI is trained to understand a subject domain,
it can be programmed to react to certain events with
speech and content produced at machine speed,
shaping the narrative almost immediately. AI tools
will know key influencers and populations with personality profiles or political inclinations that are
susceptible to their messages. The AI systems will
target additional vulnerable users with dynamically generated communications instantly and in real

ACPD | Understanding the Challenges of AI and Computational Propaganda to PD
time as events unfold. This is critical in an information environment where the news cycle is continually
squeezed into smaller and smaller windows. Often,
the first story to circulate is the only one that people
recall, even if it is untrue. Research demonstrates20
that once a fake news story is believed, it is very difficult to change people’s minds, even when presented
with compelling contrary evidence.
How can journalists, diplomats, public relations staff,
politicians and government officials plan to compete
with AI MADCOMs that can interpret and react to
stories almost instantly, developing and deploying
customized communications personalized to individuals and groups before humans can even begin a
first draft? How can a government press release, or a
carefully crafted, researched and fact-checked news
article, or a corporate public relations campaign,
precisely developed over months, ever compete with
real time, personalized, always available, dynamically
generated, instantaneous, machine-driven manipulative speech, text, video and other content?
The answer is: humans cannot compete alone. On
digital networks, only humans teamed with AI machines can compete with AI machines. The rise of
AI-driven MADCOMs will spur an information arms
race as empowered individuals, NGOs, corporations and governments all strive to shape narratives
around events. The “bad guys” will have their MADCOM AIs, and the “good guys” will have their own.
Everyone will have AI tools that try to identify adversary MADCOM accounts. These attribution tools will
be used to anticipate computational propaganda
campaigns, respond to ongoing operations and differentiate human users from machine users. Similar
to the cybersecurity struggle, the internet will be the
battleground for a continual cycle of one-upmanship
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as technologists improve AI detection tools and propagandists improve AI MADCOMs to avoid detection.
The most sophisticated machine accounts will be
nearly indistinguishable from the human accounts.
But many propagandists may not bother with detection tools since there is little marginal cost to spamming machines and people with speech and content.
So, in a bizarre twist, machines will frequently run
their information campaigns against other machines.21
Those targeted, machine-driven accounts will respond with their own communications and the online
information space be swamped with machines arguing with machines. MADCOMs will overwhelm human-generated speech and communication online.
This raises a number of larger policy questions for
governments and the private companies that make
up the social communications infrastructure. Social
media companies could adjust their tools and policies to make it much harder for machines to operate on their platforms.22 However, there are often
financial incentives against restricting MADCOM accounts, depending on the platform. Prohibiting machine-driven accounts could significantly change the
nature of the business model and communication on
the platform. Similarly, MADCOMs raise complicated
questions where they are used by adversary governments. These range from basic cybersecurity concerns to questions about the role of free speech and
definitions of acceptable norms for state behavior in
cyberspace. For countries that respect universal human rights and democratic values, MADCOMs pose
a threat to the integrity of discussion spaces used by
citizens. But efforts to regulate them would certainly create unpredictable follow-on effects and should
not be attempted without careful consideration.

FROM COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA TO COMPUTATIONAL DIPLOMACY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROFESSIONALS
Awareness of MADCOMs, computational propaganda and emerging artificial intelligence technologies
is crucial for understanding the modern information
environment. Information on these tools and techniques should be included in every level of training
for PD professionals. This will allow practitioners
to understand the dynamics of online communications, identify where computational propaganda
techniques are in play and effectively counter them.

Practitioners should maintain awareness of new research in computational propaganda, AI, bots and
related technologies.23
The Department of State should develop a comprehensive strategy and plan of action for managing
the impact of MADCOMs, analyze the possibility of
utilizing MADCOMs in public diplomacy and introduce in-house AI tools where appropriate.24 The
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Department should consider the worst-case scenario and be prepared for the possibility that the online
information environment may be completely overrun
with machine-driven speech. This would have a significant impact across a broad range of diplomatic
efforts that use the internet for messaging and communications.
In a world dominated by machine-generated, selflearning and propagating content, maintaining the
integrity of our communications campaigns and our
commitment to truthful content with open attribution is crucial to the efficacy of our efforts. Within
these parameters, the Department should develop
its own in-house MADCOM and AI tools. This does
not mean the department should engage in disinformation efforts or unattributed propaganda. Like all
technology, artificial intelligence can be used for both
good and bad purposes.
A number of tools and methods are available to help
human public diplomacy practitioners counter propagandists and their machines. The Department
must continue to develop sophisticated AI detection and attribution tools to identify and counter
disinformation campaigns before they spread.
The psychology behind computational propaganda effectiveness indicates that counter-messaging
established messages is unlikely to be effective.25
This implies that the best, and perhaps only way, to
counter computational propaganda is to detect disinformation campaigns when initiated and develop
rapid-response messaging campaigns to stifle the
disinformation before it goes viral.
Machine learning tools will be critically important in
identifying and monitoring adversary bot networks.
There may also be utility in “outing” bot networks to
social media companies, but this may have the unintended consequences of forcing propagandists to
improve their tools or driving them to more diverse
channels. As adversary MADCOMs become more
sophisticated and integrate AI technologies, AI tools
may be required for users to determine whether they
are interacting with a human or a machine online.
The Department should work with private companies
and academia to make these tools available.
The Department should develop AI chatbots. These
chatbots could discuss U.S. foreign policy generally,
or specific topics like countering violent extremism
or assisting U.S. businesses abroad. These chatbots
could be language localized and placed on U.S. em-
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bassy websites worldwide, or located on popular
messaging platforms like Facebook Messenger or
Kik. They can be an effective way to engage technology-friendly youth and provide a means for communicating policy ideas across a wide variety of platforms
without direct human intervention. Debating systems
will soon allow chatbots to have robust discussions
about complex topics, including U.S. foreign policy.
The Department should develop AI scanning tools
that improve on keyword searches by autonomously
scanning for conversations and content relevant to
U.S. foreign policy and flagging those items for action.
When relevant conversations are identified, humans
could intervene with a conversation or content, or AI
chatbots could be tasked with autonomously engaging users in discussions that promote U.S. policies or
ideas. Short of interventions, using AI machines to
simply track these conversations on the internet can
be helpful in providing real-time insights into opinions about U.S. foreign policy, unearthing nuances
between key audiences in certain countries, and enabling careful thinking about how to properly articulate American policies to these same audiences.
The Department should investigate tools for autonomous content creation regarding U.S. policy positions. AI’s are already capable of writing content for
sports and earnings reports that is indistinguishable
from human generated articles. This capability will
increase significantly over the next several years. AI
tools will soon be able to write first-drafts of speeches, create press releases and generate text, images
and video for social media faster than a human can
begin to consider a first draft. Such tools may become crucial as the Department is asked to accomplish more with fewer resources.
AI chatbots, conversation scanning tools and dynamic content creation tools will require systems that understand the semantics and intent of people when
they communicate. This requires research into machine learning and natural language processing tools
and the creation of an ontology for foreign affairs
topics. Essentially, the AI system will need to learn
the language of foreign affairs. This requires a significant, long-term investment of resources. However,
such a system will have additional diplomatic benefits outside of public diplomacy. AI tools to extract
meaning from conversations could be used to discover hidden knowledge and patterns from internal department communications. AI scanning tools could
be used as supplementary analytical “assistants” for
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U.S. diplomats. These would increase employee situational awareness, productivity and efficiency through
enhanced predictive abilities and automated country-specific event monitoring. AI content creation
tools would enable semi-automated speech-writing
and document preparation. AI conversational tools
could be used to share information among the Department’s various networks of contacts to support
diplomatic initiatives.26
The Department should also build capabilities for
personalized targeting of persuasive communications based on individual psychological profiling
and big-data analytics (within the parameters of key
statutes like the Privacy Act of 1974 and Smith-Mundt
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The U.S. government must adapt to the new threats
from AI-enabled computational propaganda before
the online information environment is toxified from
machine-generated speech. At the turn of the 21st
century, the internet was seen as a mortal threat to
authoritarian regimes due to increased openness,
access to information and ability to organize online.
Some regimes neutralized this threat and a number
of actors have turned our own technology against
us by hacking free speech. MADCOMs have given
foreign actors the ability to reach directly into the
United States with unprecedented reach, speed and
effectiveness. Artificial intelligence technologies will
soon boost those capabilities with additional velocity,

“The machines are here and they want
to have a word with us.”
Act). This would allow personalized messaging, or
mass-market communications campaigns to accurately tailor messages to target populations. These
tools would include affective computing technologies to identify and convey the appropriate emotional
tone in messaging. Machine-learning tools can also
be used to run test campaigns on individuals that
help optimize mass market campaigns for similar audiences.
Public diplomacy business processes will need to
adapt to use the new tools and operate closer to
machine speed. Content creation processes must
accelerate and approval cycles must compress. The
Department will need to gain comfort with machines
operating autonomously without tedious clearance
processes. The Department will also need to consider forming permanent rapid-response task forces
that can respond to emerging computational propaganda campaigns with high velocity rather than relying on one-off efforts.
The Department should consider how to promote
the development and availability of real-time
fact-checking27 and bot detection tools. These may
be useful for validating news and content and identifying whether an account is machine-driven. Standalone tools would rely on the user proactively accessing them, but technology companies could integrate
these functions into browsers, applications and other platforms.

personalized targeting, human mimicry, increased
operational tempo and machine learning. Regulation
is one option,28 but hardly the only option. The government needs a comprehensive, strategic response
to the current threat but also to the environment we
are rapidly moving into.
Responding to the threat of AI-enabled machine-driven communications tools, and capitalizing on opportunities posed by AI MADCOMs, will require a
conceptual leap in understanding into the world of
personalized, psychology-based, machine-driven
persuasion. This struggle will take place 24 hours
a day, every day and will become so rapid and complex that humans cannot hope to operate effectively
alone. Rather than using new tools to do the same old
processes better (e.g., dynamically generated press
releases), new artificial intelligence and MADCOM
tools must be integrated thoroughly into PD business
processes that are reinvented and reimagined to take
advantage of those tools. This will require PD professionals to learn to team with intelligent machines. It
will also require AI tools of high enough quality that
we can trust them with the autonomy they will require. This will take years of hard work to accomplish.
We must accelerate our efforts immediately.
The machines are here and they want to have a word
with us. Our level of preparation for this emerging reality will determine the fate of the internet, our societyandourdemocracy.

46

ACPD | Can Public Diplomacy Survive the Internet?

ENDNOTES
1.

See Meet XiaoIce, Cortana’s Little Sister: https://blogs.bing.com/search/2014/09/05/meet-xiaoice-cortanas-little-sister/; and
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xiaoice

2.

MADCOMs can include anything from robo-dialing telemarketing tools, to AI home assistants like Amazon Echo, to cutting edge
(and mysterious) AIs like “T” that dynamically create thousands of fake news videos for YouTube.

3.

See this video from DARPA that explains how AI evolved and how machine learning segments manifold data: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O01G3tSYpU

4.

See For Sympathetic Ear, More Chinese Turn to Smartphone Program: https://nyti.ms/2peM3T6; and Meet XiaoIce, Cortana’s
Little Sister: https://blogs.bing.com/search/2014/09/05/meet-xiaoice-cortanas-little-sister/

5.

See AP’s ‘robot journalists’ are writing their own stories now: http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/29/7939067/ap-journalism-automation-robots-financial-reporting

6.

See An AI Written Novel Has Passed Literary Prize Screening: https://futurism.com/this-ai-wrote-a-novel-and-the-work-passedthe-first-round-of-a-national-literary-award/

7.

See IBM Debating Technologies: http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/view_group.php?id=5443

8.

See Affective Computing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affective_computing

9.

See Research on Affective Pattern Recognition and Modeling: http://affect.media.mit.edu/areas.php?id=recognizing

10.

See This Freaky Baby Could Be the Future of AI: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzFW4-dvFDA&feature=youtu.be

11.

See Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of RGB Videos: http://www.graphics.stanford.edu/~niessner/thies2016face.html

12.

See Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of RGB Videos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohmajJTcpNk&feature=youtu.be

13.

See Concatenation synthesis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_synthesis#Concatenation_synthesis

14.

See A system for voice conversion based on probabilistic classification and a harmonic plus noise model: http://ieeexplore.ieee.
org/document/674422/?reload=true

15.

See Google’s DeepMind develops creepy, ultra-realistic human speech synthesis: www.geek.com/tech/googles-deepmind-develops-creepy-ultra-realistic-human-speech-synthesis-1670362/

16.

See The Secretive World of Selling Data About You: http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-464789

17.

See The Secret Agenda of a Facebook Quiz: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/the-secret-agenda-of-a-facebookquiz.html

18.

See Behind the scenes at Donald Trump’s UK digital war room: http://news.sky.com/story/behind-the-scenes-at-donald-trumpsuk-digital-war-room-10626155

19.

Have you ever taken a personality test on Facebook? If so, you’ve probably given a marketer your personality and possibly psychological profile, along with your name, email address and friend list.

20.

See the accompanying paper “Understanding the Psychology Behind Computational Propaganda”

21.

This balance between MADCOMs precisely targeted towards people and MADCOMs targeted towards machines and people is
an unknown variable. Raising the costs to MADCOMs through filtering might have a significant positive impact on the information
environment. As an analogy, filtering reduces but does not eliminate email spam.

22.

Facebook’s ‘Real Name’ policy and Twitter’s automation policy are two examples of efforts to fight bots and fake accounts.

23.

Politicalbots.org is an excellent resource for computational propaganda information and has a recommended reading list. The
Observatory on Social Media publishes research on information diffusion in social media. The author maintains a directory of AI
policy issues and resources on Medium.

24.

The State Department already uses MADCOMs and AI as they are built into social media platforms; e.g. Facebook targeted advertising relies on machine learning to reach the desired audience.

25.

See the accompanying paper: “Understanding the Psychology Behind Computational Propaganda”
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26.

Creation of this initial ontological system would likely cost upwards of $5 million and would require significant annual investments to build capabilities and expertise in specific topics. However, the benefits in terms of increased capabilities, productivity
and efficiency argue for this long-term investment. Otherwise the State Department will soon find that it is the only comparably
sized, global organization without enterprise AI tools built into its business processes, and will suffer for this lack of capability.

27.

See Automated Fact Checking: The Holy Grail of Political Communication: http://nordicapis.com/automated-fact-check- ingthe-holy-grail-of-political-communication/

28.

This raises 1st Amendment Concerns, but foreign actors do not have Constitutional protections, nor do machines. The United
States has regulated false speech in areas where there is consensus that the false speech is against the public interest, like false
advertising, slander and libel cases.

CC BY-NC-ND 2.0, elle a

PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN AN EVOLVING
INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM
By Jeffrey T. Hancock, Professor of Communication, Stanford University
In this essay I focus on some of the psychological
aspects of how communication technology affects
the way that people deceive and trust one another.
The deep concerns we’ve been facing lately about a
“post-truth society” are really a reflection of how we
can trust one another in a world dominated by social
media, a place in which people we may or may not
know can communicate with us at any time and from
anywhere. How can we tell if someone is lying to us in
their tweet, their Facebook post, the news that they
shared via a text or an online video? Worse yet, some
of those people might not even be people, but bots
coordinating to promote some propaganda or commercial interest.
Concerns about misinformation, fake news and
whether my new friend is a bot can lead us to conclude that social media is dramatically increasing
deception in the world, and that soon we’ll be unable
to trust one another, or establish what information is
true. But as Ambassador Bruce Wharton, Acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
suggests in this report, I believe that we are not in a
post-truth society. Although we’re paying more attention to the topic of truth and evidence, social media
and related technologies do not spell the end of honesty. Instead, that technology will transform how deception takes place, how we detect lies and how we
come to trust one another.
These changes to truth-telling and trust will not be
random or unpredictable, but will be driven by principles and factors that the social sciences have been
identifying over the past century. We need not throw
out the book of psychology, for example, to understand how public diplomacy needs to adapt to the
changes wrought by social media. Below I review
these principles and provide an overview of the latest
research on deception detection and trust, concluding with insights on what those engaged in public diplomacy need to address most to succeed in an evolving communication and information environment.

AN ANCIENT PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONCERN
Every generation tends to think that the current generation is less honest than the previous generation.
This is an old human concern. In western culture we
have Diogenes, the Greek philosopher who searched
for a single honest man, failing to ever find one. In
the east, the Chinese were so concerned with honesty that they developed the first deception detection
technique over 2000 years ago. They put dry rice
into a suspected liar’s mouth. If the suspect couldn’t
talk then it suggested they didn’t have enough saliva,
which the Chinese believed was a symptom of lying.
These ancient examples highlight that it is important
to historicize our current concern with deception
and misinformation with social media. As a society,
we have long been concerned with truthfulness, and
this concern is often made more salient when new
communication technologies are introduced, from
the printing press to the radio. With social media, we
see a similar pattern. To put deception and social media into context, it is useful to understand what psychology has uncovered about how deception works.

A PRIMER ON DECEPTION DETECTION
What does the hundreds of studies by psychologists
and communication researchers on deception detection tell us? First, and surprisingly, there is no reliable
cue that always indicates whether a person is lying.
There is no Pinocchio’s nose, as much as TV shows
or self-help magazines would like us to believe. While
there are some contexts, such as interrogations and
interviews and other high-stake situations, where
reliable cues to deception can be elicited, there is no
nonverbal cue that reveals lying in all the different
domains of human discourse. Recent work suggests
that deception can be more reliably revealed in language patterns, but sophisticated training or computer programs are required to identify the linguistic
footprints of lies.
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An overall meta-analysis of hundreds of deception
experiments reveals that humans perform at chance
levels (54 percent) when detecting deception. We
really aren’t very good at telling if someone is lying
based on verbal or nonverbal cues, in part because
there are no reliable cues. This difficulty in detecting
deception transfers over to social media deception.
In studies examining phishing attacks, where deceptive emails are used to access sensitive information
(as was the case in the hacking of the Clinton campaign accounts), even sophisticated users can be deceived, online or off.
In fact, there is only one reliable finding in every deception detection study: people tend to trust what
others say, an effect called the truth bias. Our default
state is to trust what other people say. This bias is

deception by just relying on cues in the message, we
now have information tools available that can help
investigate potential deceptions that were hard to
imagine just a few years ago (for more on the value
of fact-checking efforts, see Ethan Porter’s essay in
this report).
The last finding from the deception literature that is
important to share is that people lie for a reason, and
these reasons are widely varied. While this may seem
obvious, it is important to note this when considering
how deception operates in the current environment.
Fake news articles in the last election cycle were produced sometimes to influence voters, but more often
the motives were simply profit. Without considering
the reasons for deception, it is impossible to counter
them.

“Every generation tends to think that the current generation is less honest than the previous
generation. This is an old human concern.”
actually quite rational—most of the messages that a
person encounters in a day are honest, so being biased toward the truth is almost always the correct
response. This tendency to trust messages is, of
course, one of the reasons that lies can succeed, but
it’s important to note how fundamental the truth bias
is. Language philosophers even argue that for language to work we must assume a cooperative partner, suggesting that the truth bias is fundamental to
communication.
There are two other important findings from the deception literature that are relevant to public diplomacy.While we have a difficult time detecting deception
fromcues,likeeyegazeorvocalpitch,peoplecandetectlieswhentheyhavethetime,resourcesandmotivation. Lies are often discovered through contradicting information from a third source, or evidence that
challenges a deceptive account. Much like the way
police officers investigate witness statements and
suspectalibis, peopleoftendeterminethat theyhave
been deceived by seeking out and learning from other information. Our recent work suggests that most
lies that people detect rely on information from others, or come from using search engines like Google
orexaminingactivitiespostedonsocial networksites
like Facebook. Thus, while we may be bad at detecting

DECEPTION AND TRUST IN AN EVOLVING COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT
Deception is the deliberate attempt to create a false
belief in another, so to understand deception it is
important to understand how beliefs are formed.
Cognitive science research reveals that we tend to
believe information that we receive, which gives rise
to the truth bias described above. This initial belief
is “sticky” and the belief can persist even when it is
later shown to be false or incorrect, suggesting that
the first mover in sharing information has an advantage. Further, as information is repeated, these initial
beliefs become even more difficult to overturn, a fact
that advertisers know well.
At the same time people are also continuously evaluating the validity of their understanding of the world.
This process is called “epistemic vigilance,” a continuous process checking that the information that a
person believes they know about the world is accurate. Epistemic vigilance works in parallel with the
truth bias, alert to any signals that information about
the world may be incorrect, such as inconsistencies
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across sources. Thus, while our default is to trust incoming information, people also evaluate their information environment to ensure that their understanding of their world is valid.
As our information ecology evolves to be more mediatized1 and digital, the operation of epistemic vigilanceneedstoevolveaswell.Considerthesharingof
a fake news story by Shawn on Facebook that is read
by Markos. There are several signals Markos’ epistemic vigilance might rely on: the degree to which
Markos knows and trusts Shawn, how often the article has been “liked” by others, and the number of
times the article has been shared. If these signals
are all high, then there is little to trigger additional
vigilance or signal for Markos to move away from his
default state of trust.
Since the alarms over fake news emerged, social
network sites and journalists have begun to develop
additional signals that can help people assess the
validity of information. For example, Facebook now
allows users to flag stories that may be fake. These
stories are then examined by fact checkers, and if the
story is fake an alert is shown whenever the story is
shared on the platform. This kind of signal functions
to trigger epistemic vigilance and help individuals
make decisions about whether to trust the information or not. While this is a promising development, it
is still too early to measure the effectiveness of these
measures. This change nonetheless points to at least
one direction for improving our ability to assess information in social media.
Much more is required to establish trustworthy communication in our evolving information environment.
While substantial work is required to continuing improving the trustworthiness of our cyber systems,
we also need to betterunderstand the social aspects
of these new technologies. In our own work, we have
begun to look at how people reason about social
technologies, like Facebook or Twitter newsfeeds. We
find that people have folk theories about these technologies, which represent the person’s general understanding of how a system works. These theories
weighquestions,such as:How do algorithms decide
to share info? How are sources perceived? To what
degree do these systems validate information?
For example, we find that some people think of Facebook’s newsfeed as a personal shopper, helping the
person find things of interest to them. Others, however, think of the newsfeed as a spy or as paparazzi, concerned that the system is designed to exploit

them for the gain of others. Without knowing more
about people’s folk theories of these complex systems, it is difficult to predict how audiences will react
to messages that are shared through them, such as
whether they trust them or not.

SOME REASONS FOR HOPE: LESSONS
FROM THE SHARING ECONOMY
There is substantial reason to be optimistic in the long
term about truth and trust with technology. Although
trust in institutions, such as media, government and
religion, has been in decline for over a decade, there
has been substantial trust observed in how people
are believing each other via technology. For example,
when purchasing new products and services, most
people will rely on online reviews to make decisions
about what hotel to reserve or which car to buy. More
people trust peers when making these decisions
than any other form of media. In another domain, we
see huge trust in social support groups that operate
on the internet, with strangers providing support
and advice to other strangers, trusting one another
to help each other face cancer, overcome the loss of
loved ones, or how to recover from bankruptcy.
This inversion of trust, decreasing trust in institutions but rise in interpersonal trust, can also be observed in the sharing economy, from home-sharing
to car-sharing. Consider the level of trust required to
allow strangers to stay in your home. Or the amount
of trust required to hop into a stranger’s car late at
night in a strange neighborhood. How does trust operate in this multi-billion-dollar economy, and what
insights can it provide for public diplomacy in this
evolving communication environment?
First, the trust placed in these services is warranted.
Very few rides on Lyft or Uber result in any negative
incident. The same is true for house-sharing services
like Airbnb. One reason for this is that the users’ goals
are aligned. One user would like to sell their service
while the other user wants to buy this service. When
goals are aligned, trust can facilitate many social
transactions. Public diplomats know this well—messages must be aligned with the goals of the audience
or the partner. Forgetting this can undermine any
diplomatic enterprise.
Second, while we usually think about the person taking the risk when we think about trust situations, it is
important to consider the psychological dynamics on
the other side of the risk, the person being trusted.
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When people are trusted with something valuable,
such as being allowed into a stranger’s home, they often experience feelings of responsibility and are even
nervous about harming the other person. Indeed,
many Airbnb hosts report that their homes are in
great shape after renting them out. Trust often leads
to trustworthy behavior.
Third, users of these services believe that there is infrastructure in place to protect them from violations
of trust. Users expect that brands like Airbnb will reimburse them for any damages. Further, there trust is
built on layers of older, legacy infrastructure, like law
enforcement and financial regulation. In addition to
the brand of a service, such as Airbnb, users expect to
be supported by the enforcement of legal institutions
put in place long before social media came on the
scene, from the police department to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau. These layers of infrastructure that build trust should also be considered
in public diplomacy campaigns. Programming that
aims to establish relationships, and build on those relationships over time, is likely to result in robust networks of shared interests and understanding.
Finally, technology plays an important role. Users
of Uber report feeling safe in part because the app
constantly records where they are. They believe
that should something go wrong, there will be a record, and that this record keeps people honest. Indeed, one of the most important transformations
of the communication environment is the record of

behaviors, taking millions of rides with strangers and
allowing millions of strangers to stay at their homes.

LESSONS FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
TRAINING AND IMPLEMENTATION
As people engaged in public diplomacy adapt to the
evolving communication environment to engage
with foreign audiences, what are some of the keys for
success? The first is recognizing that the goals and
values of the United States and its allies and adversaries are paramount. It is important to keep a focus
on goals, objectives and our own values. Deception is
often detrimental in the long term, and the costs to
reputations can be severe. In one study asking people to rank traits, the one ranked lowest from a total
of over 500 was “liar.”
It is also important for those serving in a public diplomacy role to receive new forms of training and
education. This training should involve an emphasis
on media literacy, including both the social science of
technology and also enhancing technical skills. One
model may be the computational journalism program at Stanford University, which seeks to transform journalism by providing journalists with computational capacities that will change how they can
investigate issues of public interest. I can imagine a
new program for “computational diplomacy” that has
similar goals, to develop new skills for diplomacy that
incorporate computational abilities and social sci-

“Trust often leads to trustworthy behavior”
so many more behaviors and actions. Deception is
made more difficult when there’s a record, as most
politicians caught up in personal scandals can attest.
Public diplomacy practitioners must remain vigilant
in ensuring their outreach is transparent and messaging grounded in empiricism.
Overall, the sharing economy points out a possible
path for how trust can emerge and thrive in a fully
mediatized information environment, and how many
partners and layers of infrastructure can be leveraged to make it work. Importantly, it is also reassuring to see that people trust one another with their

ence training for understanding the social and technical aspects of new communication environments.
Finally, the United States needs to continue to develop its technical capabilities to be able to detect and
counter misinformation and other attacks by hostile
others. Importantly, this should be coupled with a
similar investment in training in the social sciences,
from the psychology of technology discussed here to
social network analysis. All of these technological capacities and social analysis skills will be required to
best engage our foreign audiences.
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ENDNOTES
1.

In media studies, mediatization is a theory suggesting that the media shapes and frames the processes and discourse of political communication as well as the society in which that communication takes place.
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FACTS MATTER, AND PEOPLE CARE:
AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
By Ethan Porter, Asst. Professor at George Washington University School of Media and Public Affairs
Does fact-checking work? That is, if we provide people with information that corrects their misperceptions, do they respond by accepting the new information—or do they reject it and cling to their prior
beliefs, no matter how wrong they might be? There is
ample reason to be pessimistic. Hardly a day goes by
without a pundit or public figure bemoaning the arrival of a “post-truth” age, in which the stuff of facts and
evidence no longer matters. Although media institutions devote considerable resources to fact-checking, the naked eye suggests that such efforts are
mostly for naught. One only has to spend a little time
on the internet, or talk with family members, to become acquainted with a vast variety of confidently
asserted mistruths offered by all sides of the political
spectrum.
Researchers are of two camps on this matter. On
the one hand, some have offered evidence implying
that efforts to raise the level of political knowledge
and correct misinformation are unlikely to succeed.
According to this school of thought, people know
very little about politics and they are so committed
to their political beliefs that they have difficulty accepting facts that challenge those beliefs.1 In fact, attempting to correct misperceptions may only serve
to strengthen people’s commitments to their misperceptions.2 According to another perspective, however, pessimism about citizens’ political knowledge and
their receptivity toward factual information is grossly
overstated. Though people may not know as much
about politics as policymakers and educators might
wish, they are quite capable of learning more, even
when doing so requires them to break from their political commitments or to think through complicated
policy issues.3
In this essay, I review both perspectives. I then describe three studies, administered over large numbers of people in the United States and the United
Kingdom, that puncture the pessimists’ consensus.
The studies make clear that, while people may not
know much about politics, they can learn more and,
crucially, that their misperceptions can be corrected.
Fact-checking may not work to the degree that some
hope it will but, as a general matter, it does seem to
work. Not only can people learn about politics, but

they can do so even when the issues are complicated
and when the facts challenge their most cherished
political beliefs.
Academic research offers many reasons to be skeptical that citizens can learn and that fact-checking can
work. From a bird’s eye view, the public appears to be
terribly misinformed. For example, in both the United States and the United Kingdom —two of the most
well-educated states in the world—citizens dramatically over-estimate the amount of money their governments spend on foreign aid, sometimes by factors
of ten.4 The picture only gets worse from here. Not
only do citizens know very little about politics, they
are virtually incapable of learning more. Their level of
commitment to their party of choice is so strong that
their partisanship effectively precludes them from
learning new information that conflicts with their
political commitments. Partisanship, it has been said,
instills what has been evocatively called a “perceptual screen” that comes between everyday people and
the empirical world around them. When confronted
with information that challenges their political beliefs, they may aggressively seek out information that
confirms those beliefs.5
Perhaps the most infamous example of citizens’ unwillingness to brook new, challenging facts comes in
the form of the supposed “backfire effect.” The backfire effect proposes that, when people are presented
with facts that correct misstatements made by their
co-partisans, they will become more convinced of the
misstatements. That is, rather than move toward the
factually accurate position, they will move in the other
direction. First identified in the study of attitudes toward the Iraq War, during which time conservatives
backfired against corrections relating to the United
States failure to find weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), the backfire effect has also been observed
in relationship to attitudes about tax policy and vaccinations.6 As the name of the phenomenon implies,
fact-checking does not simply fail—it backfires, producing the opposite effect of what those who implement it intend.
For nearly just as long as some scholars have offered
reasons to think that citizens cannot learn, others
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have disagreed. Several have argued that well-known
estimations of political ignorance are wildly overstated.7 Others have shown that offering small monetary
incentives for accurate responses can dramatically
reduce the amount of partisan bias that colors answers to factual questions.8 Still others have shown
that citizens can, over time and with some effort, increase their store of political knowledge—they can
“learn together, slowly.”9
Three recent studies have tested these competing
schools of thought. In the first study, conducted in
Spring 2016, we attempted to map out the backfire
effect among U.S. citizens, to identify the specific policy areas that would provoke certain ideological and
partisan groups to backfire. Similar to the original
studies that found backfire in relationship to WMDs
in Iraq, we searched for instances in which political
office holders or political office seekers made factual misstatements. We then randomly exposed some
survey takers to a correction to the misstatement.10
In all cases, the correction explicitly referred to neutral government data. We then asked all subjects
whether they agreed with the factually accurate position espoused by the politician who had made the
statement.11
We were careful to include a broad variety of issues
and politicians from both parties. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, we found many examples of misstatements
from both parties.) In one experiment, subjects were
randomly assigned to see only a misstatement and
then a neutral correction. For example, all respondents were presented with the following statement
by Hillary Clinton:
”We need to get back into the habit of actually rewarding workers with increases in
their paychecks...Warren Buffett has said

it, but so have a lot of other people. There’s
something wrong when hedge fund managers make more, and pay less in taxes,
than nurses or truck drivers.”
Then, those randomly assigned to see the correction
saw:
“In fact, according to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the average hedge fund manager pays about 20 times as much income tax
as the average truck driver or nurse.”
All subjects were then asked to agree or disagree
with the factually incorrect statement offered by the
politician. We were not afraid to identify Hillary Clinton’s partisan affiliation; we placed it squarely next to
her name. By the logic of backfire, this presentation
should compel Clinton’s co-partisans to reject the
correction provided, and become more convinced of
the factually inaccurate position articulated by Clinton. We also found instances of policy areas in which
members of both parties had made misstatements.
For example, Democrats and Republicans have exaggerated the amount of U.S. debt that China owns.
Again, we provided all subjects with these bipartisan misperceptions, randomly showed some survey
takers a correction based on data from a neutral
government source and then asked everyone if they
agreed or disagreed with the misperception. Finally,
because some of the earlier backfire work embedded
misstatements and the attendant corrections in (fictitious) newspaper articles, we created newspaper
articles of our own. We took a new set of misstatements made by leaders of both parties, crafted articles around such misstatements and, in some of the
articles, included corrections to the misstatements
based on neutral government data.

“...when the correction went against their
co-partisan, they sided with the correction
over and above their partisanship. When a
fellow partisan is being corrected, people still
learn from the correction, albeit grudgingly. ”
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All told, this study enrolled 8,100 people and tested 36
different issues’ capacity to generate backfire. On 35
issues, we observed no backfire. Regardless of their
own partisan beliefs, and regardless of the party affiliation of the politician being corrected, those survey
takers who saw the correction became more convinced of the factually accurate position. To be sure,
people were more reluctant to accept the facts when
the facts corrected a fellow partisan than when the
facts corrected a member of the opposite party. But
even when the correction went against their co-partisan, they sided with the correction over and above
their partisanship. When a fellow partisan is being
corrected, people still learn from the correction, albeit grudgingly.
As noted, we observed one instance of backfire. In
this case, it was the same issue that yielded backfire in the initial backfire study—whether the United
States had found WMD in Iraq. Once again, conservatives shown a correction clarifying that no WMD
were in fact found became more convinced that WMD
were found. However, even this replicable instance of
backfire was quickly overturned when we changed
the wording of the survey question. When the question was made more succinct, backfire vanished.
Once again, regardless of their partisan identification, everyone was willing to accept the factual correction provided to them.12
Of the 36 issues we tested, 35 did not generate backfire; and the one that did was highly susceptible to
question-wording effects. Just as important as what
we found—that backfire is, at best, a byproduct of
question wording—was what we didn’t find. We found
no evidence that people exposed to more factual corrections over the course of our studies became more
or less willing to accept factual corrections. Nor did
we find evidence that the order of factual corrections
one saw had any impact on one’s willingness to indicate agreement with the facts. In attempting to map
out the contours of the backfire effect, we found it
was far smaller than previous research indicated.
In the study just described, all experiments were
conducted in the United States in Spring 2016—as
the presidential race was ongoing, but before both
parties had selected their nominees. According to
the pessimistic school of thought, the relationship
between facts and partisan loyalty matters quite a
bit. And if this is the case, then it stands to reason
that the relationship might be at its apex after both
parties have selected nominees. To account for this
possibility, we conducted an additional study during
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the general election. This study consisted of two experiments designed to whether the white heat of the
general election would make people more susceptible to backfire than they would be otherwise.13
In the first experiment, we exploited a statement
made by then-candidate Trump during the 2016 Republican National Convention about crime. Not only
was the statement at odds with data produced by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, but when media figures critiqued him for it, his campaign responded by
denigrating the quality of the data and implying the
existence of an anti-Trump conspiracy within the FBI.
Once again, we devised several fictitious news articles. In one version, we merely relayed Trump’s statements. In another, we included a correction. In still
another, we included the correction and the Trump
campaign’s denigration of the data. In yet another,
we included the correction, the Trump campaign’s
denigration of the data and its insinuation that an anti-Trump conspiracy within the FBI had meddled with
the data.
In the second experiment, we exploited a misstatement made by Trump during the first debate of the
general election. While we conducted the experiment on the convention statements six weeks after
the convention, we conducted the experiment about
the debate on the same night as the debate. During
the debate, he made a claim about unemployment
that diverged from available Bureau of Labor Statistics data. On the night of the debate, we paid people
to watch the debate. After it ended, we showed everyone Trump’s inaccurate unemployment claim and
then showed some the BLS correction.
In both experiments, all subjects proved willing to accept the factual correction provided to them.14 Trump
supporters did the same, even though their candidate was being corrected in the midst of a presidential election. However, their views of their preferred
candidate did not budge. In the convention study,
Trump supporters who saw the correction became
no less favorable to Donald Trump—even though
they accepted the content of the correction. We observed a similar pattern in the debate study. Trump
supporters who saw the correction did not subsequently change their minds about candidate Trump.
Though they accepted the factual correction, thereby
conceding that their preferred candidate had made
statements at odds with the facts, they were no less
willing to support him as a result. The verdict is clear:
People can accept factual correction, even when doing so forces them to break from their preferred po-
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“To issue a correction does not amount to putting the
thumb on the scale and favoring one candidate over
another... the only consequence of fact-checking...
is that it increases the extent to which the public believes in factually accurate information.”
litical parties, and even in the midst of a presidential
election.
Can people also learn about politics when a complex
policy matter, independent of partisan politics, is at
stake? A third study suggests that they can. In 2014,
the United Kingdom mailed “taxpayer receipts” that
offered itemized descriptions of how government
had spent the tax money it collected, presented on
a per-capita basis, to 26 million taxpayers. Working in coordination with the U.K. tax authorities, we
empaneled a large group of survey respondents.15
We then randomly assigned some people to receive
reminders and encouragements about the taxpayer receipt that they would receive soon in the mail.
We surveyed everyone before and after the receipts
went out about their level of political knowledge and
a host of political attitudes. To measure levels of political knowledge, we asked subjects to estimate how
much their government had spent on various items
over the previous year. This information, contained
in the receipts themselves, has confounded many
people in many countries. As mentioned above, people are notoriously lacking in knowledge about how
much their governments spend on foreign aid—and
we asked everyone precisely this question.16
Across a range of knowledge measures, we found
that the receipts caused a significant uptick in political knowledge. Measured a number of different ways,
we find that, indeed, the receipts made people more
likely to provide accurate estimates of the amount
their government was spending on foreign aid. We
found similar effects for other uses of government

money. However, we found no effects on related political attitudes. In this study, people were not asked
to break from a fellow partisan and accept a factual
correction; instead, they were asked to break from
their own prior misperceptions. And they did so. To
be sure, they did not know much about politics before
the receipts went out. But they could learn. And they
could do so without changing their views on related
matters.
For those with public responsibilities, the erosion
of the pessimistic consensus has significant implications. Fact-checkers should take their foot off
the break. Where they see erroneous claims, they
should be unafraid to intervene. When administered
to counter a fiction, a correction can prevail even
over the power of partisanship. This is true not only
when political figures make misstatements, but when
vast numbers of citizens believe in policy mistruths,
as with foreign aid. Again and again, the facts get
through.
That we find no evidence that increasing political
knowledge causes related attitude change should
further fuel the fire of those who wish to increase
political knowledge. To issue a correction does not
amount to putting the thumb on the scale and favoring one candidate over another. Instead, the only
consequence of fact-checking that we can consistently detect is that it increases the extent to which
the public believes in factually accurate information.
Whatever one’s political position, this seems a laudable end.
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Voice of America

VOA: A WEAPON OF TRUTH IN THE WAR OF WORDS
By Amanda Bennett, Director, Voice of America

Does truth matter? In a simple word, yes. Are we living in a post-truth era? No. Despite the flood of misinformation and our own fears of being overcome by it,
history shows that truth is one of our most powerful
weapons. Against the current backdrop of propaganda and falsified news in the global media environment, truth and facts stand out—informing, educating and empowering citizenry.
Voice of America, for 75 years, has been offering just
that—the truth. In its first broadcast, William Harlan Hale said “The news may be good for us. The news
may be bad. But we shall tell you the truth.” Much has
changed since the days of Nazi propaganda and
shortwave radio. The revolution in technology and
vast proliferation in social media use over just the
past decade has dramatically upended the way information is gathered and shared.
These technological advancements initially raised
hopes for more informed and connected societies—and perhaps a diminishing need for a government-funded broadcaster like VOA. However, this
optimism must be tempered by today’s reality. State
and non-state actors alike are trying to undermine
Western democratic principles and are using traditional and social media to distribute their message.
Bots and trolls disrupt civil debate online and websites masquerading as news sites offer sensational
headlines just to make a quick, click-through, dollar.
The effort to manipulate or incite is not new. In the
past, whole swathes of the globe were denied access
to truthful information. However, the problem today
is compounded by the ease and speed with which
false information can be disseminated. This can create a sense of chaos and uncertainty about what to
believe and whom to trust.
VOA, with its commitment to fact-based journalism,
connections to far-flung audiences, and its vast network of affiliates, is an effective communications tool
against such threats because it can be trusted; trusted to provide comprehensive news, information and
context. Its mission was codified into law in 1976 in
the VOA Charter which states that VOA will be a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate news; that it will tell America’s story, not any single segment of American society, but a balanced and

comprehensive projection of significant American
thought; and that it will present U.S. policies clearly and effectively, along with responsible discussion
and opinions of those policies.
Some argue that in today’s environment that is not
enough, that given the efforts of networks such as
Russia Today (RT) and China Global Television Network (CGTN), we need to do more, fight fire with fire.
However, truth will always be much more powerful than propaganda in the long run—and the effort
to counter disinformation must be just that: a longterm play. During World War II, U.S. sailors may have
listened to Japanese propaganda disseminated by
“Tokyo Rose.” They enjoyed the music, but they didn’t
believe what was said because it was so obviously
false. I was in China when the post-Cultural Revolution control of information was near-absolute. Even
then, people understood they did not have the whole
truth. Today, Russia’s Sputnik TV is so biased in favor
of the Kremlin that its influence on rational observers
is muted. Despite the billions spent on their efforts, RT
and China’sCGTNhaverelatively small audiences.
There are also indications that falsified, or overly
hyped and biased views, can backfire. In Germany,
far-right groups have revived the Nazi-era term “Lugenpresse” or “lying press” to describe the media, in
particular, its coverage of refugees and the German
government’s immigration policies. However, a new
annual survey conducted by the University of Würzburg shows that German trust in the media actually went up sharply in 2016. The level of trust, at 55.7
percent, is the highest since the survey was started
in 2000. Even the number of respondents who considered themselves right-wing and said they trust
the press increased by 18 percent over the last year,
rising from 33 percent in 2015 to 51 percent in 2016.
Heavily biased content is seen for what it is. The need
for accurate, comprehensive, news and information
is evident by the fact that many of those in the VOA
audience risk their lives just to access it. In China and
Tibet, efforts to circumvent government censors are
widespread. In Iran, satellite dishes are illegal, but
you can find them everywhere. People try to disguise
and hide them in order to access VOA and other
western content.
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In addition, journalists risk their lives to work for
VOA. One reporter who worked for VOA in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region and Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan had his house blown
up and was eventually forced to flee to the United
States. Another was gunned down in a mosque near
Charsadda, a town close to FATA. Yet another reporter working for VOA in Syria recently had his house
bombed by ISIS. Others faced torture and abuse just
to have the opportunity to exercise the right of a free
press.

By adhering to the principles of good journalism,
VOA represents significant American thought including demonstrating the value of the rights to free
speech and a free press. It also establishes a bulwark
against disinformation. VOA is a voice the audience
can trust—in good times and in bad. Its authoritative,
engaging rapport builds a solid foundation for positive, long-term relationships. It takes years to establish the high level of trust VOA has earned; but if you
take away that credibility and authenticity, trust can
disappear immediately.

In parts of the world where alternate sources of information are very limited or virtually non-existent,
or where systems are highly polarized, VOA is a beacon of light. By providing unfettered access to news
and information in 47 languages, VOA reaches people in a way that CNN cannot. In fact, VOA reaches
more than three times the domestic (U.S.) audience
of CNN, MSNBC and Fox News combined. By the end
of 2016, VOA’s global weekly audience stood at 236.6

Edward R. Murrow, then Director of the U.S. Information Agency, stated in 1963 in congressional testimony, “American traditions and the American ethic require
us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that
truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be
persuasive, we must be believable; to be believable, we
must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is
as simple as that.”

“VOA reaches more than three times the domestic (U.S.) audience of CNN, MSNBC and Fox
Newscombined. Bytheendof2016,VOA’sglobal weekly audience stoodat236.6 million...”
million—the highest number ever recorded and a 26
percent increase over the previous year.
The size of the audience, while impressive, is just one
part of the story of VOA impact. Research shows that
86 percent of the audience finds VOA to be trustworthy, and three-fourths say VOA helps them to understand U.S. policy and current events.
The highest-ranking diplomat ever to defect from
North Korea, Thae Young-ho, recently said that while
still a foreign ministry official in Pyongyang, he read
what he termed “reference radio materials of VOA”
every morning and afternoon. He said the “North Korean regime also pays great attention on the contents
of VOA, so I think it is very important that VOA should
further strengthen its activity, and also its contents
so that, one day, I hope VOA is remembered by North
Korean people as a kind of, you know, the main player
who contributed a lot for the reunification of the Korean peninsula.”

From its beginnings, this is what set VOA apart.
Whether it be German propaganda in World War II
or Soviet propaganda in the Cold War, facts and balanced reporting were powerful weapons. Fast forward to state-sponsored false narratives, radical Islamist propaganda, and a bewildering array of things
passing themselves off as fact online. We may not be
able to counter every falsehood or half-truth pointby-point, but we can paint a different narrative, one
that is truthful and constructive. Compared to the
plethora of anti-U.S. propaganda splattered across
the internet, VOA provides an alternative canvas of
news and information that is believable because it is
based on facts. True stories about Americans, diaspora communities, U.S. government and public policies, health and technology issues.
When VOA tells these stories, the audience often
perceives more than we may even realize. Last year,
VOA’s Khmer service reporter was providing coverage of pro- and anti-gun protestors at the Republican
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National Convention via Facebook Live. The crowds
were particularly rowdy and tense. However, what
really stood out to Cambodian viewers was something else. Among their comments on Facebook in
real time were “Police in the U.S. do not beat up protestors like Hun Sen’s police in Cambodia” and “If it
was in Cambodia, Hun Sen would send police and
dogs to beatand bite the protestorsalready.”
This is just one example of how, by sharing truthful
facts, VOA not only explains the context of a news story, but also shows what life in the United States is like.
VOA journalists often go to great lengths and face
significant risks to get the facts straight. It is the
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trust in VOA reporters that led the Somali President
in Mogadishu and Somali immigrants in the United
States to agree to take part in a joint town hall. The
same trust and credibility prompted one of Ukraine’s
leading television networks to ask a VOA anchor to
moderate a parliamentary debate.
Whether they are covering wars, natural or manmade disasters, telling American stories or explaining U.S. government policies—VOA reporters and
programmers are trusted and reliable. Truth and
fact-based journalism are what the audience needs
atthis time—andarethestrongestweaponswehave
in the war of words.
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U.S. 2016 ELECTIONS: A CASE STUDY
IN “INOCULATING” PUBLIC OPINION
AGAINST DISINFORMATION
By Jonathan Henick, Principal Deputy Coordinator for International Information Programs and
RyanWalsh,SeniorAdvisorforDigitalProduct,BureauofInternationalInformationPrograms
Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle,
politicians and pundits sounded the alarms over “fake
news” and its potential role in influencing public opinion. Facebook and Google scrambled to build tools
and partnerships to address the more egregious cases and to shore up the confidence of their consumers
and advertisers. While “fake news” remains poorly
defined and includes some novel efforts to exploit
the new media landscape for political and personal
profit, one subset has long been a principal concern
for public diplomacy practitioners: state-sponsored
disinformation. Throughout much of the Cold War,
for example, Soviet propaganda engaged prolifically
in such efforts in an attempt to undermine Western
principles and sustain support behind the Iron Curtain. The United States and its allies, meanwhile, employed their own tools, programs and platforms—including the Voice of America and other broadcasting
affiliates—to counter such disinformation.
Since the end of the Cold War certain state actors
have continued to invest in traditional broadcasting
platforms while also developing new programs and
techniques to take advantage of the ongoing transformation in the media landscape—particularly the
emergence of social media. These new techniques
include the use of coordinated internet “troll” farms,
employed to aggressively disseminate disinformation
in an effort to sow mistrust and inflame and exploit
societal and political tensions through social media.1
The Voice of America and its sister broadcasting organizations have also adapted to the digital age and
are producing a steady stream of content designed
to inform foreign audiences and correct disinformation. At the same time, the U.S. Department of State
has become the “world’s leading user of eDiplomacy,” directly engaging on social media platforms with
hundreds of accounts managed from Washington or
by U.S. embassies and consulates overseas.2 Today,
Department of State maintains approximately 750
individual Facebook and Twitter (400 Facebook and
350 Twitter) accounts worldwide, and when it experiences peak traffic, the Bureau of International In-

formation Programs’ most popular content is shared
across as many as 400 of these properties. That said,
U.S. public diplomacy efforts have struggled to keep
pace with the torrent of foreign state-sponsored disinformation.
U.S. efforts have been constrained by a number of factors including resource limitations, the proliferation
of self-described digital “news” outlets unconstrained
by fact, and the policy clearance process, but perhaps
the greatest challenge has to do with how individuals
process new information. We would like to believe
that veritas omnia vincit (i.e., truth conquers all) and
that rational people will be persuaded by factual evidence. The reality is that philosophers have long observed, and academic research strongly suggests,
that people are highly susceptible to “confirmation
bias.” In other words they ignore information that
contradicts, and actively seek out information that
confirms, their preexisting beliefs.3 In fact, people
who are presented with contradictory information or
“facts” often become even more dogmatic in defense
of their opinions. Other studies have demonstrated
a “primacy effect” in which people are most likely to
embrace the first piece of information they consume
on a particular subject, particularly when introduced
to negative information.4 This is especially true if that
information is later reinforced with the help of confirmation bias. Another phenomenon known as “source
amnesia,” which prevents people from recalling
correctly exactly where, when or how information
was acquired, compounds the problem.5 As a result,
state-sponsored disinformation amplified through a
multitude of distribution channels and widely shared
by armies of internet “trolls” has been remarkably
effective at influencing public opinion, even when the
stories are easily debunked by U.S.-supported or independent mainstream media sources.
The Bureau for International Information Programs
(IIP)—oneofthethreebureausinthepublicdiplomacy“family”intheU.S.DepartmentofState—haspiloted a new approach designed to address this partic-
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ular challenge and to generally improve U.S. efforts
to engage and inform foreign publics. Executed in the
weeks preceding the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
the initial pilot aimed to identify and counter specific
state-sponsored disinformation that sought to cast
doubt on the legitimacy of the U.S. electoral process
and, subsequently, U.S. support for human rights and
democratic principles abroad. The effort brought
together teams of experts from across IIP including
native foreign language speakers, content creators,
social media experts and data analysts to develop an
in cycle targeted content development approach, illustrated below:

First, team members from the office of analytics
equipped IIP’s in-house language experts with publically available tools to engage in social listening by
examining foreign language social media in a number of priority regions to identify when and where
state-sponsored disinformation about the upcoming
U.S. elections were trending. Once stories surfaced
through the social monitoring tools, the language
and regional experts reviewed the stories for qualitative nuance to identify the broad disinformation targeting the U.S. election process. Identified narratives
included false accusations that the United States
had denied permission for international election
observers to access polling stations. Another trending thread suggested that ballot boxes in the United States were susceptible to fraud and vote tallies
could be easily subject to political manipulation. Each
of these narratives was targeted at foreign publics to
undermine the legitimacy of the U.S. elections and
discredit ongoing U.S. efforts to promote democratic rights and principles abroad. Importantly, these
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were emerging narratives that had not yet achieved
broaddistributionin thesemediamarkets.
Next, IIP’s editorial and video units, as well as
its speaker and interactive offices, worked quickly to
plan content—both by developing new content and
modifying existing articles, videos and interactive
programs designed to address the negative narratives identified earlier. This content did not seek to
“counter” or directly refute disinformation, but instead presented factual and engaging narratives
clarifying the election process without reference
to the disinformation themes. Much of the content
was made available on a specially designed U.S.
elections web page on IIP’s ShareAmerica website.
IIP’s analytics team designed and executed a paid
social media targeted advertising campaign with the
goal of “inoculating” broader audiences in targeted
countries before they consumed reports containing
the disinformation. Finally, IIP evaluated the ongoing campaign and repeated the cycle, as needed, to
identify new disinformation narratives, develop more
content and target new audiences for inoculation.

“We would like to believe
that... truth conquers all
and that rational people
will be persuaded by factualevidence.Thereality
isthatphilosophershave
long observed, and academic research strongly suggests, that people
arehighlysusceptibleto
“confirmation bias.””
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Above: IIP Analytics Tools Depict Spiking Disinformation and Emerging Narratives in November 2016
The results of this pilot program suggest that this
approach has considerable merit and success in
countering state-sponsored disinformation. Specifically, over a 10-day period leading up to the U.S. elections, IIP delivered over 13 million advertisements
to foreign audiences in 20 countries searching for
information about the U.S. electoral process in their
native language. As a result, the IIP election web
page, which included 25 unique pieces of content in
six languages, attracted over 300,000 unique article

views and over 100,000 unique video views. Perhaps
more important than just achieving unique views of
IIP content are the accompanying high engagement
numbers—a strong indicator of interest by the end
user. For example, IIP observed a dramatic spike in
average session length: 5 minutes 25 seconds for
election articles (compared to a normal average 2
minutes 44 seconds) and 1 minute 25 seconds for
election videos (compared to a normal average of 21
seconds).
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Above: Examples of Disinformation and Counter-Narrative IIP Elections Content
Notably, subsequent analysis of a major state-sponsored disinformation outlet found that IIP content
produced to counter false narratives often performed on par or better than the disinformation, as
measured by Facebook’s publically available data on
shares and reach. Specifically, individual IIP election
stories averaged 145 public shares to an estimated potential audience of 5.4 million per story. The
state-sponsored disinformation outlet, on the other
hand, achieved an average of 218 public shares per
story reaching a potential audience of just 2.9 million.
Industry standards suggest that the actual reach of
content is 1–2 percent of potential reach, meaning
ShareAmerica content was likely seen by an organic
audience of 128,000 users, over two times the estimated average size of the organic audience the disinformation was able to reach (58,000+).6

guage homepage, was distributed in the feeds of over
100 individual Department of State properties by social media managers in the field, and generated over
400 unique public feed shares to a potential audience
of over 16 million people. In addition, the paid distribution strategy, in English alone, reached an additional
1.6 million unique Facebook users in key markets vulnerable to disinformation. While these numbers reflect just publically available data from Facebook, and
don’t account for “private” (and offline) shares, it is
encouraging to see the comparatively strong performance of IIP content relative to the disinformation
outlet, particularly considering the potential impact
of other external factors, such as the possibility that
state-sponsored disinformation may be boosted by
fake accounts, or be the benefactor of bot networks
programmed to share its stories.

One reason for the disparity in audience numbers
is that the Department of State has a comparative
advantage in leveraging its network of hundreds of
social media properties. In fact, each IIP story produced to dispel election disinformation was posted,
on average,to 29+ individual newsfeeds of other Department of State social media properties. This has
exponentialimplicationson reach.Forexample,IIP’s
top performing page, the IIP elections English-lan-

These social media metrics suggest that not only
did the analytics team and language experts correctly identify where and when negative narratives
about the U.S. election were trending, but the paid
distribution strategy worked by effectively placing
content relevant to the news cycle in front of target
audiences right when they were most likely to be exposed to disinformation about the elections. Further,
and perhaps most importantly, as demonstrated by
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Above: Unique views of IIP election content peak the week before the 2016 U.S. Election
increased average session length and engagement
metrics, IIP election content resonated with target
audiences and, correspondingly, the reach of IIP’s
positive narratives increased. The spike in engagements, specifically “shares,” are critical to social network algorithms for priority placement in the newsfeeds of others who did not originally engage with
the content—those in “secondary networks.” This not
only can result in increased reach of the content, but
it can also contribute to the perceived credibility of
the content itself, due to the fact that a “share” introduces the content to the target audience’s secondary
network via a newsfeed curated by those who have

already opted-in to see one another’s status updates.
All Indications are that state-sponsored disinformation on social media will remain a serious challenge
to U.S. public diplomacy efforts moving forward.
With metrics suggesting strong performance of this
initial “inoculation” effort, IIP will use this campaign
as a case study to demonstrate the power and effectiveness of integrating data and analytics to drive
content production, precisely target audiences and
quantitatively measure results as we continue to institutionalize these practices throughout the department’s public diplomacy efforts.
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IN DEFENSE OF TRUTH, AND THE
THREAT OF DISINFORMATION
By Jason Stanley, Jacob Urowsky Professor of Philosophy, Yale University
Thereisaninternational,anti-democratic,nationalist
movement buoying authoritarians abroad, threatening to end hopeful democratic moments in Eastern
Europeandelsewhere.Howmuchisduetonewtechnology delivering novel means of propaganda? And
how much of it is the pendulum of history, returning
us to age-old concerns about the stability of liberal
democratic states? In this essay, I place these concerns in historical and philosophicalcontext, to elucidateboth theproblemand the bestresponse.
In section I, I begin with the problem of defining the
topic. What is propaganda? In section II, I trace the
roots of the problem back to the founding texts of
western philosophy. In section III, I give a defense of
truth, and further expand on the risks of disinformation efforts. I conclude with some recommendations
about how public diplomacy can be marshaled to respond to the problem of authoritarian propaganda.

SECTION I: PROPAGANDA DEFINED
One of the problems with the current debate about
“fakenews”and propaganda is the lack ofa cleartheoretical taxonomy. I begin this section by explaining
the difficulty of characterizing the topic of propaganda. Using definitions from my 2015 book How Propaganda Works, I attempt what I hope to be a more useful definition of propaganda. In Section III, I use this
definitiontocharacterizeauthoritarianpropaganda.
It might be thought simple and straightforward to
characterize our topic, but it is useful to look at some
candidate definitions of propaganda to see that it is
morecomplexthanonemayinitiallyrealize.
First attempt to define propaganda: Propaganda is the manipulation of public opinion.
This is a familiar characterization of propaganda
and, yet, it is uninformative. Any attempt to persuade
a public of something involves giving an argument of
some kind. In defining propaganda, we want to know
what the difference is between giving a propagandistic
argument, and giving a non-propagandistic argument.
This definition tells us that propagandistic arguments

are ones that persuade by “manipulation”. But what
is it to persuade by manipulation? Here is a natural
characterization:
Manipulation: Manipulation is the use of
devious methods to get an audience to do
one’sbidding.
What are “devious methods”? One might answer that
devious methods are those that involve propaganda.
In short, our first attempt is thoroughly uninformative. Let’s try again.
Second attempt to define propaganda:
Propaganda is cherry-picking facts.
But what is “cherry-picking facts”? Is “cherry picking
facts” not listing all the facts? But it is impossible to
list all facts. If someone were to try to list all facts, it
would take more seconds than there are in the universe. Any list of all facts would have to, for example,
list the facts about all the molecules presently found
under my left pinky fingernail. Whenever one provides information, one selects some facts to present
and neglects others. This suggests a second definition of “cherry-picking facts.” One cherry-picks facts
when one omits relevant facts. But this is both too
broad and not broad enough. It is too broad, because
it includes cases of propaganda that include just bad
arguments (some people are just wrong about what
isarelevantfact).Andevenifweemendthedefinition
to “intentionally omits relevant facts,” it omits cases
of propaganda that involve false claims, which are of
course not facts at all.
Here is another definition that overcomes some of
these weaknesses:
Third attempt to define propaganda: Propaganda consists of known falsehoods.
However, propaganda can be true. Suppose an anti-Semitic leader gives a talk in front of their parliament, bringing out victims of (for example) predatory
lending practices by bankers who happen to be Jewish. Let’s suppose there are victims of such practices
by bankers who happen to be Jewish, as is plausible—though of course people of Jewish faith are no
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more likely to perpetrate such financial impropriety
than people who are not of Jewish faith. And let’s
suppose the people being presented as victims are
indeed victims of such predatory lending practices. It
is still propaganda to present them as such, since it
suggests that there is some distinctive problem with
the Jewish faith. Propaganda does not need to consist of known falsehoods.
A series of perfectly true assertions can constitute
propaganda. Omission of crucial information is characteristically propagandistic. If I am only told that
the blue tribe killed my grandfather, I might form a
lifelong hatred of members of the blue tribe. But if I
am also given the information that my grandfather
enjoyed murdering children from the blue tribe for
sport, then I will instead develop a more nuanced
view of my personal history.
Just as a series of true statements can be clearly propagandistic, a series of perfectly false assertions can
be clearly non-propagandistic. In teaching physics,
one may spend one semester on Newtonian Mechanics. Newtonian mechanics is false. It is nevertheless a
good theory to teach, since it is approximately enough
true of middle-sized physical objections. The methodology of the natural sciences is governed by the ideal.
It is natural to slip into teaching an ideal model as if it
were reality. The divergences between the ideal model and reality are not important for the science. Still,
if one is teaching an ideal model of physics or chemistry, or even rationality, one is saying false things.
Physics classes are not thereby propaganda.
Nor is deception necessary for propaganda. It is unquestionably true that Hitler was a deeply committed
anti-Semite. Nevertheless, in Mein Kampf, Hitler is very
clear that he is also using anti-Semitism propagandistically.
Is propaganda the use of words to skew debate? It
really is not possible to use any word without “skewing debate” in some way. In his essay, “General Semantics and Propaganda,” published in 1939, S. I.
Hayakawa writes:
“In fact, there is nothing that can be named,
let alone described, without invoking the
wraiths of an entire contextual system.
What is ‘money’? What is a ‘house of correction’? What is a ‘professor’? What is a
‘musician’? … a ‘tom-boy’? … a ‘mortgage’?
… a ‘cat’?”1

Here are some definitions of propaganda from my
own work:2
Political propaganda: An argument that
employs a political ideal in the service of
a goal, seeking to advance or undermine
that ideal by non-rational means.
The most central kind of political propaganda is what
I call undermining propaganda.
Undermining propaganda: An argument
that employs a political ideal to undermine
that very political ideal.
Given my definition, propaganda can be either good
or bad. It is good when it is used to undermine bad
ideals, and bad when it is used to undermine good
ideals. Assuming the ideals of liberal democracy are
good, we can characterize demagoguery as:
Demagoguery: An argument that employs
democratic ideals to undermine democratic ideals.
These are unfamiliar characterizations of propaganda. I have argued that the familiar ones do not help
us characterize the terrain. More persuasively, these
definitions allow us to see that the structure of demagoguery we face today fits straightforwardly into the
model I have outlined. The journalist Peter Pomerantsev characterizes the “political system in miniature”
of Vladislav Surkov, the author of Putin’s propaganda
regime, as “democratic rhetoric and undemocratic
intent.”3
Now that we have defined the terrain, we can begin
with an overview of its history. I will argue that the efficacy of the propaganda of tyranny is not a byproduct of novel technologies. It is rather, historically, the
chief obstacle to the stability of democracies. What
we see in Eastern Europe today, for example, is the
fragility of democracy when confronted with some of
its chief obstacles.

SECTION II: PROPAGANDA, IDEOLOGY
AND DEMOCRACY
Plato and Aristotle both regarded stability as a vital
metric by which to evaluate political systems, though
they differed on their judgments about democracy.
Plato’s Republic is about proper governance of “the
city” and “the soul,” and includes a description of “the
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characteristics of democracy,” such as “the city’s tolerance.” In summary, “it would seem to be a pleasant
constitution, which lacks rulers and not variety and
which distributes a sort of equality to both equals and
unequals alike.”4
A culture whose central value is liberty will lead to
sweeping social equality. In a democratic city, students in the academies challenge their teachers. A
democratic culture equalizes those who are natural-born and immigrant; in such a system “[a] resident alien or a foreign visitor is made equal to a
citizen.” Democracy is inconsistent with enslaving
others. And in a democracy, there is equality between
men and women.5
Socrates recognizes that the flourishing of liberties,
the diversity of practices and customs, and social
equality, may seem attractive. However, he urges us
to attend to its risks. People are not naturally inclined
to self-governance, “always in the habit of setting up
one man as their special champion, nurturing him
and making him great.”6 Democracy also creates a
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The equal participation of all citizens in the formation
of the policies that will be adopted and fairly applied
lends the system its stability. Aristotle also emphasizes democracy’s epistemic virtues, arguing that open
and honest cooperative deliberation about policy between all citizens yields better results, in the form of
wiser policy, further strengthening the stability of the
system. Democracy requires a clean public square.
Plato’s democratic city is based upon a notion of liberty as unconstrained freedom to satisfy one’s desires,
freedom from the limitations of customs and traditions. Aristotle’s conception of democracy, by contrast, allows democratic societies to have communal
values. However, this is possible only if all citizens
freely and equally participate in the decision to adopt
them, decisions that must be continually revisited.
Participating equally in such decisions is, for Aristotle, genuine freedom.
Contemporary liberal democracies differ from these
conceptions of democracy in at least two ways. First,
they incorporate essential insights of Christianity,

“Plato sees in democracy’s ideal of the freedom of speech the cause of its potential
downfall.”
vast amount of resentment, due to the social upheaval required by prizing freedom and the attendant
costs to traditions, customs and hierarchies.
Plato sees in democracy’s ideal of the freedom of
speech the cause of its potential downfall. Pressure
for freedom and equality leads to resentments of fellow citizens, as will the inevitable hypocritical use of
these ideals (e.g., when the ideal of liberty is used to
justify corruption). These resentments can be exploited by outside forces to stoke fear of fellow citizens.
Since tyranny is liberal democracy’s greatest enemy,
the propaganda of tyranny characteristically takes
the form of undermining propaganda, and what is often referred to these days as disinformation.
Aristotle was more sanguine. In Aristotle’s democratic city, all citizens participate in the formation of
the laws by which they are governed, an activity that
for Aristotle was the purest expression of freedom.

such as the concept of human rights. Secondly, they
involve elected representatives to act on behalf of our
best interests, tasked to deliberate with one another
reflectively, openly and truthfully, with willingness to
changing their minds and compromise.
American democracy differs in a significant way
from most other Western democracies, which make
Plato’s concerns particularly relevant. Democracies
throughout the world, in the words of Jeremy Waldron, have the “conviction that a liberal democracy
must take affirmative responsibility for protecting
the atmosphere of mutual respect for its citizens.”
But our Constitution provides the broadest protections for speech in the political arena. India’s first
amendment bans hate speech; our first amendment
protects it. If Plato is right, with the rise of ubiquitous,
mobile connectivity, the global public sphere is at risk
of being overrun with competing resentments from
around the world.
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There is much attention that has been given to the
force of technology; and it is true that we have seen
a new way to target specific voters by ideology by
observing their online habits. But we also face an old
problem in new form. We speak now about how the
internet has unleashed the tide of free expression,
bringing with it supposedly novel dangers. Yet Victor
Klemperer, in his 1957 book The Language of the Third Reich, writes, about the Weimar Republic:
“The Republic, almost suicidally, lifted all
controls on freedom of expression; the
National Socialists used to claim scornfully
that they were only taking advantage of the
rights granted to them by the constitution
when in their books and newspapers they
mercilessly attacked the state and all its institutions and guiding principles using every available weapon of satire and belligerent sermonizing. There were no restraints
whatsoever in the realm of the arts and sciences, aesthetics and philosophy. Nobody
was bound to a particular dogma or ideal
of beauty, everyone was free to choose.
This motley intellectual freedom was celebrated as a tremendous and decisive leap
forward compared with the imperial age.”7
As we have seen, Plato is clear-eyed about the risks
that certain forms of propaganda pose to liberal
democracy; free expression allows for the airing of
views that inflame and divide the public against one
another, leading to tyranny. Nor was this point unknown to democracy’s greatest enemies in the 20th
century. Joseph Goebbels said freedom of expression “will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by
which it was destroyed.”8
The contemporary democratic system of the West is
hardly the first to face challenges posed by its most
cherished values, nor will it be the last. The virtues
of democracy—the ever-expanding circle of liberty,
encompassing women, religious minorities, gays and
other groups—are evident to many. But philosophers
from Plato through Hobbes and Rousseau have argued that its commitment to liberty is likely to render
it less stable than authoritarian systems. Yet, this very
weakness is also its greatest strength.
Aristotle, in the Politics, paves the way for democratic stability, arguing that a genuine commitment to
equality makes society less susceptible to revolution.
Aristotle’s conception of equality is political equality.

Aristotle argues that a society in which each citizen
is fully represented in public debate will not lead to a
breeding ground for anti-democratic resentment. If
Aristotle is right, the greatest advertisement for our
democratic system abroad is a full and open commitment to democratic participation by all of our citizens.
Toadvertise democracy is to advertise a system with
easy access to the ballot box, where public disputes
are aired openly in an atmosphere of transparency.
Hypocritical employment of our values will be seized
uponbyour adversariesasevidencethatdemocratic
valuesareonlyevermasksforinjustice.

SECTION III: IN DEFENSE OF TRUTH
The eminent ethicist Stephen Darwall describes a
well-constituted democratic society as one “in which
people are answerable to one another for their conduct … one that values public inquiry, getting at the
truth behind social appearances and ‘speaking truth
to power’ … When we … respect all equally … we commit ourselves to a mutual accountability that implicitly honors fact over appearance.”9
Truth underlies the democratic ideal of equal respect. Without truth, there is no way to speak truth to
power. Truth underlies dissent. Without truth, there
is no way to dissent by appealing to facts that undermine the authority of a leader. Truth underlies trust.
Without trust, our institutions cannot function; their
authority merely will rest on power. That is not democratic authority.
Democratic and cooperative systems depend on
truth, because truth underlies equal political equality.
Truth and falsity, indeed reality, are the referees in the
public arena. If the public arena is guided by truth,
someone lacking material power can nevertheless
be a political equal, since they can appeal to facts
against those with more material power. Truth is the
essential backbone of a democratic society.
Given the foregoing, what, then, is the shape and form
of disinformation? Characteristically, disinformation
takes the form of the undermining of reality. Examples in include efforts to weaken public confidence in
democratic institutions, or the establishment news
sites using false information to undermine legitimate
news institutions. Media outlets masquerading as
news, like the numerous portals that popped up in
Macedonia in 2016, are perfect examples of this. They
appeal to the ideal of objective truth to undermine
objective truth.
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CONCLUSION
Public diplomacy practitioners have their work cut
out for them, but should also feel reassured in that
the challenges we face today are, to a large extent,
rootedin the deep historyofhumancivilization.Democratic systems, by the very nature of being open
societies, are more vulnerable to foreign efforts to
spreaddisinformation.Moderntechnologiesamplify
this threat, at least at first.
Insofar as public diplomacy aims to support democratic systems of governance abroad, emphasis
must be placed on restoring confidence in the value
of widespread public participation in politics, and
a faith in transparent intuitions to be capable and/
or redeemable in serving the public. In short, public
diplomacy needs to confront the cynicism that is, in

75

part, driven by the modern media ecosystem (the origins of which are detailed in Sam Ford’s essay in this
report).
Encouraging civil, respectful discursive engagement
needs to also be a priority, given the threat of uncivil
discourse presents to democratic systems. Emphasizing this point in exchange program curriculum
should be prioritized, for example. Embassies and international broadcasters can both contribute to this
through their public programing around the world.
Models of democratic debates on important public
policy issues that embody respectful, fact-based back
and forth and consensus building are a good way to
remind foreign citizens, and ourselves, that discursive disagreements need not aggravate social cleavages.
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVES1
By Laura J. Roselle, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Elon University
This essay makes five interrelated arguments about
the efficacy of public diplomacy efforts: (1) public diplomacy cannot be understood without understanding the importance of narratives in social and political relations; (2) public diplomacy involves shared
narratives created with publics abroad; (3) a new
communication ecology undergirds public diplomacy efforts; (4) the “post-truth society” is a narrative
that focuses attention away from public diplomacy;
and (5) multi-method analyses are needed to understand narrative creation, diffusion and effects.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CANNOT BE
UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS.
A narrative is “a sequence of events tied together by
a plot line” and is a social product produced within a
social context.2 Narratives are central to the way human beings think. They are important to people as
conceptual organizing tools that allow individuals to
understand one another within a particular context.
The importance of narratives is recognized by numerous fields including political science, psychology,
anthropology and sociology.
Strategic narratives are defined as “a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the
past, present and future of politics in order to shape
the behavior of other actors.”3
Debates over the environment, energy provision, reform of global institutions, security and power transition can all be understood through the lens of strategic narrative. Each proposal to confront problems
of the international community is driven by underlying narratives that may be strategically deployed by
actors. This is a complex endeavor as the world is
marked by contestation over narratives, but a compelling narrative may become a power resource on
its own.
There are three different types of strategic narratives that we identify:
• International system narratives describe

how international order is structured, who
the players are and how the system works.
For example, a Cold War narrative suggests
a bi-polar international order marked by conflict between two competing powers (and
most often even now these countries are
identified as the United States and the RussianFederation).
• Identity narratives describes the political actor, what values it has and what goals it has.
Narratives about what led to the creation of
NATO, its values and what goals it has today,
would be an example.
• Policy narratives set out why a policy is needed and how it will be implemented. This includes narratives that seek to persuade people to support a particular policy or action.
Usually policy narratives reference, at least
implicitly, identity and system narratives to
set the policy within a context to enhance its
legitimacy.
It is important to recognize that these different types
of strategic narratives can complement or undermine each other. If a policy, for example, does not
seem to be in accord with a state’s identity narratives,
support for that policy may suffer as a result. In addition, actions taken by a state can undermine broader narratives that are meant to support longer-term
goals about constructing a shared understanding of
how the international system should function. For example, a post-Cold War system narrative that might
have incorporated a greater reliance on cooperation
and diplomacy was undermined by U.S. and Russian
military actions in Iraq and Chechnya, respectively.4

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS SHARED
NARRATIVES
A dominant strain of academic literature makes some
crucial points about public diplomacy. First, public diplomacy is designed to “foster mutual trust and productive relationships,” typically for a strategic purpose.5 This implies that the goal of public diplomacy is
the enhancement of soft power. Rather than focusing
on hard power as the ability to coerce or induce another to do something, scholars and politicians often
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say that soft power is the ability to influence others
through the attraction of culture, values, narratives
and policies—which are soft power resources.6 A different way to think about soft power is as the ability
to create consensus around shared meaning. Creating a shared consensus, however, can be much more
difficult than using hard power to force another to do
something, but there is reason to believe that the results can be more lasting. Soft power resources may
set the stage for shared understandings and this en-

timing and audience as political actors (including individuals), non-state actors, NGOs, terrorist cells and
international organizations have access to communication technologies that will reach a vast audience.8
Soft power may be a resource on which leaders can
draw; however, skilled political leadership is still required as soft power is employed in foreign policy and
international relations. As Richard Holbrooke once
commented to Michael Ignatieff, “Diplomacy is not
like chess. . . It’s more like jazz—a constant improvisa-

“Creating a shared consensus, however, can be
much more difficult than using hard power to force
another to do something, but there is reason to believe that the results can be more lasting.”
hances other types of interactions, including opportunities in enterprise and coordination of shared human goals, such as the alleviation of human suffering.
Second, public diplomacy implies listening and creating narratives with foreign publics. This suggests
that the strategy of narrative construction should be
collaborative. Public diplomacy does not imply that a
narrative is constructed in isolation for political reasons to be injected into a foreign population. As acting under secretary for public diplomacy and public
affairs, Ambassador Bruce Warton notes: “Crafting
and effectively putting forth that narrative with foreign publics is the real challenge of public diplomacy
today.”7
How are narratives constructed with foreign publics? That is the crucial question that should guide
thinking on public diplomacy.

A NEW COMMUNICATION ECOLOGY
UNDERGIRDS SOFT POWER POSSIBILITIES
The importance of understanding strategic narratives as being mutually constructed is even more
important in our new communication ecology. New
means of communication and the greater ability of
people around the world to access these new communication technologies shape public diplomacy today. Elites have lost relative power over information,

tion on a theme.” The ability to devise and implement
a coherent strategy rests on the vagaries of events
and the views of others.9 It also rests on collaboration
rather than unilateral, one-way communication.

“POST-TRUTH SOCIETY” AS A STRATEGIC NARRATIVE
Yet, a review of the popular media and some scholarship done on new communication technologies, suggests the idea—the narrative—that we live in a “posttruth society.”10 This narrative, by asserting that there
is no desire for, or focus on, “truth,” actually undermines the ability to construct strategic narratives
based on shared understandings of international
order and policy. The post-truth narrative is, itself,
both strategic and problematic from the perspective
of conducting effective and ethical public diplomacy.
Instead of a post-truth society, it may be more apt to
say that we are living in a world with more narrative
contestation. There are more ways to construct and
share narratives. This does not necessarily mean that
the truth is less important, but this does point to the
need to recognize that public diplomacy will succeed
only when multiple narratives are recognized and understood. This suggests that it is important to understand how different people and groups experience
the world in different ways, and that the acknowledgement of multiple perspectives and narratives
can undergird the legitimacy of public diplomacy. We
should note that there are still facts in the world, and
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lies or falsehoods can and should be challenged, but
multiple perspectives and narratives may be helpful
in understanding an issue or policy.
It may also mean that people in democracies need
to become more skilled in reading power in communication messages. Experience in the Soviet case is
informative. In the Soviet Union people were exposed
to the repetition of media messages controlled by the
government, but we know that the hypodermic model of media effects did not work in this context.11 Soviet citizens learned to “read” the media messages not
as presenting the “truth,” but as presenting the story that the powerful wanted to project. In the Soviet
case, overbearing, controlled messages did not work
in the long run. People learn to read power relations.
That citizens in the West might not be good at this
is interesting, but hardly surprising—and it may be
changing. Evidence from Q-sorts,12 done in issue
areas as diverse as the environment and U.S./U.K.
policies discussions about Syria, show that people
do not swallow narratives whole, but craft their own
narratives from the broadcloth of existing narratives
andfromtheirownlivedexperiences.

MULTI-METHOD ANALYSES ARE NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND SOFT POWER
There are many new ways of monitoring, measuring
and evaluating the impact of strategic narratives in
a new media environment. Examples of quantitative measures include: analyses of reach, time spent
with online content, number of Twitter followers and
retweets and positivity of sentiment. However, these
may not capture the quality of engagement and what
follows from it. Additionally, these may not capture the
patterns of public narratives that do not match elite
narratives. If public diplomacy is to be most effective
in increasing U.S. attractiveness, strategic narratives
must be constructed with an understanding of system, identity and policy narratives within the public
realm. For example, a policy narrative is usually tied
to system and identity narratives that seek to place
the policy within a specific context. Additional qualitative research is needed—including focus groups,
interviews and participant observation. A multifaceted approach is needed to fully understand the use
and effectiveness of public diplomacy.
For example, using Q-sort methodology can show
how policy narratives may differ between elite and
the public. For example, in an analysis of U.S. and
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U.K. narratives about potential policies towards Syria
in 2013–2014, six elite narratives were found in both
cases, but six differently constructed U.K. respondents’ narratives and four differently constructed
U.S. respondents’ narratives were found.13 That is,
there were patterns to respondent narratives but
they did not replicate or match elite narratives. In the
U.K. respondents’ narratives there was agreement in
a number of narratives that the international community has a responsibility to uphold international
law (system), but whether or what action to take was
unclear (policy), and British leadership (identity) was
supported strongly in only one narrative. In the U.K.
case, most respondent narratives opposed intervention saying it might do more harm than good—which
was shared in many of the elite narratives found in
the House of Commons debate—but there was disagreement about what that might mean for the U.K.
and the world more broadly (identity and system narratives).
So, it is important to note that there may be different
narratives even among those who may support a specific policy. In Q-methodology consensus statements
are those that are shared between different narratives. We found no consensus statements among U.K.
respondents’ narratives in the 2013–2014 study. This
confirms the picture of U.K. public attitudes to foreign affairs being particularly ambivalent during this
period of time. In the U.S. case, there was consensus
around six basic statements about foreign affairs
within the four U.S. respondents’ narratives. For example, all four narratives shared disagreement with
the statement that U.S. intervention in Syria would
radicalize American Muslims and bring terrorism
to the streets of the United States. The consensus
statements give a perspective on shared component
parts of what may be different narratives. Looking for
similarities in system and identity narratives among
those who disagree on policy, and looking for differences in system and identity narratives among those
who agree on policy, offer insight into future support
and legitimacy for policy proposals.
In the U.S. case, no respondents’ narrative supported the statement that the United States must act as
leader of the international community, although one
supported the statement that the world is looking to
the United States for action. One narrative strongly
supported the idea that the 2003 Iraq war showed
the difficulty of using military intervention, while all
narratives agree, to varying degrees, that intervention could lead to escalation. There was strong support for humanitarian concerns in one narrative. Two
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narratives in the study agreed that domestic politics
was driving U.S. policy, but these narratives did not
include support for unilateral congressional action
or support for calling President Obama an imperial
president. Knowing something about identity narratives (what the United States is and should be) and
system narratives (the structure of the international
system itself) allows a more refined understanding of
support for specific policies.
It is important to understand how public narratives
change over time. It is also important to recognize
that there are multiple (but not an unlimited number of) public narratives, and that they may or may
not mirror elite narratives. Understanding system
and identity narratives would allow those involved in
public diplomacy to construct policy narratives that

speak to, or at least acknowledge, those underlying
system and identity narratives. The Russian Achilles’
heel is that the Russian system and identity narratives are exclusive, shutting others out by asserting
that those with power should do what they want. U.S.
public diplomacy—conceived as listening and collaborative—avoids that Russian vulnerability.
Overall, public diplomacy should focus on understanding system, identity and policy narratives with
audiences around the world. In addition, audiences
will be more discerning about media messages
when they appreciate the power relations involved
in media messages. Finally, multi-method analyses
are needed that focus on audience narrative construction in a nuanced and subtle way.
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CRAFTING RESILIENT STATE NARRATIVES IN POST
TRUTH ENVIRONMENTS: UKRAINE AND GEORGIA
By Vivian S. Walker, Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College
The rapid evolution of communications paradigms,
as well as vulnerabilities created by unlimited and unfiltered access to information, challenge a state’s ability to craft a credible narrative about its interests and
aspirations in the service of its strategic goals. 1 First,
difficulty in discerning objective fact from subjective
belief in a “post-truth” information environment degrades narrative authenticity.2 Moreover, the erosion
of public trust in state institutions and traditional
media sources further damages a state’s capacity to
make its case in the public sphere.
Russia has taken advantage of this overloaded and
compromised information space to launch punitive
disinformation campaigns against former satellite
states seeking lasting relationships with Euro-Atlantic institutions. Russian information attacks force
these vulnerable emerging democracies to confront
existential questions about national identity, values
and models of governance. To neutralize the toxic
and often destructive effects of Russian propaganda,
targeted countries must project a coherent, consistent account of their unique political, economic and
security assets. This counter narrative must also establish the state as a resilient security and economic
power in the region.
A comparison of Russian disinformation effects in
Georgia and Ukraine offers useful insights into the
challenges associated with the creation of viable
state narratives in a post-truth environment. Russia’s
weaponization of information has recently attracted
a greatdeal of international scrutiny,especially in the
aftermath of Putin’s triumphal annexation of Crimea
and the occupation of two Eastern Ukrainian provinces.3 Less well documented, but equally troubling,
is the ongoing information war being waged in Georgia. Russia’s 2008 invasion, in which it took control
of two Georgian territories, provides a chilling counterpoint to its powerful, and potentially destabilizing,
disinformation campaign to bring Georgia back into
itssphereofinfluence.
Historically Georgia and Ukraine have been at the
mercy of aggressive regional powers and competing
religious and cultural influences. For centuries, both
countries experienced brief periods of sovereignty

interspersed with long stretches of conflict. Russia
and Turkey, for example, have treated Georgia as a
pawn in a series of attempts to assert regional dominance, much as Ukraine has been subject to a series
of invasions and occupations by Poland, the Crimean
Khanate, Hapsburg Austria and Tsarist Russia. Both
countries enjoyed a taste of independence before being swallowed into the Soviet Union in the aftermath
of the Russian revolution.
Following the collapse of the USSR, Georgia and
Ukraine began the slow process of democratic institution building and political integration with Western
institutions. Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, which
resulted in a peaceful transition of power, was heralded as a “new wave of democratization” for the
region.4 Similarly, the 2004 Orange Revolution in
Ukraine upheld and validated the power of the electoral process and civil resistance. But Russia’s 2008
invasion of Georgia and subsequent occupation of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, followed by the 2014 annexation of Crimea, highlighted the fragility of these
gains. Today Georgia, like Ukraine, is a country under
actual Russian occupation. Their sovereignty has
been compromised, and the threat of sustained or
renewed conflict with Russia has limited and simultaneously polarized, their foreign policy options. At the
same time, both countries remain at war in the information space, vulnerable to Russia’s adroit manipulation of facts and ability to exploit audience paranoia
and predilections.

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION EFFECTS:
IDENTITY
Into that space between East and West, between traditional and modern cultures, between illiberal and
liberal political institutions, Russia inserts an insidious and potentially undermining series of messages
about the supremacy of the “Russian World.” These
include a call for a return to the mythologized version of a “Greater Russia;” a reminder of the target
country’s place historical and cultural place in the
Russian world; the promotion of Euro-skepticism
along with an effort to discredit the target country’s
European (EU) and Euro-Atlantic (NATO) aspirations;
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a rant against an aggressive and hostile “West” that
threatens Russian’s regional security and economic
interests; a tendency to blame current conflicts and
global economic threats on selfish Western nations
corrupted by their national interests; and an appeal
to a pan-Slavic orthodoxy as an antidote to corrupt
and overbearing Western values. 5
As part of its anti-Western discourse, Russia’s broad
information warfare campaigns focus on the consolidation and spiritual repatriation of ethnic Russian
minorities, based largely upon the rationalization of a
shared identity. The striking similarities between the
Ukrainian and Georgian experiences of identity driven disinformation campaigns typify post-Soviet state
vulnerability to Russia’s revisionist resurgence. Both
countries are linked to Russia by shared borders and
a long history of political, economic and religious oppression, not to mention occupation. Following the
collapse of the former Soviet Union, Georgia, like

gia, which turns on the question of national identity
and language, illustrates the uniqueness of the Georgian case. The Russian narrative attacks on Ukraine
suggest that to be Russian is vastly better than to be
Ukrainian, to which the Ukrainians respond with defiant, inspirational messaging in support of their national identity.7 When it comes to Georgia, however,
Russia blurs and softens the boundaries of national character—making it difficult to discern what it
means to be Georgian. At the same time the Russian
narrative does not, as a rule, denigrate Georgia’s national identity, unlike its evident display of contempt
for Ukraine’s political, social and economic attributes
and consistent descriptions of its leadership as “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites.”8
The difference in narrative description of national
identity is reinforced by language. In Ukraine, home
to a sizeable ethnic Russian minority, propaganda ef-

“Russia’s subtle appropriation of Georgian and
Ukrainian national identities originates in Soviet efforts to control its minority populations.”
Ukraine, has attempted to repudiate its Soviet legacy
and establish itself as a nation built on constitutional
principles.
Russia’s subtle appropriation of Georgian and
Ukrainian national identities originates in Soviet efforts to control its minority populations. The USSR
devalued the concept of ethnic identity and repressed the spread of ethnically motivated political
nationalism by replacing “national attachments” with
generic (and artificial) values of solidarity and fraternity.6 Removing ethnic singularity from the political
lexicon enabled the Soviets to preempt radicalized
discourse. Today Russia disinformation efforts in
both countries are framed in a set of fuzzy assertions
about a shared historical and religious heritage.
These efforts include glossing over Stalin’sevisceration of the Georgian Orthodox Church or the fraught
history of multiple Russian imperial annexations of
Ukrainian territories. The resultant narratives are
laden with false claims to shared cultural and spiritual ethnicity.
However, an important distinction between the Russian disinformation campaigns in Ukraine and Geor-

forts are almost entirely in Russian and consciously
play up themes of ethnic isolation, cultural devaluation and feelings of disenfranchisement.9 The Russian narrative actively portrays Russian minorities
in Ukraine as victims of government sponsored violence and encourages pro-Russian separatist efforts
to discredit and even destabilize the ruling party.
In Georgia, however, ethnic Russians only make up 1.5
percent of the population, so the target for Russian
propaganda efforts is almost exclusively Georgian.10
In fact, the pro-Russian voice in Georgia is Georgian.11
The Russian narrative does not attempt to appeal to
a disenfranchised Russian minority, nor does it discredit current leadership. Rather it promotes pro
Georgian sentiments—albeit on Russian terms—and
lays the foundation for the claim that to be Georgian
is to be Russian—or at least not European.

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION EFFECTS:
VALUES
The pro-Russian, anti-European narrative in the
countries of the former Soviet Union asserts the
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existence of a shared set of deeply held, historically
based and culturally embedded shared values. Inevitably, the Russian narratives portray the so-called
“morally bankrupt West” in unflattering terms and
play to deep-seated fears and prejudices held by target audiences. The Russian narrative then offers the
solace of a morally superior, pan-Slavic orthodoxy.
The battle for the narrative in these countries plays
out in a dynamic of opposing political, social and cultural norms.
Much of the dominant imagery in the Russian narrative recalls past glories and recasts Russian imperial dominance in the region as examples of benign
stewardship. These narratives also retell Georgian
and Ukrainian history in terms that laud Russian military and political intervention. In reality, Russia has
waged a series of wars in the region, using Georgia
and Ukraine as a staging ground for its exploits and,
in the process, absorbed territory and subjugated
citizens. The Russian version of these events, however, tells a story of benevolent protectionism rather
than territorial occupation.
In addition to retelling history, the Russian narrative in Georgia and Ukraine posits the existence of
a closed community, hermetically sealed within the
boundaries of greater Russia. For Georgia in particular, the EU and the NATO represent a direct threat
sovereignty and territorial integrity: “The EU Commission” will “define [Georgia’s] way of life, economic
issues [and] policies…. This Commission is considered the parallel government of Georgia.”12 Meanwhile, as a consequence of a deepening relationship
with NATO, Georgia will become “a transit territory…
with a NATO camp training international terrorists.”13
Similarly the Russian narrative calls for the reunion
of Russia and Ukraine through the embrace of their
“shared” culture and history.14
The Russian disinformation narrative in Georgia,
as in Ukraine, touts the primacy of the Orthodox
Church, including the propagation of extremely conservative attitudes about gender equality, sexuality
and tolerance. This narrative is particularly powerful
in Georgia, where prominent Georgian political and
religious figures routinely claim that the West is in a
“fight against Orthodox Christianity.” In other words,
the only way that Georgia can be “saved” from a godless West is by “partnering with Orthodox Russia.”15
In championing the morays of the Orthodox church,
the Russian narrative frequently alludes to Europe’s
“legalization” of “homosexuality, pedophilia and a
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perverse mode of life” by the West and claims that as
part of the package of the EU Association Agreement,
Ukrainian and Georgian citizens must embrace these
corrupt values.16 Local, pro-Russian political leaders
reinforce this homophobic narrative, conveying aggression toward and contempt for “LGBT people or
their lifestyle or culture.” 17

RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION EFFECTS:
MODELS OF GOVERNANCE
The Russian narrative derives much of its illiberal,
anti-democratic impetus from its national security
strategy, which describes a series of politically motivated threats to Russian sovereignty:
“The activities of…foreign and international nongovernmental organizations, and financial and economic structures and also
individuals, focused on destroying the unity
and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, destabilizing the domestic political
and social situation—including through inciting ‘color revolutions’—and destroying
Russian religious and moral values.”18
The Rose and Orange Revolutions, which opened
the door to increasing liberal democratic models of
governance, posed an existential threat to Russia. No
wonder that much of the Russian propaganda effort
in Georgia and Ukraine attacks attempts to pursue
further democratic reforms. A commentator on a
pro-Russian Georgian language television station argued, for example, that:
“As long as the U.S. is in the region of the
Caucasus, the dirtiness like the so-called
Revolution of Roses, Orange Revolution
and other troubles are very possible. They
were invented to strengthen [the] American regime.”19
By contrast, Russian propaganda narratives in Georgia and Ukraine assert Putin’s political invincibility,
and the futility of resisting Russia’s might.20 Russian
occupation of their territories reinforces this message.
However, the anti NATO narrative plays out differently
in the two countries. For Ukrainian audiences, Russia
portrays NATO as a purely aggressive entity, bent on
encircling and destroying Russia.21 By contrast, in
Georgia, Russian propaganda draws on fears that
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the West has abandoned the Georgian people. The
fact that Georgia has not been invited to join NATO,
for example, becomes, in Russia’s nihilistic narrative,
proof that the West does not have confidence in Georgia as a security partner. Instead, the Russians argue,
it is better for Georgia to embrace its neutrality as a
“non-Bloc” state.22 Finally, while Ukraine is already in
active conflict with Russia, Georgia’s leadership fears
the resurgence of open hostilities over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and therefore has chosen not to run
the risk of a public embrace of NATO. The subtext of
the Russian narrative in Georgia is simple in its malevolence—Georgia needs Russia to restore its territorial integrity.
The Russian anti-EU narrative in both countries plays
on rural economic vulnerabilities, as well as residual
nostalgia among older citizens who remain nostalgic
for the relative security and stability of life in former
Soviet Union.23 Unlike Ukraine, however, which retains a sizeable industrial base and technology sector, Georgia’s economy is still largely agrarian and
depends primarily on agricultural outputs. Accustomed to generous state subsidies and minimal product standardization under the old regime, Georgia’s
farmers and food processors must now contend with
complicated EU trade export regulations and the reality of open market competition under the EU Free
Trade Zone. By contrast, Russia offers Georgia’s agricultural producers immediate and unrestricted access to its own markets as well as membership in the
less stringent Eurasian Economic Union.24
The Russians also regularly exploit challenges to the
EU integration such as the Dutch failure to ratify the
Ukrainian accession treaty or the long delay in Georgia’s entry into the EU visa liberalization program. The
Russian version of events suggested that the West did
not want to open its doors to Georgia’s “criminal elements,” arguing that Berlin blocked a first-round decision to grant Georgian visa liberalization because it
“feared a spike of crimes committed by Georgians
in Germany.”25 Even after the implementation of the
visa regime, it was all too easy to characterize as yet
another instance in which Europe failed to behave expeditiously as Georgia’s advocate and partner.

BUILDING A COUNTER-NARRATIVE
Construction of a viable counter-narrative for Georgia and Ukraine in the post-truth environment begins
with a clear, consistent and unified articulation of
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strategic priorities. Narrative resilience also requires
coordination across government on messaging content and dissemination, both internal and external.
When appropriate, messaging should be synchronized with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
and media sectors, at home and abroad. More indigenous programming content should be developed to
project a truly national identity and shared values.
Existing legislation governing media and NGO licensing, ownership and financing must be improved and
implemented for greater political transparency.
Next, the Ukrainian and Georgian governments
must deepen their understanding of target audiences needs and interests in order to develop effective
message content. Visually compelling and easily understandable representations of strategic interests
and potential must appeal to external and internal
audiences, as well as local and international opinion makers and journalists. Finally, the government,
in cooperation with public and private sector institutions, must build a regional and ultimately global
network of journalists and news organizations that
can support efforts to professionalize official media
output and expand outreach efforts. Such networks
would also facilitate the systematic investigation and
exposure of the Russian state’s “weaponization” of information.
These steps can diminish Russia’s narrative dominance in Georgia and Ukraine. But the emergence
of a truly viable counter-narrative requires that both
countriesofferrealisticassessmentsofthecostsand
risks associated with Euro-Atlantic integration. Unmet promises about NATO membership are easily exploited, as are the stringencies of EU market access
and production requirements.
For Georgia, the development of a consistent counter-narrative is further challenged by an apparent
ambivalence within current leadership about the relationship with Russia and the West on all fronts—political, economic and military.26 This, in turn “create[s]
a feeling of ambiguity in society and contribute[s] to
Euro-skepticism.”27 Finally, the absence of official discourse about linkages to liberal, pro-Western agenda
creates a narrative void, allowing Russia to depict itself as Georgia’s only viable ally and champion.
At the same time, the Ukrainian narrative, in particular,should focus on the representation of its potential
as a regional economic and security partner, rather
than a recap of its past victimization. The current focus on the present crisis leaves no room for the pro-
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jection of a better future. Moreover, if left unchecked,
Ukraine’s healthy defiance of Russian aggression can
easily morph into the projection of a form of ultra-nationalism not in keeping with its image as a tolerant,
pluralistic nation.
Before either country can arrive at a viable articulation of strategic intent, they have some difficult
questions to answer. First, they must decide on their
respective identities in the post-cold war political system. Can Ukraine transition from a largely defensive
account of its grievances to a positive projection of
its regional potential? Will Georgia continue to be a
beleaguered satellite of an imperious Russia or join
the ranks of nations vying to exert power in a complex media environment?
Then, both countries must live up to the values espoused in their strategic narratives. Can Ukraine’s
government make good on the civic momentum of
the EuroMaidan? Will Georgia’s post-independence
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intent to become a liberal “beacon of democracy”28
be compromised by its domestic political, economic
and security vulnerabilities? Finally, both countries
must commit to a system of democratic governance
consistent with stated values. But can they embrace
“civic nationalism” and tolerance as long as the impetus for illiberal “blood patriotism”—e.g. the annexation of their sovereign territories—remains?29
Ultimately, the sustainability of the Georgian and
Ukrainian narratives in the global information space
depends on the will and capacity to shift from a
threat-driven reactive discourse to an opportuni- tybased narrative that frames potential security and
economic benefits in terms that resonate with target
audiences. At all costs their narratives must avoid the
tyranny of the stark rhetorical choice between “furious Russia” and the “disgraceful West.”30 Effective
persuasion lies in nuance, and the ability to communicate the character and resilience of their national
identities, values and models of governance.
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AMERICA’S STRATEGIC NARRATIVE AND
A PATH FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
By Markos Kounalakis, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
The underlying strategic narrative driving American
foreign policy priorities for the past 70-plus years,
utilized time and again to encourage acceptance of
Western values, is increasingly at risk. To be clear,
this is not the result of one administration’s policy preferences over another’s. Rather, consensus
around certain values and goals—good democratic
governance as a fundamental human right, the need
to care for communities in crisis, a desire for equal
rights for all, for example—is increasingly contested.
This contestation isn’t because people have turned
their backs on one another, are increasingly narcissistic, or mean spirited. Rather, it is because the systems that this narrative support and normalize have
failed to serve a large number of communities, both
here in the United States and abroad. As crucial as
new technology is to getting the right message out
to the right audience, even the sleekest public diplomacy campaign may be for naught unless we rebuild
a domestic consensus regarding what we stand for
as a nation and articulate how these values translate
into foreign policy goals and priorities.
A Greek friend, Yannis, always used to say that when
he was younger, in the 1960s and 1970s, he was always proud to see the Greek flag be the first to enter
an Olympic stadium and, naturally, always rooted for
his countrymen to win in competition. But he always
had a second favorite nation: The United States. He
felt it was patriotic and right to root for America to
win over the dictators and demagogues who sat in
the special seats reserved for the corrupt leaders of
other nations. Greece first, America second was how
he saw the world. And he was not alone.
Times have changed. Yannis no longer has a second
pick in these international competitions. He has not
switched to rooting for Russia or Germany, but he no
longer feels that emotional tug and viscerally driven,
positive orientation towards America. Once again, he
is not alone. In the quest for an “America first” policy,
“America” may not last in the world’s popular imagination.
Traveling abroad, I’ve heard similar comments along
the lines of, “The United States used to be better.”
There was a time when regardless of American foibles—self-serving government interventions or, even,

assassination plots—citizens in developed and developing nations looked to the United States as a land
of equality, political freedom and economic promise.
They were willing, if not eager, to forgive American
mistakes as temporary deviations from what was
otherwise a noble and promising vision of the world.
This instinct to forgive speaks precisely to the power
of a strategic narrative and its centrality for effective
public diplomacy.
There is a prevalence of stories that have created a
widespread domestic and international perception
of an America that has finally come to terms with its
own seemingly latent issues of corruption, conspiracy and cynicism. Schadenfreude mixed with a confirmatory bias towards anti-Americanism, however, is
a growing narrative as images, news stories and social media amplify and focus on America’s perceived
slights toward foreign leaders, policy failures and divisiveness and hatred here at home.
Put simply, the world can no longer buy the mystique,
invest in the national brand and look to America as
the beacon of freedom and defender of human rights
if, as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once
told me, “we no longer believe that story ourselves.”

A RETURN TO BIG, BAD AMERICA
Many have tried to attribute the three Cs of corruption, conspiracy and cynicism to the American political and economic systems. Generally they have met
with little success, in part because of our self-correcting and responsive political, economic and legal
systems. Yet, the arrival of digital media platforms
and a more sophisticated adversarial class utilizing
bots and other digital tools may finally be muddying
America’s messages with three Cs-themed criticisms, sometimes (but not necessarily) grounded in
a modicum of fact.
While a return to big, bad America is a contemporary aberration, it is not an historic exception. Recall
the Reagan-era Kirkpatrick doctrine proposing a
moderate approach towards friendly authoritarian
states and a more confrontational posture contra
totalitarian communist regimes. The same friend-foe
calculus—sometimes described as a transactional
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“Even the sleekest public diplomacy campaign may be for naught unless we rebuild
a domestic consensus regarding what we
standforasanationandarticulatehowthese
values translate into foreign policy goals and
priorities.”
approach—is being used today as the current administration assesses its policies toward and the domestic stability of much of the Middle East. The recent
praise of Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was
a calculated articulation of support for an authoritarian regime that could be considered endangered
by liberalization, with a concern that a rapid, uncontrolled liberalization could again bring about a radical, illiberal regime such as the Muslim Brotherhood
government voted into power post-Mubarak. Similar
levels of support have been expressed by the American leadership for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan after the recent referendum granting him
greater authority and power.
This transactional approach, seemingly distant from
a values-based approach that undergirded U.S. foreign policy for so long, requires those who are delivering public diplomacy goods and services to pivot
is some significant ways. To start, public diplomacy
needs to become more top-down, focusing on systemically aligning efforts with American national
security priorities, while syncing with local, shared,
policy goals.
This approach may also mean less focus on national
popular will and more on political elites, both democratically elected and not, capable of leading public
opinion toward consensual national alignment and
support for American national security and economic interests.
In such an environment, civil society oppositional
forces in foreign nations do not and, in the short run,
may continue not to receive top-level access, support
or recognition by U.S. government leaders. For ex-

ample, in clear contrast to previous administrations,
a recent visit to Moscow by Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson did not include meetings with civil society
or opposition leaders. Establishing this top-down
approach in the early stages of a government may
be necessary to reinforce both respect for national
sovereignty and the building of trustworthy relations
between senior governmental officials.
It is understandable that an administration and officials with minimal prior interactions at a government-to-government level would seek such closeddoor and top-level interactions, eschewing pressures
to test another nation’s tolerance or question its domestic approach or agenda. While understandable,
this approach is also likely not sustainable. Domestic pressure from an American press and populace
will demand interactions with opposition forces, civil
society actors, minority groups and the cultural and
educational institutions that make up the complex
fabric of any society. This pressure, coupled with the
long-term national interests of the United States,
should expand the otherwise natural inclination to
work more insularly and transactionally toward limited goals and tight agendas.
But even a short-term transactional approach will
require engagement with individuals and institutions
currently out of power or out of favor with governing
regimes and ruling political elites. Public diplomacy
must continue to build civil society actors and leaders, as they are likely to become the next generation
of political leaders. Basic business logic and investment strategies familiar to many within the administration require the hedging of bets, spreading of risk
and investment in the future of any foreign govern-
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ment or administration. Shifts in political fortune and
favor can be fickle and a strategy that makes medium- and long-term plays is a secure public diplomacy
strategy.
Public diplomacy emphases of the recent past have
now changed and, either contemporarily or consequently, the message of liberal democracy has lost its
shine, credibility and purchase. Given the espousal of
a more transactional, efficient, business-centric, investment-dominant and sovereignty-accepting political leadership in Washington, a more effective public
diplomacy approach will need to be dramatically different in order to be effective.
Ifa Cold War public diplomacy model is helpful in communicating an approach to those formulating and
implementing policy, then there is a cognate in the
contemporary framework. The dominant Cold War
adversary, however, is no longer a Moscow-based regime promoting a flavor of global communist ideology. The adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union
has, in part, been supplanted by Beijing and Tehran
(at the “peer-competitor” or “rising” state level) and
“radical Islamic terrorism” (at the ideological level).
As the Soviet successor state, Russia continues to
challenge and threaten American interests—in particular Russia’s still unfolding, yet the clearly formidable, information operations that are being investigated and assessed. But in the early days of the new
administration, China and Iran were assigned greater adversarial value.
Given the relative power of these states and their
ability to operate outside of a transactional framework, proxy conflicts may be primarily conducted between the United States and China, with the potential
for some alliance participation, and against Iran via
a combination of military, economic and propaganda
means aimed at containing and degrading the capacities of those states and their leadership structures.
Recent April 2017 recalibrations regarding Russo-American relations may change some of the public diplomacy formulations, but to date the campaign
and administration policy pronouncements and early
administration actions dominate this analysis.
Moving towards an updated Cold War II public diplomacy framework and a rekindled reliance on a modernized Kirkpatrick doctrine will mean that America
respects a strong sovereignty approach towards
friends and allies—regardless of their regime-type—
and abstain from assertive policies and support for a
civil society that can lead to dissatisfaction with gov-
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erning elites or regime change. In such a framework,
however, adversarial regimes are subject to the full
spectrum of American power and public diplomacy,
from informational and educational programs to civil
society infrastructural development for regime oppositional forces. Access to the populations of these
adversarial regimes is the dominant constraint, of
course, but these populations should be a primary
American public diplomacy target. Regions, nations
and regimes that are either neutral in their relations
with the United States or are contested by regimes
that are U.S. adversaries could also be a public diplomacy priority. Access to the potential audiences of
these contested places could face fewer constraints
and their leaderships could be more open to straight
transactional engagement, depending on whether
the contested state is leaning towards the United
States or towards an adversary. The following table
represents this renewed public diplomacy approach
in a resource constrained environment:

IRAN & ISIS
ISIS is under significant military attack and Iran is
under increasing political and military pressure, giving support to domestic oppositional forces in both
ISIS-held territory and within Iran. Public diplomacy
activities should find greater receptivity in such an
environment.
In seeking a public diplomacy means for undermining the ideological basis for supporting the current
Iranian or ISIS structures, an emphasis on “Islamic
Reformation” should factor in heavily. Two practical target groups for this approach are women and
youth, though they are by no means the only potential
targets.
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Focusing on female empowerment as the primary
public diplomacy goal within the Islamic-influenced
world will allow the United States to maintain a moral component for American power and its liberation
narrative.
The demographic dominance of youth—and youth
unemployment—in this region also offers a unique
opportunity to focus public diplomacy efforts on inculcating a dissatisfied demographic component
with the tools and education to organize and confront the inherent contradictions of these societies,
such as religious elite privilege, regime elite power,
social conformist demands, structural unemployment realities, etc. Here, again, Cold War methods
and practices are instructive in helping to introduce
and reinforce messages and methods for organization and opposition to regional regimes.

CHINA
China’s current “Three Warfare” approach (using
psychological, legal and media warfare) to policy
priorities will be less effective in a U.S.-enforced,
less permissive, global trade, maritime, military and
political environment. In a more constrained, Ameri-

an assertive public diplomacy approach with a more
“one-size fits all” model.
Given the previously outlined confrontational American posture and constrained environment where anti-communist regime dissent will feel support, it will
be in the U.S. interest to reinforce the more liberal
factions of opposition and to seek support for a diffuse anti-Peoples Republic of China nationalist leadership base as well as expanded centers of regime
opposition. Taiwan is a natural ally in this approach.
Still vibrant forces—individuals and organizations in
Hong Kong, in particular—should be targets of Cold
War-style public diplomacy efforts. American diaspora, visiting scholars and students, business interests
with foreign investment in China, and other intersectional individuals and institutions should be cultivated
and the targets of a public diplomacy program that
can have impact.
In terms of proxy practices favored during the Cold
War, China has made significant inroads into both
the African continent and in Latin America, using
a successful combination of infrastructural investment and regime support. Chinese public diplomacy
efforts have promoted Chinese interests and used
an “anti-colonial” narrative to undermine Western

“Public diplomacy has an opportunity to influence a different international influencer
class—the business, political, military and
social elite.”
can-led, global environment, Chinese access to global markets could become less open, free movement
of shipping will encounter friction, and a state of “humiliation” could be perceived by any forced standing
down of Chinese military (e.g. naval) and hybrid forces (e.g., off the North Korean coast).
China poses a greater challenge in terms of population, geographic size and public diplomacy penetration. But there is a Cold War corollary here, too,
including some natural advantages that did not exist
during the Cold War. The most obvious one is that
greater linguistic homogeneity allow for scalability of

efforts in the recent past and into the current moment. A constant and credible propounding of the
failure of the “Washington Consensus” model of development—in particular in light of the 2008 global
recession—has particular resonance. The promotion
of the “Beijing Consensus” (sometimes sold in combination with the “Singapore Model”) and the promise
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), at
a time when American aid and diplomatic resources
are retrenching, could be a winning combination.
Despite these inroads, there are some fairly straightforward ways to mitigate China’s public diplomacy
gains. Countering the Chinese narrative should be
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a public diplomacy goal. Dissatisfaction with the
Chinese practice of demanding Chinese workforce
deployment that accompanies Beijing-funded infrastructure projects (e.g., Ethiopia’s recently built railroad system) and requires the on-going employment
of Chinese nationals is already causing local conflict.
Chinese finance terms for development is another source of irritation to host nations. Kickback
schemes, regime-level corruption, media takeover
and dominance, cultural imposition, societal elite
fealty, and other characteristics of Chinese conditionality are ripe targets for a public diplomacy campaign to countering the current dominant Chinese
relationships and accommodations. Cold War public
diplomacy practices, again, are directly applicable,
though demanding of localization in different parts of
the African continent and in Latin America.
Outside of the Islamic and Chinese front, public diplomacy and diplomatic efforts in general, should be
more concentrated in areas that are contiguous to
those regions and that fall into what would be considered a traditional geographic sphere of influence or
ideological affinity zone. Other nations with natural
or traditionally allied relations with the U.S. fall from
any priority targeting and can be the recipients of
whatever legacy public diplomacy programs exists to
exchange cultural, educational and professional personnel. Diplomatic relations should be maintained
as close to status quo as is possible, all the while anticipating unplanned and occasional unpredictable
social media attacks or policy pronouncements that
could be counterproductive. Early indications are
that there will be an active attempt on the part of administration cabinet members both to limit any potential damage, reinforce a policy continuity where it
is aligned with previous administration foreign policy
positions, and actively seek to privately reassure foreign leaders and nations of the otherwise consistent
application of policy and favor.
In this environment, public diplomacy has an opportunity to influence a different international influencer
class—the business, political, military and social elite.
Below are a few ideas:
1. One productive way to do public diplomacy when policy priorities are unclear—or
locally unpopular—is to go back to reliable
projects and programs, such as emphasizing sporting competitions and events.
American prowess in athletics, whether

the NBA or amateur athletics and Olympic
sports, is the primary and popular way to
achieve a level of cross-cultural penetration. Sports are a favored means to popular interest. An emphasis on American
sports, training facilities, exceptional athletes and historical events can all build a
positive image of a disciplined, admired
and dominant America. The NBA is a global
brand and marketing machine with a diverse and global group of athletes playing
in a uniquely American context.
2. Targeting authoritarian states that had
fallen into disfavor during previous administrations as a result of an emphasis on
democratic transition and transparency.
This is a moment during which countries
where public diplomacy efforts have been
unwelcome, rebuffed or countered in the
past are now welcome. Hungary, Poland
and the Philippines are only a few countries that come to mind. Some authoritarian countries that have been courted
heavily by China in the last decade are now
potentially in play. In the Middle East, a
strongman posture that favors an elite and
emphasizes America’s own, new—if partly
romanticized—strongman leadership and
projected, tough-guy posture has an opportunity for penetration. When considering public performance or appearance, a
newer, more visible and heavier reliance
on diplomatic security with military presence to emphasize strength and permanence is favored to reinforce the big, bad
nature of America. Think Death Star over
Rebelforces.
3. Framing public diplomacy will be as important as implementation of public diplomacy
programming, especially as we move away
from the “soft power” formulation. One
potential frame: The ideal state for a more
transactional public diplomacy environment would be one that moves away from
the “soft power versus hard power” construct and its inaccurate implications that
“soft” is “weak” and instead move toward a
public diplomacy deployment of “full spectrum power,” where strong military, business, educational institutions and cultural
products are forward leaning, leading and
unrelentingly winning globally. Assuring
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and exhibiting that these institutions are
the best globally would be consonant with
the administration’s approach to policy and
power projection. “Making America great
again” includes—in fact, requires—“making American public diplomacy great again.

Overall, the shift is for America to be feared and respected and away from an emphasis on openness
andattraction.
Achieving some of these program shifts in public
diplomacy will be difficult given the traditions and
culture of the majority of the American electorate
and State Department training and practice to date.
Some will be easier to achieve, such as the athletic
and sporting component. Others will be more challenging, such as adjusting public diplomacy messaging and practice to accommodate authoritarian leaders, their sycophants and supporters.
In certain instances, public diplomacy professionals may feel estranged from the new foreign elite
that will be their audience and customer. A tighter

relationship with the defense attaché and with the
commercial section will be required at post to make
sure that public diplomacy is greatly aligned with U.S.
commercial and business interests, as well as national security priorities.
This is a comfort zone for autocratic regimes and the
transactional nature of the relationship is more defined, reliable and predictable for leadership in these
countries. Instead of playing towards a dissident
elite, the target audience for the near future will be
the ruling elite. The competition will be Chinese public diplomacy, in many cases, but may include a Russia
both trained and successful at adversarial public diplomacy practice.
Finally, as this policy re-orientation may be temporary, it is important not to burn all bridges. Maintaining relations with the non-ruling class will be helpful
in the future. But taking advantage of the current moment and in places where American public diplomacy has either been shut out or unwelcome in the past,
will allow for this administration’s policy priorities to
find a more receptive audience.
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